SupremeToday Landscape Ad
Back
Next
Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation
Listen Audio Icon Pause Audio Icon
judgment-img

2026 Supreme(Gau) 939

IN THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) AT KOHIMA BENCH
PRANJAL DAS, J.
Royal Sundaram G.I.C. Ltd. – Appellant
Versus
Bharati Bhuyan Konwar W/o Late Raghi Konwar – Respondent
I.A. (Civil) No. 210 of 2024
Decided On : 28-04-2026

Advocates Appeared:
For the Appellant : Vikramjeet Devnath
For the Respondents: Tongpok Pongener, Laknyei Phom

Condonation of delay under the limitation statute requires proof of sufficient cause and diligence. Administrative negligence or internal processing delays in organizations do not constitute sufficient cause, and courts must not evaluate the merits of the primary appeal when adjudicating the plea for condoning delay.

Headnote:(A) Limitation Act, 1963 - Section 5 - Condonation of delay - Sufficiency of cause - Principles laid down - Law of limitation based on public policy to end litigation - Discretionary power to condone delay requires demonstration of sufficient cause - Administrative process or internal communication gaps within organizations do not excuse inordinate delay - Merits of main appeal are not to be considered during adjudication of delay condonation. (Paras 13, 14, 21, 24)

(B) Appellate Review - Binding Precedents - Conflicting decisions between coordinate benches of equal strength - Preferable course is to follow the earlier decision of a coordinate bench or refer to a larger bench for authoritative settlement - Doctrine of precedent promotes consistency and legal certainty. (Paras 18, 19, 20)

Facts of the case:
The appellant-insurer sought condonation of a 321-day delay in filing an appeal against a compensation award passed by a tribunal. The insurer cited internal processing, panel lawyer empanelment, and legal opinion cycles as grounds for the delay, asserting that the appeal addressed substantial questions of law regarding the conversion of legal provisions for calculating compensation.

Findings of Court:
The court found that the explanation provided was merely a recitation of dates and internal administrative processes lacking cogent justification for the significant time gaps. It observed that the applicant failed to prove 'sufficient cause' and that large, unexplained gaps in the procedural timeline indicated a lack of due diligence, precluding the exercise of discretionary power to condone the delay.

Issues: The primary issues were whether the appellant established sufficient cause for the condonation of a 321-day delay under the limitation statute and whether the court should consider the merits of the underlying appeal when deciding a delay condonation application.

Ratio Decidendi: Delay condonation requires a demonstration of bonafide reasons rather than mere administrative procedural accounts. Adjudicating authorities cannot delve into the merits of the main case during a delay condonation proceeding, as established by binding precedents (coordinate benches). Internal organizational delays without adequate justification do not merit the exercise of judicial discretion to override statutory limitation periods.

Result: Application dismissed.

Table of Content
1. establishing the factual background and timeline of the delay in filing the appeal. (Para 1 , 2 , 3 , 4)
2. parties' arguments regarding whether 321 days constitutes sufficient cause for condonation of delay. (Para 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 , 10 , 11)
3. resolution of conflicting precedents concerning whether merits of a case can be considered during delay condonation. (Para 12 , 13 , 14 , 15 , 16 , 17 , 18 , 19 , 20)
4. requirement for realistic and bona fide explanation of delay, even for organizational litigants. (Para 21 , 22)
5. application of legal principles to specific facts leading to the rejection of the delay condonation application. (Para 23 , 24 , 25 , 26 , 27)

JUDGMENT :

PRANJAL DAS, J.

1. Heard Mr. Vikramjeet Devnath, learned counsel for the applicant. Also heard Mr. Tongpok Pongener, learned counsel and Mr. Laknyei Phom, learned counsel for the respondent nos. 1 and 2.

2. The applicant/Insurance company is seeking to file an appeal under Section 173 of the MV Act, 1988 against the Judgment and Award dated 16.10.2023 passed by the learned Member, MACT, Mokokchung in MAC case No. 40 of 2018, whereby the Tribunal was pleased to award a total compensation of Rs. 23,59,800/- (Twenty Three Lakhs Fifty Nine Thousand Eight Hundred) to the claimants (respondent no. 1 and 2 herein) along with interest of 7.5% per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition. However, there is stated to be a delay of 321 days in preferring the appeal and hence an application has been filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, thereby giving rise to the instant interlocutory proceeding.

3. The applicant/Insurance company has narrated the grounds of delay in para 7 thereof. The applicant has also filed an additional affidavit wherein also in paragraphs 2 and 3, narration regarding the delay and its explanation thereof has been given. The explanation regarding the delay, including the various dates that emerges from para 7 of the delay condonation petition and para 2 and 3 of the additional affidavit may be enumerated in the following tabular format:-

4. In the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the respondent Nos. 1 and 2, it is stated that 5 months and 19 days lapsed from the date of receipt of the Judgment by the Panel Lawyer and processing of the same at the Head Office of the applicant at Chennai. It is also stated that though legal opinion was given on 03.05.2024 to the Head Office, but after 5 months and 19 days, the Head Office on 20.10.2024 instructed the counsel to prepare the MAC Appeal.

5. It is stated and submitted that there was delay on the part of the applicant at every stage and except for mentioning the dates and the decisions taken, there was no explanation as to why the delay had occasioned. In this backdrop, the respondent Nos. 1 and 2, contends that the said statements should not be accepted as showing sufficient cause for condoning the delay of 321 days. It is also stated and contended that the applicant has taken a casual and negligent attitude and that, except mentioning dates, the applicant has failed to give any cogent reasons to condone the delay, which is also on the higher side.

6. The learned counsel for the applicant drawing attention to Paragraph 7 of the main application, and Paragraph 2 of the additional affidavit, has submitted that the said paragraphs have enumerated the explanations for the delay that occurred in filing the appeal. It is submitted that when the impugned judgment was rendered, he was not yet empanelled by the Insurance Company and only subsequently, he came to be empanelled and that this also contributed to the delay. It is submitted that in several decisions, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has indicated that a liberal approach should be adopted on the question of delay condonation.

7. He further submits that in the impugned judgment, though the claim petition was filed under Section 163A of the MV Act 1988, but the learned Tribunal stating that the 2019 amendment had abolished the

Click Here to Read the rest of this document
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
SupremeToday Portrait Ad
supreme today icon
logo-black

An indispensable Tool for Legal Professionals, Endorsed by Various High Court and Judicial Officers

Please visit our Training & Support
Center or Contact Us for assistance

qr

Scan Me!

India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!

For Daily Legal Updates, Join us on :

whatsapp-icon Back to top