The need for a justice-oriented and pragmatic approach over technicalities in condoning the delay in filing the appeal.

JUDGMENT :

1. Office Note dated 11.11.2022 reflects that fresh notice upon the respondent No. 4 by registered post with A/D was issued on 9.11.2022 and no fresh notice has been issued upon the respondent No. 1. Further, the respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 5 have entered appearance through their learned counsel

2. Ms. M. Saikia, learned counsel for the applicant, however, submits that the respondent No. 1 (claimant No. 1) was the mother of the deceased., who had passed away even before the award could be passed and she has been made party only in terms of the format. The learned counsel, accordingly submits that the name of the respondent No. 1 may be struck off as there are two other claimants who are the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 represented by Shri D. Mondal, learned counsel. Ms. Saikia, learned counsel further submits that the respondent No. 4 is the owner to whom fresh notice has been issued.

3. Since the ground of appeal is mainly on the quantum, the presence of the owner, i.e., the respondent No. 4 may not be necessary and. accordingly, the name of the respondent No. 4 is also struck off.

4. Shri A.A. Mondal, learned, counsel has entered appearance for the respondent No. 5.

5. Heard, the learned counsel on the application for condonation of delay.

6. Ms. Saikia, learned counsel for the applicant has submitted that the delay of 52 days in preferring the appeal is for reasons beyond the control of the applicant-appellant. The learned counsel has submitted that the copy of the impugned judgment and award dated 15.30.2018 was received by the Advocate only on 16.11.2018 and thereafter by the Office on 29.11.2018. Scrutiny of the records and referring the matter to the panel Advocate to prefer the appeal consumed sometime as a result thereof, there is a delay of 52 days. Ms. Saikia, learned counsel has submitted that in considering a delay condonation petition, a justice oriented and pragmatic approach should be taken by the court so that substantial justice can be given more weightage than the technicalities.

7. Both the learned counsel for the opposite parties, namely, Shri D. Mondal and Shri A.A. Mondal do not seriously oppose the prayer for condonation of delay and submit that they would rather contest on the merits of the case.

8. As rightly contended by the learned counsel for the applicant while considering a delay condonation application, unless the delay is found to be a result of gross negligence, the approach of the court should be a lenient one so that substantive justice can be given due importance over technicalities. Though law of limitation is equally important law by which the adverse party acquires a right on the expiry period of limitation, the discretion given for condonation of delay needs to be exercised in a judicious manner to protect the interest of justice.

9. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani, (1996) 3 SCC 132 had laid down the law relating to condonation of delay. The relevant extract is as follows;

“11. … The expression “sufficient cause” should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day's delay. The factors “which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-a-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause.

10. Further, in the case of State of Nagaland v. Lipok Ao, (2005) 3 SCC 752, the Hon'ble Supreme Court as held as follow:

“7…. A pragmatic approach has to be adopted and when substantial justice and technical approach are pitted against each other the former has to be preferred.”

11. In view of the above, this court is of the opinion that the delay