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2022 Supreme(Del) 1655

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Rajiv Shakdher, Jasmeet Singh, JJ.
Ashutosh Gautam - Appellant
Versus
Icar & Ors. - Respondents
Civil Writ Petition No. 3493 of 2022, Civil Miscellaneous No.10308 of 2022
Decided On : 28-02-2022

Advocates appeared:
M. K. Bhardwaj, Advocate, S. K. Gupta, Advocate

The main legal point established in the judgment is the requirement to address the petitioner's claim regarding the disciplinary authority and the possibility of victimization, and the court's authority to set aside the impugned order and remit the matter for a fresh hearing.

Headnote:

Limitation - Disciplinary Authority - Administrative Tribunal Act 1985 - Section 21 - [LIMITATION] - [Disciplinary Authority] - [Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunal Act 1985] - The court discussed the limitation prescribed for filing O.a. before the Tribunal and the requirement to seek condonation of delay. It referenced several cases including S.S. Rathore v. State of M.P. and Union of India & Ors. v. M.K. Sarkar to establish the legal framework for addressing delay in approaching the Tribunal. The court set aside the impugned order and remitted the matter to the Tribunal for a fresh hearing.

Fact of the Case:

The petitioner challenged the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal dismissing the O.a. on the ground of limitation. The petitioner contended that the disciplinary authority for the petitioner should have been the Director, IaRI, and raised allegations of victimization.

Finding of the Court:

The court found that the Tribunal failed to render a decision on the tenability of the petitioner's claim regarding the disciplinary authority. It also noted that the matter of victimization could be examined when the Tribunal re-examines the case.

Issues: The issues included the dismissal of the O.a. on the ground of limitation, the appointment of the disciplinary authority, and allegations of victimization.

Ratio Decidendi: The court's decision was based on the failure of the Tribunal to address the petitioner's claim regarding the disciplinary authority and the possibility of victimization. It set aside the impugned order and remitted the matter to the Tribunal for a fresh hearing.

Final Decision: The writ petition was disposed of by setting aside the impugned order and remitting the matter to the Tribunal for a fresh hearing.

JUDGMENT

Rajiv Shakdher, J. - Issue notice.

1.1. Mr S. K. Gupta accepts notice on behalf of the respondents.

2. With the consent of the counsel for the parties, the writ petition is taken up for hearing and final disposal, at this stage itself, based on the record presently available with the Court.

3. This writ petition is directed against the order dated 27.01.2022, passed by the Central administrative Tribunal [in short, the 'Tribunal'] in O.a. No.179/2022.

3.1. Mr M. K. Bhardwaj, who appears on behalf of the petitioner, says that the petitioner is aggrieved by the fact that the Tribunal has dismissed the aforesaid O.a. via the impugned order, simply, on the ground of limitation. 3.2 according to Mr Bhardwaj, apart from anything else, there was a challenge in the O.a. to the order dated 12.07.2021 passed by respondent no.4 i.e., Chief Vigilance Officer, Indian Council of agricultural Research [in short, 'ICaR'], whereby the appointing authority for the post of assistant Legal advisor [in short 'aLa'] i.e., Secretary, ICaR was appointed as the disciplinary authority qua the petitioner.

3.3 Mr Bhardwaj says that the petitioner was transferred from ICaR Headquarters to the Indian agricultural Research Institute [in short, 'IaRI'], pursuant to order dated 03.05.2017. Mr Bhardwaj states that the petitioner continues to work with IaRI.

3.4. Therefore, it is Mr Bhardwaj's contention that the disciplinary authority qua the petitioner could only be the Director, IaRI. In support of this plea, the petitioner, inter alia, has placed reliance on the communication dated 07.06.2019, addressed by the then Under Secretary (Vigilance), ICaR to the Director, IaRI, as also the Office Memorandum dated 16.04.1969, issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Home affairs; to which a reference has been made in the said communication.

3.5. This aspect of the matter has, concededly, not been decided by the Tribunal.

4. The operative directions issued in the impugned order dated 27.01.2022 are extracted hereafter:

    '8. We find that applicant is challenging the memorandum dated 15.12.2016 and 05.01.2017 without giving any explanation as to the delay in approaching the Tribunal. No Ma seeking condonation of delay has been filed either. It is well settled that an applicant has to explain each day's delay in approaching the Tribunal.

    xxx xxx xxx

    10. From the perusal of the aforesaid section, it is abundantly clear that limitation prescribed for filing O.a. before this Tribunal is one year from the date of accrual of the cause of action. The same can be extended by another six months from the date of filing of appeal, if the same is not decided. It has further been stated that if the application is not filed within time as stipulated in Section 21 of the a.T. act, then the applicant has to move a Misc. application for seeking condonation of delay by explaining the delay of each day in not filing the Original application within the limitation. Section 21 of the administrative Tribunal act 1985 came up for consideration before the Hon'ble apex Court in a catena of cases including the following cases:-

    (a) S.S. Rathore v. State of M.P. (aIR 1990 SC 10);

    (b) administrator of Union Territory of Daman and Diu and others Vs. R.D. Valand - 1995 Supp(4) SC.C. 593;

    (c) State of Karnataka & Ors. Vs. S.M.Kotrayya & Ors. 1996 (6) S.L.R. S.C. Page 664);

    (d) P.K.Ramachandran versus State of Kerala & another (J.T. 1997(8) S.C. 189);

    (e) Karnataka Power Corporation Limited through its CMD & another vs. K.Thangappan & another (2006(4) S.C.C. 322);

    (f) U.P.Jal Nigam vs. Jaswant Singh & Ors. (2007(1) S.C.T. 225;

    (g) C. Jacob vs. Director Geology & Mining (2008 (10) S.C.C. 115) ;

    (h) Union of India & Ors. v. M.K. Sarkar reported in (2010)2 Supreme Court Cases 59; and

    (i) Union of India & Ors. Versus a.Duairaj (J.T. 2011 (3) S.C. Page 254).'

    xxx xxx xxx

    12. We also find that the applicant has made personal allegations against respondents No.3 to 5 but he has not been able to substantiate

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