The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was driving in a 'rash and negligent' manner; mere high speed does not suffice to establish guilt under Sections 279 and 304A IPC.

JUDGMENT :

1. The petitioner, by the present petition under Section 397 read with Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 , Hereinafter referred as “ Cr.P.C . seeks to assail the judgment dated 03.12.2022 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-07, South, Saket Courts, New Delhi, [Hereinafter referred as “learned ASJ”] in Criminal Appeal no.384/2019 whereby the learned ASJ has dismissed his appeal and upheld the order of conviction dated 03.09.2019 and order of sentence dated 16.09.2019 passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate-06 (South), Saket Courts, New Delhi, [Hereinafter referred as “learned MM], however reduced the sentence to eighteen months from twenty four months under Section 304A of the IPC , arising out of FIR No.48/2012 dated 20.02.2012 registered under Section(s) 279/304A at P.S. Hauz Khas, Delhi, whereby the petitioner was convicted of offences under Section(s) 279 & 304A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 , [Hereinafter referred as “ IPC ] and awarded sentence of two years Rigorous Imprisonment, [Hereinafter referred as “RI] under Section 304A IPC and six months of Simple Imprisonment, [Hereinafter referred as “SI] under Section 279 IPC , [both sentences to run concurrently], along with a fine of Rs.50,000/- [Rupees Fifty Thousand Only] to be paid to the families of each of the two pedestrians, namely Sultan Singh and Raja @ Raghu Verma, [Hereinafter referred as “pedestrians], in default whereof, he would undergo one month of Simple Imprisonment.

2. As per facts, on the fateful day of 20.02.2012, at about 06:45 AM, vide DD No.9A P.S. Hauz Khas, received information about an accident in front of Kamla Nehru College Bus Stand, August Kranti Road. Upon receipt of the said DD, SI Nihal Singh (PW-5) alongwith other police personal reached the spot and found that a Swift Dzire Car bearing no.DL-2C-AL- 7285, Hereinafter referred as “Car had met with an accident, resultingly causing injury to the two pedestrians. Thereafter, the above said police personnel received information vide DD No.10A that the AIIMS Trauma Centre, New Delhi had declared them dead on arrival.

3. The petitioner, who was employed as a cleaner by one Ms. Isha Shrivastava, the owner of the Car, while cleaning the Car on the fateful morning of 20.02.2012, was persuaded by five of his friends to take them for a joy ride in the Car for buying milk from the Mother Dairy booth. On their way back, whilst taking a left turn, the petitioner lost control of the Car and after hitting the two deceased pedestrians collided with the footpath.

4. After the said accident, all the persons in the offending Car including the petitioner, left the spot in a local transport bus without helping the then injured pedestrians.

5. Meanwhile, in response to the notice under Section 133 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, Ms. Isha Shrivastava submitted that the petitioner was driving the Car without her permission and knowledge at the time of the accident.

6. Thereafter, an FIR was registered. After investigation, a chargesheet dated 30.06.2012 was filed against the petitioner and charges framed against him under Section(s) 279/ 304A of the IPC . This led to the conviction of the petitioner under both Section(s) 279/ 304A of the IPC vide order dated 03.09.2019 passed by the learned MM.

7. In a challenge thereto, the learned ASJ vide the impugned order upheld the aforesaid order passed by the learned MM but reduced the sentence of the petitioner under Section 304A IPC from two years of RI to eighteen months of RI.

8. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner has filed the present petition.

9. As per the learned counsel for petitioner, the inference by the learned ASJ to establish guilt of the petitioner is contrary to the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Syad Akbar vs State of Karnataka, [(1980) 1 SCC 30] , wherein it has been held that guilt of an accused, like the petitioner herein, has to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and not the other way around.

10. Furth