IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD AT LUCKNOW
JASPREET SINGH, J.
National Highways Authority of India, through its Project Director – Appellant
Versus
Om Prakash Singh and Others – Respondents
Appeal Under Section 37 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 No. 42 of 2025
Decided On : 25-11-2025
| Table of Content |
|---|
| 1. details of appeal under section 37 (Para 2 , 16 , 17 , 18) |
| 2. arguments regarding jurisdiction and re-appraisal of evidence (Para 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 , 9 , 10 , 11) |
| 3. discussion on scope of proceedings under section 34 (Para 14 , 15 , 19 , 20) |
| 4. interpretation of section 34(4) and its applicability (Para 21 , 22 , 23 , 24 , 25 , 26 , 27 , 28) |
| 5. final ruling on appeal (Para 29) |
JUDGMENT :
JASPREET SINGH, J.
1. Heard Sri Abhishek Pathak, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri Prasidh Narayan Singh, learned counsel along with Sri J.N. Singh, learned counsel for the respondent no. 1 on caveat.
2. The instant appeal has been preferred under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act of 1996") assailing the judgment and order dated 08.08.2025 passed by the Additional District Judge-I, Ambedkar Nagar in Arbitration Case No. 4 of 2022 whereby the petition preferred under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 filed by the respondent no. 1 has been allowed and the matter has been remitted for consideration afresh.
3. The submission of learned counsel for the appellant is that the Court while exercising powers under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 has overstepped its jurisdiction, inasmuch as, it has entered into the merits of the dispute and it has re-appraised the evidence which is not within the domain of the Court exercising powers under Section 34 of the Act of 1996.
4. It is further urged that where a view has been taken by an Arbitrator after considering the material available on record, unless it is shown to be perverse, such view has to be accepted and the courts under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 are not empowered to take a different view, thus, the Court while entering into the factual aspect, has re-appraised the evidence which is not permissible, accordingly, the order impugned dated 08.08.2025 is bad in the eyes of law.
5. It has further been submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that the court further over-stepped its jurisdiction by ignoring the principles enunciated in Section 34 (4) of the Act of 1996.
6. In case if certain technical errors were discovered by the court in exercise of powers under Section 34 of the Act, it was always open for the court to have taken recourse to the provisions of Section 34(4) enabling the Arbitral Tribunal to iron out the creases and to eliminate the ground upon which the petition under Section 34 of the Act was preferred. Having ignored this aspect, the order passed by the Court stands vitiated.
7. The learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Kinnari Mullick and Another v. Ghansyam Das Damani , 2018 (11) SCC 328 and another decision of a coordinate Bench of this Court in Hema Agarwal and others v. National Highway Authority of India and another , 2025: AHC : 148001 .
8. It is thus urged that for the aforesaid reasons, the order impugned cannot be sustained and as such deserves to be set aside.
9. Sri Prasidh Narain Singh, learned counsel appearing for the private respondent has urged that the court while considering the respective submissions has merely considered the impact of certain awards which were passed in respect of a contiguous land-holder and thereafter it has come to the conclusion that the award cannot be sustained as two equal persons cannot be treated differently.
10. The entire reasoning of the Court is on the aforesaid premise and it is not a case where the court has undertaken an independent or re-appraisal of evidence, hence, the submission made by learned counsel for the appellant does not flow from the record.
11. It has further been urged that the reliance placed by the learned counsel for the appellant in the case of Kinnari Mullick (supra) will not have any impact for the reasons, ingredients mentioned therein are not met.
12. It is thus urged that once the award passed by the Statutory Authority under the National Highway Authority of India Act has bee
Kinnari Mullick and Another v. Ghansyam Das Damani
Hema Agarwal and others v. National Highway Authority of India and another
Gayatri Balasamy v. ISG Novasoft Technologies Ltd.
The court affirmed that under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, courts cannot re-evaluate the merits of an arbitral award and must adhere to jurisdictional limits under Section 34.
The court affirmed that under Section 34, a Civil Court lacks jurisdiction to reappraise evidence in arbitral awards and may only modify awards for clear errors, not on merits.
Under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, a court cannot modify an arbitral award through reappraisal of evidence or merits; it is restricted to grounds explicitly stated in the....
The Court can partially set aside an arbitral Award and has limited scope of interference under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Court cannot modify an Award but can set ....
Judicial review of an arbitral award under Section 34 is limited to specific grounds without reappraising evidence; the Court cannot modify awards based on merits.
Login now and unlock free premium legal research
Login to SupremeToday AI and access free legal analysis, AI highlights, and smart tools.
Login
now!
India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!
Copyright © 2023 Vikas Info Solution Pvt Ltd. All Rights Reserved.