HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT
MRS. JUSTICE SUNITA AGARWAL, CJ, MR. JUSTICE PRANAV TRIVEDI, J
NATIONAL HIGHWAYS AUTHORITY OF INDIA THRO HARMENDRA SINGH ROTRWAL – Appellant
Versus
MER RANABHAI RAMDEBHAI – Respondent
FIRST APPEAL NO. 2338 of 2024
(A) Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Sections 34 and 37 - Scope of jurisdiction - The court examined whether it can modify an arbitral award under Section 34 and if such power is limited to severable awards - The court emphasized that it cannot re-appreciate evidence to substitute findings of the Arbitrator regarding market value - The court decided to proceed with the hearing despite pending questions before the Apex Court. (Paras 1, 4, 5, 8)
(B) Judicial discipline - High Courts must follow the law as it stands and cannot await outcomes of references or review petitions unless directed by the Apex Court. (Paras 5, 6)
Facts of the case:
The appeal concerns the jurisdiction of the court under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act regarding the modification of an arbitral award and the determination of compensation under the National Highways Act. The respondents argued for postponement due to pending questions before the Apex Court.
Findings of Court:
The court found it appropriate to proceed with the appeals under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, despite the pending reference to a Larger Bench.
Issues: The main issues were the scope of the court's jurisdiction under Section 34 and whether it can modify an arbitral award.
Ratio Decidendi: The court ruled that it cannot re-appreciate evidence or substitute the Arbitrator's findings and must proceed based on existing law. The High Court is bound to follow the Apex Court's decisions without delay due to pending references.
Result: The hearing of the appeals is to proceed.
ORDER :
SUNITA AGARWAL, C.J.
Mr. Jenil Shah, the learned advocate appearing for the respondents/land holders would submit that the questions as to whether the powers of the Court under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 will include the power to modify an arbitral award and further if the power to modify is available, whether such power can be exercised only when the award is severable and part thereof can be modified, are engaging attention of the Apex Court Apex Court in Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 15336-15337 of 2021. It is submitted that two other questions as to whether the power to set aside the award under Section 34 of the Act, 1996, being a larger power, will include the power to modify the arbitral award and if so, to what extent and whether the power to modify the award can be read into the power to set aside the award under Section 34 of the Act, 1996, are also subject matter of considerations before the Apex Court.
2. The contention is that in view of the fact that the above noted questions have been referred to the Larger Bench vide judgment and order dated 20th February, 2024 passed by the three Judges’ Bench of the Apex Court, this Court may not proceed with the matters, inasmuch as, any statement of law on the issue by the Apex Court would be the law of the land and would be binding on the Courts in the country.
3. Testing this submission of the learned counsel for the respondents/land holders, we may record that the issue in the present appeal under section 37 of the Act, 1996 is about the scope of exercise of jurisdiction by the Court under Section 34 of the Act, 1996.
4. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the Court while exercising the jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Act, 1996 has proceeded to re-appreciate the evidence to substitute the findings of the Arbitrator in the matter of determination of market value of the lands-in-question so as to modify the compensation amount determined by the competent authority and the Arbitrator. The exercise of powers under Section 34 of the Act, 1996 does not permit the Civil Court to re-appreciate the evidence like a Court of First Appeal to draw an independent finding on the question of market value as a continuation of the proceedings in the matter of determination/re-determination of compensation under the National Highways Act, 1956.
5. Taking note of the issues involved in the present appeals, we do not agree with the contentions of the learned counsel for the respondents to postpone the matter on the premise that the questions which may have bearing in the present matters have been referred to a Larger Bench of the Apex Court. We may also take note of the decision of the Apex Court in Union Territory of Ladakh and Others vs. Jammu and Kashmir National Conference and Another [(2023) SCC OnLine SC 1140], wherein it is clarified that in case of conflicting decisions, the High Court cannot refuse deference to the judgments of the Apex Court on the score that a later Co-ordinate Bench has doubted its correctness. It was laid down that the High Court has to proceed to decide the matter on the basis of law as it stands. It is not open to await for an outcome of a reference or review petition, as the case may be, unless specifically a direction by the Apex Court to await an outcome of reference or review petition, as the case may be. It is not open to the High Court to refuse to follow the judgments by stating that it has been doubted by a later Co-ordinate Bench.
6. A judicial notice was taken by the Apex Court of the fact that High Courts were not deciding the cases on the ground that the leading judgment of the Apex Court on the subject was either referred to a Large Bench or a review petition relating thereto was pending.
7. Learned counsel for the respondents, however, has relied on the observations made in the judgment of the Apex Court in D.K. Trivedi and Sons vs. State of Gujarat [1986 (Supp.) 1 SCC 20] w
The court cannot modify an arbitral award under Section 34 by re-appreciating evidence; it must follow existing law and proceed with the hearing despite pending references.
Judicial review of an arbitral award under Section 34 is limited to specific grounds without reappraising evidence; the Court cannot modify awards based on merits.
The court affirmed that under Section 34, a Civil Court lacks jurisdiction to reappraise evidence in arbitral awards and may only modify awards for clear errors, not on merits.
Under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, a court cannot modify an arbitral award through reappraisal of evidence or merits; it is restricted to grounds explicitly stated in the....
The court affirmed that under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, courts cannot re-evaluate the merits of an arbitral award and must adhere to jurisdictional limits under Section 34.
The court cannot modify an arbitral award under Section 34 of the J&K Arbitration and Conciliation Act; it can only set aside or uphold the award based on specified grounds.
The court emphasized that judicial interference with arbitral awards under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act is severely limited and cannot involve reevaluation of merits or factual findings.
A Section 34 court cannot modify an arbitral award, as established by the Supreme Court in Hakeem, which overruled previous case law allowing such modifications.
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