Statutory limitations under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act are strict; applications for setting aside arbitral awards cannot be entertained if filed beyond the designated timeframe.

JUDGMENT

Navin Chawla, J. This appeal has been filed challenging the Order dated 12.07.2021 passed by the learned District Judge (Commercial Court) - 04, Central, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi, in OMP (COMM) No. 79 of 2019, titled Prashant Gautam v. Aakash Educational Services Pvt. Ltd., dismissing the application filed by the appellant under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the `Act') in challenge to the Arbitral Award dated 12.05.2016 of the learned Sole Arbitrator, on the ground of it being barred by limitation under Section 34 (3) of the Act.

2. The dispute between the parties arose out of the offer of appointment as a Faculty in Physics Department by the respondent to the appellant vide letter dated 05.03.2014. As the appellant left the employment of the respondent on 01.04.2015, the respondent raised a claim of compensation/damages before the learned Sole Arbitrator. The learned Sole Arbitrator vide the Arbitral Award dated 12.05.2016 awarded a sum of Rs.9,93,966/- (Rupees nine lakh ninety-three thousand nine hundred sixty-six) alongwith interest at the rate of 9% per annum in favour of the respondent. The appellant, claiming that the copy of the Arbitral Award was received by him only on 10.07.2019 in the enforcement proceedings filed by the respondent before the learned District & Sessions Court, Kota, Rajasthan, filed the above application under Section 34 of the Act on 14.08.2019 challenging the Arbitral Award. The same was, however, dismissed by the learned District Judge as being not maintainable under Section 34 (3) of the Act.

3. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that the Impugned Order passed by the learned District Judge itself records that the Arbitral Award is contrary to law and justice and therefore, the learned District Judge has taken a hyper-technical view by dismissing the application of the appellant only on the ground of it being filed belatedly.

4. She further submits that even otherwise, the finding of the learned District Judge on the issue of limitation is incorrect inasmuch as the appellant did not receive the copy of the Arbitral Award from the learned Arbitrator but received the same only in the enforcement proceedings on 10.07.2019. The application under Section 34 of the Act having been filed on 14.08.2018 was therefore, within the time granted under Section 34 (3) of the Act.

5. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellant, however, find no merit in the same.

6. Section 34 (3) of the Act provides that an application for setting aside the Arbitral Award has to be made within three months from the date when the applicant receives a copy of the Arbitral Award. This period of filing can be extended by the Court only for a further period of thirty days, `but not thereafter'.

7. The Supreme Court in Simplex Infrastructure Ltd. v. Union of India, 2019(2) SCC 455, considered the above provision and has held as under:

"9. Section 34 provides that recourse to a court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award "in accordance with" sub-section (2) and sub-section (3). Sub-section (2) relates to the grounds for setting aside an award. An application filed beyond the period mentioned in sub-section (3) of Section 34 , would not be an application "in accordance with" that sub- section. By virtue of Section 34 (3), recourse to the court against an arbitral award cannot be beyond the period prescribed. Sub-section (3) of Section 34 , read with the proviso, makes it abundantly clear that the application f