1. The present petition has been filed by the petitioner under Articles 14, 19(1)(g), 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India as well as under Sections 20 and 22 of the Companies Act, 1956 on the grounds stated in the memo of petition for the following prayers :

(A) Issue an appropriate writ and quash and set aside the Order dated 30/08/2011 at Annexure “A” hereto passed by the respondent No.2 Regional Director(North West Region) in the Application No.RD((NWR)/Sec.22/7/201011/2580.

(B) During the pendency and final disposal of the this petition, stay the implementation, execution and operation of the Order dated 30/08/2011 at Annexure “A” hereto passed by the respondent No.2 Regional Director (North West Region) in the Application No.RD((NWR)/Sec.22/7/2010 11/2580.

(C) Award cost of this petition.

(D) Grant such other and further reliefs as may be deemed just and expedient.

2. Heard learned senior counsel, Shri S.N. Soparkar appearing with learned advocate, Shri Amar N. Bhatt for the petitioner, learned counsel, Shri Navin Pahwa for the respondent no.1 and learned counsel, Shri Hriday Buch for the respondent no.2.

3. Learned senior counsel, Shri Soparkar referred to the papers and pointedly referred to the provisions of Section 22 of the Companies Act. He emphasized the provisions of Section 22(1)(ii)(b) of the Act and submitted that such powers could be exercised within a period of twelve months only directing the change of name. He submitted the order passed is contrary to the provisions of Section 22 of the Companies Act. Further, learned senior counsel, Shri Soparkar submitted that the intention of the Legislature has to be considered and what has been provided cannot be added or substituted when there is no provision for entertaining the application beyond time limit prescribed by the statute like the Companies Act. He further submitted that law of limitation does not apply and, therefore, there is no question of any condonation of delay. Learned senior counsel, Shri Soparkar submitted that when the special statute has provided specific limit, same cannot be extended and the authority will not have any jurisdiction to exercise such power after the period prescribed in the statute is over. In support of his submissions, he referred to and relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Raj Kumar Dev & Ors. Vs. Tarapada Dev & Ors., reported in (1987) 4 SCC 398 and submitted that it was with regard to the registration of arbitration award providing for a period of limitation and same contention has been considered. He has also referred to and relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Japani Sahoo Vs. Chandra Sekhar Mohanty, reported in (2007) 7 SCC 394 and submitted that in this judgment, the observation has been made referring to the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. He emphasized that underlying object of providing time limit is that option or remedy has to be exercised within a stipulated period. He emphasized the observation, “But it also cannot be overlooked that no person can be kept under continuous apprehension that he can be prosecuted at “any time” for “any crime” irrespective of the nature or seriousness of the offence. “People will have no peace of mind if there is no period of limitation even for petty offences.” Similarly learned senior counsel, Shri Soparkar referred to the judgment of the Full Bench of the High Court in case of Memon Ibrahim Haji Latif Sukhediwala Vs. Officer on Special Duty (Land Acquisition) & Anr., reported in 1994 (1) GLR 296 and submitted that as observed that the Limitation Act will not have any application as Collector was not the authority within the meaning of the Act. Similarly, learned senior counsel, Shri Soparkar submitted that the respondent authority cannot be said to be a court under the Act and, therefore, the Limitation Act will not have any application as it could have an application only in respect of the proceeding before th