Point of Law : Principle of criminal jurisprudence that burden lies upon prosecution side to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubt.

JUDGMENT :

ROBIN PHUKAN, J.

1. Heard Mr. N.N. Upadhaya, learned counsel for the appellant and also heard Mr. S. Khound, learned counsel for respondent No. 2 and Mr. P. Borthakur, learned Addl. P.P. for State respondent No. 1.

2. This appeal under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is directed against the judgment and order dated 04.04.2015, passed in Crl. App.....11(2)/2014 by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Dibrugarh. It is to be noted here that vide impugned judgment and order, the learned Court below has acquitted the respondent by setting aside the judgment and order of conviction, dated 07.05.2014, passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Dibrugarh, in C.R. Case No. 34C/2009, convicting the respondent under Section 500 IPC and sentencing him to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000/- (Rupees Two Thousand) and on default, to undergo SI for three months.

3. The factual background leading to filing of this appeal is adumbrated herein-below:

“The appellant, Shri Sailendra Kumar Goswami, was serving as the Manager, Muttuck Tea Estate, P.O. & P.S. Lahowal. The respondent was appointed as an Asstt. Factory Manager at Muttock T.E. Since the date of joining of respondent many untoward incidents had taken place in the company, for which the respondent was blamed by the staff and laborers. Thereafter, being dissatisfied with the performance of the respondent, the company has removed him from service. Thereafter, on 28.01.2009, the respondent sent one letter by e-mail, containing defamatory statement against the appellant to the President, M.K. Exports, Head Office at Mumbai, and also sent copies of the said letter to all concerned who are related with the Tea Management Group. Besides, the respondent has also been threatening the appellant with dire consequences by assuming and presuming him to be solely responsible for termination of his service. Then the appellant filed a complaint before the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Dibrugarh and then the learned Judicial Magistrate, after examination of the appellant, took cognizance of the offence under Section 500 IPC and summoned the respondent, Shri Raju Hazarika to appear before it and to stand trial. After receiving summon, the respondent appeared before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Dibrugarh, and stood trial. And he pleaded not guilty to the offence under Section 500 IPC, which was explained and read over to him. Thereafter, the appellant has examined as many as five witnesses including him, and after closing the evidence, the respondent was examined under section 313, Cr.P.C. on 23.02.2010. Thereafter, the respondent has examined himself as defense witness and after closing the evidence of both the parties and hearing the arguments of both sides, the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, has convicted the respondent as aforesaid.”

4. The respondent then filed an appeal before the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge, Dibrugarh, and vide impugned judgment and order dated 04.04.2015, the learned Additional Sessions Judge, in Crl. App.....11(2)/2014, has allowed the appeal, and set aside the judgment and order of conviction of the respondent so handed down by the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Dibrugarh.

5. Being highly aggrieved by the impugned judgment and order dated 04.04.2015, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge in Crl. App.....11(2)/2014, the appellant has preferred this appeal on the ground that:

(i) That, the learned Court below has misread the provision of law and the evidence on record and thereby committed irregularity and illegality.

(ii) That, the prosecution side has succeeded in establishing the case beyond reasonable doubt and that the prosecution witnesses namely, PW-1 (Shri Milan Saikia) and PW-2 (Shri Pranab Jyoti Dowerah) have clearly stated that the letter was sent by e-mail by the respondent, which was derogatory and damaging to the reputation of the appellant.

(iii) That, the derogatory stat