IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Suresh Kumar Kait, Neena Bansal Krishna, JJ.
Union of India - Appellant
Versus
M/s Pragati Construction Consultant - Respondent
FAO(OS) (COMM) 129 of 2023, CM APPL. Nos. 33304 of 2023, 33306 of 2023 & 33307 of 2023
Decided On : 14-09-2023
Commercial Courts Act - Arbitration - Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, Commercial Division and Commercial Appellate Division of High Courts Act, 2015 read with Section 37(1)(B) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Section 34
Fact of the Case:
Disputes arose between the parties regarding a construction contract. The respondent invoked the arbitration clause, and the impugned Award was passed. The appellant filed Objections under Section 34 of the Act, 1996, which were dismissed by the Single Judge on the ground of limitation.
Finding of the Court:
The Court found that the Objections were filed beyond the prescribed period of three months from the date of the Award, and the appellant failed to provide sufficient cause for the delay. The Court dismissed the Appeal, upholding the dismissal of the Objections on the ground of limitation.
Issues: The main issue was whether the dismissal of Objections under Section 34 of the Act, 1996 on the ground of being barred by limitation was legally justified.
Ratio Decidendi: The Court held that the appellant failed to provide sufficient cause for the delay in filing the Objections, and the benefit of additional 30 days under the Proviso to Section 34(3) of the Act, 1996 cannot be granted as a matter of right without explanation.
Final Decision: The Appeal was dismissed, and the Court found no ground to interfere with the impugned Order dismissing the Objections on the ground of limitation.
JUDGMENT (Oral)
1. The present Appeal under Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, Commercial Division and Commercial Appellate Division of High Courts Act, 2015 read with Section 37(1) (B) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the `Act, 1996') has been filed to set aside the impugned Judgment and Order dated 08.05.2023 dismissing the Objections under Section 34 of the Act, 1996 by the learned Single Judge on the ground of limitation.
2. The respondent was awarded the work for `construction of printing press hall, training centre and other allied works in connection with modernization of printing press at Shakurbasti, New Delhi' pursuant to a tender bearing No. 1-Aces/Tender/SSB/65 dated 4th April 2011 floated by the petitioner/appellant. Disputes arose between the parties and the respondent invoked the arbitration clause. The learned Arbitrators were appointed to adjudicate the disputes between the parties on 26.05.2014. The parties initiated the adjudication process and statement of facts was filed on 30.10.2014. The impugned Award was passed on 24.02.2018.
3. Aggrieved by the Award, the appellant approached Tis Hazari Courts and filed its Objections under Section 34 of the Act, 1996 on 30.05.2018. An Objection was taken by the respondent that the value of the petition was beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the learned District and Sessions Judge. Consequently, in view of the objection taken, the appellant withdrew his petition so filed.
4. Thereafter, the Objections under Section 34 of the Act were filed before the learned Single Judge who considered the preliminary objection of the respondent that the Objections were barred by limitation and observed that the Objections under Section 34 of the Act, 1996 were filed beyond the period of 120 days as provided under Section 34(3) of the Act, 1996. The delay in filing the objections was of 12 months for which there was no explanation and was explicitly in contravention of the mandate of Section 34(3) of the Act, 1996. Thus, the objections were dismissed as barred by limitation.
5. Being aggrieved, the present Appeal has been preferred.
6. Submissions heard.
7. Learned counsel on behalf of the appellant has contended that the impugned Order suffers from patent illegality and is against the law as the period for which the Objections were pending before the Court not having jurisdiction, has not been excluded in accordance with Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
8. The only moot aspect for determination is whether there is any patent illegality in dismissal of Objections under Section 34 of the Act, 1996 on the ground of barred by limitation.
9. In order to appreciate the merits of the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellant, it is pertinent to refer to Section 34(3) of the Act, 1996 which provides for period of filing of the Objections and reads as under:
"34. Application for setting aside arbitral award. -
...
(3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been made under section 33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal:
Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months it may entertain the application within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter....".
10. According to Section 34 of the Act, 1996, the aggrieved party has a period of three months as a matter of right for filing the Objections under Section 34 of the Act, 1996. However, the Proviso to Section 34(3) gives a further window of 30 days which can be condoned if the court is satisfied with the reasons for delay.
11. The appellant has claimed that its Objections were well within the time and has explained the same in the following manner:
| SL. | Particulars | Number o | |
Sesh Nath Singh and Anr. vs. Baidyabati Sheoraphulli Co-operative Bank Ltd.
The Court emphasized the importance of providing sufficient cause for delay in filing Objections under Section 34 of the Act, 1996 and highlighted the inflexibility of the limitation period.
The scope of interference in an arbitral award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is limited and narrow. The Courts shall not sit in an appeal while adjudicating a challen....
The main legal point established in the judgment is the absolute and unextendible nature of the time-limit prescribed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 to challenge an aw....
Point of Law : Even if the period of delay is considered to be of 21 days. Since Section 34(3) of the Act, 1996 bars condonation of delay beyond the period of 30 days after the period of 3 months is ....
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