JUDGMENT :

1. Heard Mr. P.K. Tiwari, learned senior counsel, assisted by Mr. K. Saxena, learned counsel for the applicant/returned candidate and Mr. H. Lampu, learned counsel for the opposite party/election petitioner.

2. The opposite party/election petitioner having filed a Election Petition No. 03(AP)/2019, before this court praying for; (i) order dated 23.5.2019 declaring Smt. Dasanglu Pul, BJP candidate, as a winning candidate of 45-Hayuliang (ST) Assembly Constituency be held void and (ii) Er. Lupalum Kri, the election petitioner be declared elected candidate of the 45-Hayuliang (ST) Assembly Constituency; and in view of the second prayer of the election petitioner made in the election petition, the present applicant/returned candidate having filed a recrimination petition under section 97 of the Representation of the Peoples Act, 1951, registered as Recrimination Case No. 01(AP)/2020, seeking a declaration that the election petitioner was holding an office of profit on the day his nomination papers were scrutinized by the Returning Officer of 45-Hayuliang (ST) Assembly Constituency and as such, was disqualified for being chosen as and for being a member of the Legislative Assembly of the State of Arunachal Pradesh; this application under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been filed by the applicant/returned candidate for holding of joint trial of the Election Petition No. 03(AP)/2019 and Recrimination No. 01(AP)/2020.

3. Contending that it is the requirement under the law that election petition and recrimination petition needs to be tried together, Mr. Tiwari, learned senior counsel for the applicant has relied on the following decisions:

(i) Jabar Singh v. Genda Lal, AIR 1964 SC 1200, paragraph Nos. 10 and 11.

“…10. It would be convenient if we take a simple case of an election petition where the petitioner makes only one claim and that is that the election of the returned candidate is void. This claim can be made under section 100. Section 100(1)(a), (b) and (c) refer to three distinct grounds on which the election of the returned candidate can be challenged. We are not concerned with any of these grounds. In dealing with the challenge to the validity of the election of the returned candidate under section 100(1)(d). it would be noticed that what the election petition has to prove is not only the existence of one or the other of the grounds specified in sub-clauses (i) to (iv) of section 100(1)(d). but it has also to establish that as a result of the existence of the said ground, the result of the election insofar as it concerns a returned candidate has been materially affected. It is, thus, obvious that what the Tribunal has to find is whether or not the election insofar as it concerns the returned candidate has been materially affected, and that means that the only point which the Tribunal has to decide is : has the election of the returned candidate been materially affected? And no other enquiry is legitimate or permissible in such a case. This requirement of section 100(1)(d) necessarily imports limitations on the scope of the enquiry. Confining ourselves to sub-clause (iii) of section 100(1)(d). what the Tribunal has to consider is whether there has been an improper reception of votes in favour of the returned candidate. It may also enquire whether there has been a refusal or rejection of any vote in regard to any other candidate or whether there has been a reception of any vote which is void and this can only be the reception of a void vote in favour of the returned candidate. In other words, the scope of the enquiry in a case failing under section 100(1)(d)(iii) is to determine whether any votes have been improperly cast in favour of the returned candidate, or any votes have been improperly refused or rejected in regard to any other candidate. These are the only two matters which would be relevant in deciding whether the election of the returned candidate has been materially affected or not. At this enqu