The main legal point established in the judgment is the inapplicability of Rule 12 of Letters Patent for maintaining an intra court appeal against an order passed by a Single Judge of the Court in exercise of criminal jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

JUDGMENT :

Rajesh Sekhri, J.

1. An FIR came to be registered against the appellant, by respondent No.2, on the directions of learned Additional Special Mobile Magistrate, Doda (hereinafter referred to as the trial court), on an application preferred by respondent No.1, in terms of Section 156(3) of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1989 (for short, Cr.P.C.). The appellant invoked inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to implore for quashment of the said order dated 24.08.2023, passed by learned trial court, which petition came to be dismissed by learned Single Judge of this Court on 04.09.2023.

2. The appellant has invoked Rule 12 of Letters Patent Rules for quashment of both the orders dated 04.09.2023, passed by learned Single Judge of this Court and 24.08.2023 passed by learned trial court on multiple grounds urged in the memo of appeal.

3. Heard and perused.

4. It is by far a crystallized position of law and no longer remains res integra now that in terms of Rule 12 of Letters Patent of J&K, intra court appeal against an order passed by a Single Judge of this Court, in exercise of inherent powers envisaged under Section 482 Cr.P.C., is not maintainable. A Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Shamshada Akhter v. Aijad Parvaiz Shah AND Parvez Ahmad Fafoo v. Imtiyaz Ahmad Tak [LPA No. 80 of 2020 & LPA No. 84 of 2021 decided on 16.08.2021] has already set the controversy at naught, insofar as applicability of Rule 12 of Letters Patent against an order passed by a Single Judge of this Court in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. (pari materia to Section 561-A of J&K Cr.P.C., which stands repealed now) is concerned by holding that no appeal is provided for against an order passed by a Single Judge of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Relevant excerpt of the judgment reads thus:

“We are of the opinion and have come to the conclusion that the powers of superintendence vested in the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir have been and are akin to the inherent powers saved under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1933, which corresponds to Section 482 Cr.P.C. now applicable in the Union Territory and, consequently, there has been and is no appeal provided for against orders passed by a Single Judge of the court in exercise of such powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. before the court. Resultantly, no LPA lies against the order passed by a Jude of this Court in exercise of the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C.”

5. Aside another Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Abdul Qayoom Khan and anr. v. State of J&K and ors. [LPA No. 265 of 2022 decided on 02.08.2023] of which one of us (Sekhri-J) was a Member has ruled that even a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, which has a colour of a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C., against an order passed by a Single Bench of this Court in exercise of criminal jurisdiction, is not maintainable.

6. Incidentally, in both Shamshada Akhter and Abdul Qayoom Khan (supra) submissions were made by the rival factions on the basis of Ram Kishan Fauji v. State of Haryana and ors. reported as 2017 (5) SCC 533 whereby a distinction was sought to be drawn between Letters Patent applicable to the erstwhile High Courts of Punjab and Lahore and Letters Patent applicable to the High Court of J&K. It was argued that though Letters Patent applicable to this Court, on first blush, appears to be in pari materia to the Letters Patent as applicable to the High Courts of Punjab and Lahore, however, there was a marked difference, if the Letters Patent of this Court are read in juxtaposition to Letters Patent of High Court of Punjab and Lahore. It was submitted that while Rule 10 of Letters Patent applicable to the High Courts of Punjab and Lahore excludes the appellate jurisdiction against an order passed by a Single Judge of the said High Court in exercise of its criminal jurisdiction, the said provision of exclusion of appellate jurisdiction against a Single Judge order exercising