IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Rekha Palli, J.
Essential Interiors Designs Pvt. Ltd. – Appellant
Versus
Globe International Inc. – Respondent
Arb.P. 306 of 2023 & I.A. 12258 of 2023 -Delay 44 days in filing Reply by Res.
Decided On : 12-07-2023
Arbitration - Territorial Jurisdiction - Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Section 11(6) - [Arbitration] - [Territorial Jurisdiction] - [Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996] - The court discussed the arbitration clause, the decisions in Brahmani River Pellets Ltd. v. Kamachi Industries Ltd. and Ravi Ranjan Developers (P.) Ltd. v. Aditya Kumar Chatterjee, and concluded that the venue of arbitration does not confer exclusive jurisdiction on the courts at that venue. The court held that the cause of action and the parties' business locations determine territorial jurisdiction.
Fact of the Case:
The petition sought the appointment of an Arbitrator for disputes arising from a work order. The respondent opposed the petition based on territorial jurisdiction, arguing that the agreed venue of arbitration was Gurugram, Haryana.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the entire cause of action had arisen in Delhi, where both parties were carrying out business, and the seat of arbitration was not predetermined. The court held that the decision in Ravi Ranjan Developers Pvt. Ltd. (supra) was applicable, and appointed an arbitrator for adjudication of disputes.
Issues: The main issue was the territorial jurisdiction of the court to entertain the petition under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, based on the agreed venue of arbitration.
Ratio Decidendi: The court relied on the decisions in Ravi Ranjan Developers Pvt. Ltd. (supra) and Brahmani River Pellets Ltd. v. Kamachi Industries Ltd. to determine that the venue of arbitration does not confer exclusive jurisdiction on the courts at that venue. The cause of action and the parties' business locations are crucial in determining territorial jurisdiction.
Final Decision: The petition was allowed, and an arbitrator was appointed for adjudication of disputes. The arbitration proceedings would be conducted under the aegis of the Delhi International Arbitration Centre (DIAC).
JUDGMENT
Rekha Palli, J. (Oral)
1. The present petition under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred as "The Act") seeks appointment of an Arbitrator for adjudication of disputes between the parties, which have arisen out of the work order dated 12.10.2021 issued by the petitioner.
2. At the outset itself, it may be noted that while the respondent does not deny that the disputes between the parties were required to be adjudicated through arbitration, the petition is opposed only on the ground of territorial jurisdiction. It is the respondent's plea that the parties having agreed that the venue of arbitration would be at Gurugram, Haryana, this Court would not have the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the present petition under Section 11(6) of the Act.
3. By placing reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Brahmani River Pellets Ltd. v. Kamachi Industries Ltd., (2020)5 SCC 462, learned counsel for the respondent submits that the parties having agreed to confer exclusive jurisdiction on the Courts at Gurugram, the present petition would not be maintainable. He contends that in Brahmani River Pellets Limited Ltd. (supra), the Apex Court has dealt with a similar situation where the Madras High Court had erroneously exercised jurisdiction under Section 11(6) of the Act to appoint an arbitrator despite the parties having agreed that the venue of arbitration would be Bhubaneswar, Odisha. This decision of the Madras High Court was set aside by the Apex Court by holding that once the parties had agreed for the venue of the arbitration as Bhubaneswar, the intention of the parties was to exclude the jurisdiction of all other Courts. It was held that by agreeing that the venue of arbitration would be Bhubaneswar, the parties had implicitly agreed for the exclusive jurisdiction of the Courts at Bhubaneswar. He therefore contends that in the present case as well, the parties having agreed that all the sittings of the Arbitral Tribunal would be at Gurugram, Haryana, their intention was to exclude the jurisdiction of all other Courts. He therefore prays that the present petition be dismissed.
4. In response, learned counsel for the petitioner, seeks to place reliance on a subsequent decision of the Apex Court in Ravi Ranjan Developers (P.) Ltd. v. Aditya Kumar Chatterjee, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 568, where even though the parties had agreed that the sittings of the Arbitral Tribunal would be at Kolkata, neither the cause of action had arisen in Kolkata nor were the parties residing/carrying out business in Kolkata. In the said case, not only were the parties residing/carrying out business in Bihar but even the cause of action had arisen only in Bihar. However, by relying on the agreement between the parties designating Kolkata as the venue for arbitration, a petition under Section 11 was filed by one of the parties before the Calcutta High Court, which proceeded to appoint an arbitrator. This order of the Calcutta High Court was set aside by the Apex Court by holding that once the entire cause of action had arisen in Bihar, the mere factum of the parties agreeing that the venue of arbitration would be Kolkata, would not clothe the Calcutta High Court with the jurisdiction to entertain a petition under Section 11(6) of the Act. He, therefore, contends that in the present case as well, once it is an admitted position that not only are the registered offices of both the parties situated at Delhi but even the site where the work was carried out under the contract was in Delhi, it is only this Court which would have the requisite territorial jurisdiction to entertain the present petition. Furthermore, even the invoices issued by the respondent were addressed to the petitioner's Delhi office and therefore no cause of action whatsoever had arisen at Gurugram. He therefore prays that the present petition be allowed.
5. Having considered the submissions of the parties, I may begin by first noting th
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