The main legal point established in the judgment is the distinction between original jurisdiction and supervisory jurisdiction under Article 226 and Article 227 of the Constitution of India, and the maintainability of an appeal under Section 15 of the Letters Patent Act.

ORDER :

1. This intra-court appeal is directed against the order dated 14.10.2020 passed by the learned Single Judge in Special Civil Application No. 12595 of 2020.

2. On noticing that prayers sought for in Special Civil Application No. 12595 of 2020 before the learned Single Judge was for setting aside the order dated 17.03.2017 which was revised on 20.03.2017 by the Additional Sessions Judge, Bhavnagar in Criminal Revision Application No. 75 of 2016 (Annexure-A) and said orders having been assailed before the learned Single Judge was by filing a petition by categorizing it as one falling under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, we posed a pointed question to the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner as to how this petition can be construed as one filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and would it not fall under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. However, Shri Deepak Sanchela, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would contend, this Court having entertained the appeal by issuing notice may not insist for hearing regarding maintainability as it is deemed that this Court had entertained the appeal on merits and has prayed for appeal being taken up for being heard on merits only instead of raising the issue of maintainability.

3. In the aforesaid background, we have perused the case papers and find that the order which came to be impugned before the learned Single Judge was an order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Bhavnagar, in Criminal Revision Applicant No. 75 of 2016 dated 17.03.2017, which was revised on 20.03.2017. Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Act does not provide an appeal against the judgment or order passed by a learned Single Judge in a petition filed under Article 227 and intra-court appeal would lie only if the judgment or order is passed in a petition filed under Article 226. However, where a petition is filed both under Articles 226 and 227, it will have to be considered whether the issues raised in the petition which arise for adjudication for the first time before the High Court, so as to construe it as a jurisdiction having been exercised by the learned Single Judge in original jurisdiction. If the challenge in the petition is with respect to the point already adjudicated by the Subordinate Court or Tribunal, then it will have to be held that supervisory jurisdiction vested under Article 227 of the Constitution of India having been exercised by the learned Single Judge and not the original jurisdiction. The relief prayed for and granted by the Court is also a factor that would indicate as to how the petition filed is to be construed or understood. In a case where it can be said that the petition would fall both under Articles 226 and 227, then it would be proper to consider the petition as one filed under Article 226 and in those cases, an appeal would lie under Section 15 of the Letters Patent Act.

4. The proceedings under Article 226 is an original proceeding or the learned Single Judge would exercise the powers under the original jurisdiction and when it concerns Civil rights, it is in original civil proceedings. The proceedings under Article 227 is not and would not be an original proceeding. An intra-court appeal does not lie against the judgment of a learned Single Judge when the power of superintendence is exercised by examining the order of the Subordinate Court.

5. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Life Insurance Corporation of India vs. Nandini J. Shah, (2018) 15 SCC 356, has held that appellate officer while exercising the power under Section 9 of the Public Premises Act does not act as a persona designata but in his capacity as a pre-existing judicial authority in the district (being a District Judge or a Judicial Officer designated by the District Judge, possessing essential qualification). Further, the order passed by the District Judge under the Public Premises Act is in the capacity of an appellate Court and it would partake the order of the S