IMPORTANT POINT
The judgment established the application of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, in justifying the delay in filing the application under Section 34 of the A&C Act, and highlighted the discretion of the Court in condoning the delay in re-filing.

JUDGMENT

Vibhu Bakhru, J. (Oral) - The appellant has filed the present appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereafter `the A&C Act'), impugning a judgment dated 04.06.2020 (hereafter `impugned judgment'), rendered by the learned Single Judge in OMP(COMM) 26/2019, captioned as Indira Gandhi National Open University v. M/s. Sharat Das and Associates Pvt. Ltd..

2. By the impugned judgment, the appellant's application under Section 34 of the A&C Act assailing an arbitral award dated 25.04.2018 (hereafter `the impugned award'), was rejected on the ground that it was filed beyond the period of limitation as stipulated under Section 34(3) of the A&C Act.

3. It is not disputed that the impugned award was rendered on 25.04.2018 and delivered on the same date.

4. In terms of Section 34(3) of the A&C Act, the time available for the appellant to file an application under Section 34 of the A&C Act expired on 24.07.2018. Admittedly, the appellant filed an application under Section 34 of the A&C Act (CIS-ARBTN-233-2018 captioned Indira Gandhi National Open University (IGNOU) v. M/s. Sharat Das & Associates Pvt. Ltd.) before the learned Commercial Court on the last date of period of limitation, that is on 24.07.2018

5. Notice in the said application was issued by the learned Commercial Court on 06.08.2018. The respondent appeared in the said proceedings and objected to the jurisdiction of the learned Commercial Court to hear the said application. Concededly, the objection raised was merited. Given the value of the dispute, the learned Commercial Court did not have the jurisdiction to entertain the said application. Accordingly, on 28.08.2018, the learned counsel for the appellant, on instructions, sought to withdraw the said application. His statement was recorded, and the learned Commercial Court dismissed the application as withdrawn with liberty to file a fresh petition in accordance with law.

6. In view of the above, the appellant filed the application under Section 34 of the A&C Act before this Court on 11.09.2018. The said application was dismissed by the impugned judgment on the ground of delay in filing as well as re-filing the application.

7. The learned Single Judge allowed the application of the appellant for condonation of delay under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1968. However, rejected the application for condonation of delay in re-filing the application, inter alia, construing the appellant's initial filing before this Court as non est. Whilst the appellant, being aggrieved by this decision has filed the present appeal, the respondent has filed cross-objections assailing the impugned judgment to the extent that the appellant's application for condonation of delay under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 was allowed.

8. As is apparent from the sequence of events as noted above, there was a delay of 48 (forty eight) days in filing the application under Section 34 of the A&C Act. The delay of 35 (thirty-five) days is sought to be explained on account of the appellant pursuing its remedy against the impugned award in a Court not competent to entertain the same. In terms of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, a litigant who approaches the Court, which does not have jurisdiction and pursues his remedy in good faith, is entitled to the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Thus, the period spent by the said litigant to pursue its remedy is required to be excluded for the purpose of computing the period of limitation.

9. We find no infirmity with the decision of the learned Single Judge in allowing the appellant's application for condonation of delay of 35 (thirty-five) days - that is, from 24.07.2018 to 28.08.2018 - under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1968.

10. It is apparent from the above that even if the appellant is granted the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1968, it is also required to explain a further delay of 13 (thirteen) days being the period between withdraw