GAUHATI HIGH COURT
K. M. LAHIRI AND T. C. DAS, J.
State of Assam and others -Appellant
Versus
Naresh Chandra Das and another -Respondent
Civil Misc. Case No. 22 of 1981 (in (W. A. (T) 144 of 1981)
Decided On : 19-08-1981
LIMITATION ACT - SECTION 5 - APPLICATION - WRIT APPEALS - GAUTI HIGH COURT RULES - APPLICABILITY - SPECIAL LAW - INTERPRETATION - EXTENSION OF TIME - SUFFICIENT CAUSE - MISPLACEMENT OF RECORDS.
Fact of the Case:
The petitioner filed an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, seeking extension of time to file a writ appeal against the judgment of a single judge of the Gauhati High Court. The petitioner argued that the Gauhati High Court Rules, which prescribed a period of 30 days for filing writ appeals, were not a "special law" within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, and therefore, Section 5 was not applicable to writ appeals.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the Gauhati High Court Rules were a "special law" within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, and therefore, Section 5 was applicable to writ appeals. The court further held that the petitioner had shown sufficient cause for not filing the appeal within the prescribed period, as the records of the case had been misplaced in the office of the Senior Government Advocate. The court allowed the application and condoned the delay.
Issues: 1. Whether the Gauhati High Court Rules were a "special law" within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act? 2. Whether the petitioner had shown sufficient cause for not filing the appeal within the prescribed period?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court held that the Gauhati High Court Rules were a "special law" within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act because they were framed by the High Court under Article 225 of the Constitution, which empowered the High Court to make rules for regulating the practice and procedure of the court. The court also held that the Rules were not a general law, as they applied only to proceedings in the Gauhati High Court. 2. The court held that the petitioner had shown sufficient cause for not filing the appeal within the prescribed period, as the records of the case had been misplaced in the office of the Senior Government Advocate. The court found that the petitioner had taken all reasonable steps to obtain a copy of the judgment and to file the appeal, and that the delay was not due to any negligence or indifference on the part of the petitioner.
Final Decision: The court allowed the application and condoned the delay.
LAHIRI, J.:- This is an application u/s.5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963, for short "the Act". Based on the following premises, Mr. B.K. Das, learned counsel has propounded that S.5 of "the Act" is not applicable in writ appeals filed under Rule 2 of the Gauhati High Court Rules and the application merits summary rejection :-
(I) The set of Rules framed by the High Court and styled as "The Rules of the Gauhati High Court", for short "the Rules", is not a law as it has not been made by the Legislature:
(II) Assuming that it is a "Law" it does not fall within the ambit of "special law" referred in S.29 (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963;
(III) Rule 2 of "the Rules" has not Only created the right of writ appeal against the decision of a single Judge but it has also prescribed the period of limitation as 30 days which is the same as prescribed in Art.117 of "the Act" for appeals to the High Court from the same Court. Therefore, R.2 does not prescribe a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule of "the Act". As such, S.29 (2) forbids application of Sections 4 to 24 of "the Act" - these are applicable only when a special law prescribes a period of limitation "different from the period prescribed by the schedule":
(IV) As "the Rules" form a complete Code the provisions of S.5 of "the Act" are not applicable in writ appeal under Rule 2 of "the Rules": and.
(V) Rule 2, by necessary implication excludes the application of Sections 4 to 24 of "the Act" in writ appeals,
To bear up the first two contentions the learned counsel has relied on Mukund Mahto v. Niranjan Chakravarty, AIR 1934 Patna 353 and Bangalore Municipal Corporation v. T.S. Setty. AIR 1955 Mys. 110. In support of the third and fourth contentions reliance was placed on Kaushalya Rani v. Gopal Singh, AIR 1964 SC 260. Hukumdev Narain v. Lalit Narain, AIR 1974 SC 480, and. Hari Shanker Tripathi v. Shiv Harsh, (1976) 1 SCC 897 were placed to buttress the last contention.
2. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties. In our opinion, at this stage, we should not give any importance to the contentions of the State that the appeal involves substantial questions of constitutional law or the impugned judgment has declared two clauses of the Assam Paddy and Rice Procurement (Licensing and Levy) Order, 1980 ultra vires or public interest and equitable distribution of supply of commodities essential to the life of the community demand hearing and disposal of the writ appeals. The questions posed by Mr. Das relate to the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain an application u/s.5 of "the Act" and the same mast be disposed uninfluenced by any other consideration.
3. We extract the intrinsic laws pertinent to resolve the debates at the bar. Section 29 (2) of "the Act" reads as follows :-
"29 (1) ** ** **
(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limtiation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Sec 3 shall apply as it such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Ss.4 to 24 inclusive shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law."
We also extract the third proviso to Rule 2 of Chapter V (A) of "the Rules":
"2 ** ** ** Provided further that the appeal shall lie to a Division Bench from the decision of single Judge if filed within 30 days of the said decision,"
4. Let us now take up the first two contentions. Though the legal theories or the science of law may not find it easy to define "a law" as distinguished from executive orders, its main features are well recognised. Broadly stated, a law is a body of rules laid down for determining legal rights and legal obligations which are recognised by Courts. The
AIR 1976 SC 105 : 1976 Cri LJ 179
(1976) 1 SCC 897 : 1976 UJ (SC) 242
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