GAUHATI HIGH COURT
B.L.Hansaria, S.P.Rajkhowa, JJ.
Dore Sangma; John Sangma; Mega Marak; Nongsan Marak; Allipon Marak; Maring Sangma; Chejan Laskar Nokma; Chingre Sangma; Nelson Sangma Nokma; Dansim -Appellant
Versus
Chief Executive Member, Garo ZHills District Council; Joran Sangma; Rimjing Marak; Binolli Marak; Jangson Momin; Rangan Marak Nokma; Chengjan Sang -Respondent
Civil Rule Nos. 58 of 1978, 403, 917, 918, 936, 1176 of 1982, 92 of 1984, 752 of 1985, 463, 473 of 1986
Decided On : 17-05-1988
GARO HILLS AUTONOMOUS DISTRICT (SOCIAL CUSTOMS AND USAGES) VALIDATING ACT, 1958 - SECTION 11 - VALIDITY AND EFFECT - JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURTS - BARRED - EXCEPTIONS - PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL PROCEDURE TO BE FOLLOWED BY REVENUE MEMBER AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE MEMBER - RES JUDICATA - APPLICABILITY.
Fact of the Case:
The petitions challenged the validity of Section 11 of the Garo Hills Autonomous District (Social Customs and Usages) Validating Act, 1958, which barred the jurisdiction of civil courts in matters falling within the purview of the Act. Some petitions also contended that despite this bar, civil courts' jurisdiction was not barred.
Finding of the Court:
1. Section 11 of the Act, which barred the jurisdiction of civil courts in matters falling within the purview of the Act, was held to be valid and constitutional. 2. The Garo Hills District Council had the competence to enact Section 11 as it fell within the scope of its law-making powers under the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution. 3. Despite the bar imposed by Section 11, civil courts' jurisdiction was not entirely barred. Parties could still approach civil courts if the Revenue Member or the Chief Executive Member, who were empowered to decide disputes relating to Nokmaship, did not follow the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. 4. The Revenue Member and the Chief Executive Member were required to follow certain fundamental principles of judicial procedure while deciding disputes relating to Nokmaship, including framing of issues, opportunity to lead evidence, and hearing of parties. 5. The principle of res judicata was applicable to proceedings before the Revenue Member and the Chief Executive Member. A decision rendered by the Deputy Commissioner in 1937 regarding the Nokmaship of the Akhing in question was held to be binding and could not be reopened.
Issues: 1. Whether Section 11 of the Garo Hills Autonomous District (Social Customs and Usages) Validating Act, 1958, was valid and constitutional. 2. Whether civil courts' jurisdiction was entirely barred by Section 11 of the Act. 3. Whether the Revenue Member and the Chief Executive Member were required to follow any principles of judicial procedure while deciding disputes relating to Nokmaship. 4. Whether the principle of res judicata was applicable to proceedings before the Revenue Member and the Chief Executive Member.
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The Garo Hills District Council had the competence to enact Section 11 of the Act as it fell within the scope of its law-making powers under the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution. 2. The bar imposed by Section 11 on the jurisdiction of civil courts was not absolute. Parties could still approach civil courts if the Revenue Member or the Chief Executive Member did not follow the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. 3. The Revenue Member and the Chief Executive Member were required to follow certain fundamental principles of judicial procedure while deciding disputes relating to Nokmaship, including framing of issues, opportunity to lead evidence, and hearing of parties. 4. The principle of res judicata was applicable to proceedings before the Revenue Member and the Chief Executive Member. A decision rendered by the Deputy Commissioner in 1937 regarding the Nokmaship of the Akhing in question was held to be binding and could not be reopened.
Final Decision: 1. The petition challenging the validity of Section 11 of the Act was dismissed. 2. The other petitions were set down for hearing on facts.
In this batch of cases, common, questions of law are involved. A common judgment is therefore being passed on the question of Jaw. One of the questions relate to the validity and effect of section 11 of the Garo Hills Autonomous District (Social Customs and Usages) Validating Act, 1958, hereinafter the Act, which was inserted by the Garo Autonomous District (Social Customs and Usages) Validating (Amendment) Act, 1972. Section 11, whose validity has been assailed in some of these petitions reads follows :-
"11. Bar to jurisdiction of Civil Courts: No Civil Court shall entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of any matter falling within the purview of the Act".
In some other petitions, the validity of the aforesaid section has not been assailed, but it has been contended that despite the aforesaid express bar to entertain any suit or proceeding by Civil Court, Civil Court's jurisdiction is really not barred.
2. To appreciate the later submission, we have note certain provisions of the Act, which was enacted in 1959 to remove doubts which had arisen as to the legal force of the social customs and usages prevails in the District of Garo Hills. The Act was, thereafter anacted to validate those social customs and usages which were not against morality or public policy. Sections 7, 8 and 9 are the relevant provisions of the Act which need be noted. They read as below :-
"7. The succession to the Nokmaship of any Akhing shall be recognised in accordance with such social custom or customary practice as was followed prevalent in that behalf before the commencement of the Constitution, except that the powers which were exercised by the Deputy Commissioner before the commencement of the Constitution shall hereafter be exercised by the Revenue Member of the District Council.
8. (1). Wherever a vacancy accure in the office of Nokma of any Akhing or there arises any dispute in the matter of succession to Nokmaship of any Akhing or any dispute with regard to any other matter relating to or connected with, any Akhing and the boundaries thereof, the matter shall be referred, in the first instance, to the Revenue Member for disposal in accordance with the customary practice and the usages in the Garos.
(2) Any person aggrieved at the order of the Revenue Member under sub-section (1) above may prefer an appeal to the Chief Executive Member within 60 days from the date of order.
9. All successions to Nokmaship hereto affected and all disputes with regard to any other matter relating to any Akhing and the boundaries thereof hereto settled shall be deemed to be validly affected and validly settled notwithstanding any irregularity contained therein provided such succession and settlement of disputes is consistent with this Act and for that purpose this Act shall be deemed to have come into force from the date of the commencement of the Constitution."
The dispute in this batch of petitions is connected with the Nokmaship of the Akhing.
3. To appreciate the rival contentions advanced, it would be appropriate to first acquaint ourselves as to the meaning and significance of the word "Nokma" and "Akhing". The word "Nokma" has been defined in section 4 (8) of the Act as "head of a clan or machong who holds any land as custodian on behalf of a clan or machong." The word "Akhing" has been defined in the Garo Hills District (Jhum) Regulation, J954, in its section 2 (1) as below: -
"(1) "Akhing" means-
(a) any land hold by a clan or 'machong' under the custody of the head of the clan or 'machong' called 'Nokma' recognised as such by the District Council;
(b) any land held collectively by a particular community of a particular village or group of villages which is under the custody of the head of the said community or group of villages called 'Nokma' recognised as such by the District Council;"
From the aforesaid definitions themselves it is clear that Nokma is a headman. It would, however, be profitable to know what some writers have said about the
.District Council of United K & J Hills vs. Sitimon
District Council of Jowau Autonomous District vs. Dwet Singh, AIR 1986 SC 1930
Secretary of State vs. Mask and Company
I. S. Chetty & Sons vs. State of A. P.
Desika Charyuly vs. State of A. P. AIR 1964 SC 807
D. D. BhalJa vs. District Co-operative Bank Ltd., 1969 (3) SCC 694
State of W. B. vs. Iron and Steel Company Ltd., AIR 1970 SC 1298
Premier Automobiles Ltd. vs. K. S. Wadke
Inder Mohan Lal vs. Ramesb Kharma
Gulabchand Chhotelal vs. State of Gujrat
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