SMT. ABHILASHA KUMARI, J. By preferring this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners have prayed for the issuance of a Writ of Certiorari or any other appropriate Writ or order, quashing and setting aside the impugned order dated 28.07.2009 passed by the learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Junagadh, below Exhibit 170 in Regular Civil Suit No.696 of 1998, whereby, the said application for condoning the delay of 234 days and setting aside the abatement, has been rejected.

2. Briefly stated, the relevant facts of the case are that the sole plaintiff of the abovementioned suit, Amin Ibrahim Tajwani (now deceased) expired on 08.04.2007. The suit had been instituted for grant of declaration and permanent injunction against the respondents. The petitioner No.1 is the widow of the deceased plaintiff. The petitioners Nos.2 to 6 are the daughters of the deceased plaintiff and petitioners Nos.7 to 10 are the sons of the deceased plaintiff. The petitioners Nos.8 to 10 are minors. The petitioners filed the abovementioned application for condoning the delay of 234 days caused in filing the application and for setting aside the abatement, by joining them as heirs and legal representatives of deceased plaintiff Amin Ibrahim Tajwani. This application has been rejected by the Trial Court, by passing the impugned order, giving rise to the filing of the petition.

3. Mr. Anshin H. Desai, learned counsel for the petitioners, has made the following submissions:

(a) That the impugned order rejecting the application for condonation of delay and setting aside the abatement is against settled principles of law as, the provisions contained in Order 22 Rule 9, sub-rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“the Code”) provide for setting aside the abatement if the applicant shows sufficient cause for the same.

(b) That in the present case, sufficient cause has been shown by the petitioners as the petitioner No.1, who is the widow of the deceased plaintiff, is a Purdahnashin lady and could only move the application when she came to know from the learned advocate for the deceased plaintiff, about the filing of the suit. The petitioners Nos.2 to 10 are daughters and sons of the deceased plaintiff, some of whom are minors, and as the delay of 234 days is not a gross one, and the cause of substantial justice can be served if a liberal construction is given to the term “sufficient cause”, the application ought to have been allowed by the Trial Court.

(c) That by rejecting the application, the petitioners have been deprived of their valuable right to sue. A hyper-technical view such as the one adopted by the Trial Court, is not warranted in law and the only ground on which the application has been rejected is that it has not been filed within the prescribed period of limitation i.e. 90 days.

(d) That the petitioner No.1 is a Purdahnashin and cannot be expected to have information regarding the filing of the suit by the deceased plaintiff. The petitioners have approached the Trial Court with the application for condoning the delay and setting aside the abatement, on coming to know from the learned advocate, regarding the pendency of the suit. There is no reason why the bona fides of the petitioners should be doubted. The reasons stated by the petitioners in the application have not been believed by the Trial Court even though there is no material no record to the contrary.

(e) That no prejudice would be caused to the respondents if the abatement is set aside and the petitioners are permitted to pursue the litigation. By passing the impugned order, the petitioners are likely to suffer irreparable loss, damage and injury, which cannot be compensated in terms of money, as the right to sue as heirs and legal representatives of the deceased plaintiff survives and, if the impugned order is allowed to stand, it would amount to a denial of the right of hearing the suit on merits, therefore, the impugned order may be quashed