Facts:

1. The two petitioners in W.P.(C)No.23166/2015 and the sole petitioner in W.P.(C)No.23865/2015, all of them being the Senior Managers in charge working in the second respondent Society, have filed the present writ petitions assailing the orders of suspension passed by the first respondent in W.P.(C)No.23166/2015 and the third respondent in W.P.(C)No.23865/2015.

2. Since all the petitioners, having been similarly situated, have raised a common grievance against the same set of respondents, this Court has proposed to dispose of both the writ petitions through a common judgment. Accordingly, for ease of reference and convenience, the facts as narrated and the parties as arrayed in W.P.(C) No.23166/2015 have been referred to for the purpose of elucidating the issue.

3. Briefly stated, the petitioners have been placed under suspension through Exhibits P1 and P2, apart from having been served with Exhibits P3 and P4 charge memos by the first respondent. Essentially assailing the orders of suspension as being ultra vires of the fourth respondent, the petitioners have filed the present writ petition.

Submissions:

Petitioners’:

4. Mr.Sasindran, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in W.P.(C)No.23166/2015, has submitted that the second respondent is a Consumer Federation, a Cooperative Society, governed by the provisions of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969 and the Rules made thereunder. The learned counsel has drawn my attention to Section 80 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act (‘the Act’ for brevity) dealing with classification of the societies, especially Section 80(3) thereof dealing with the power to make rules. He has further referred to Rule 182(2) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules (‘the Rules’ for brevity) to emphasize the fact that it is the Managing Committee that has got the power to appoint all employees in the Federation, and consequently to suspend them, as well.

5. The learned counsel has also drawn my attention to Rules 198(2)(a) and 198(2)(b) of the Rules to hammer home the point that disciplinary powers are to be exercised by a sub-committee to be appointed by the Managing Committee. In that context, the learned counsel has strenuously contended that Rule 188(8) of the Rules is explicit in stating that the power of suspension vests with the appointing authority, which is none other than the Managing Committee. In other words, it is the singular contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the first respondent, being the Managing Director, has not been conferred with any power either under the principal enactment or under any secondary legislation, to suspend a delinquent employee, as a part of the disciplinary proceedings.

6. Based on the averments made in the counter affidavit filed by the respondent Society, the learned counsel would refer to clause 29 of the Bye-laws to contend that once the bye-laws are in conflict with the principal enactment or the rules made thereunder, they would not survive. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel has placed reliance on P.A. George v. Tatapuram Cooperative Society Ltd., (1975 KLT 367) and Venugopalan v. Co operative Tribunal (1986 KLT 1213)

7. The learned counsel for the petitioner in W.P.(C) No.23865/2015 has adopted the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioners in W.P.(C)No.23166/2015.

The Plea of the State:

8. The learned Government Pleader, appearing for the fourth respondent in W.P.(C)No.23166/2015 and respondents 1 and 2 in W.P.(C)No.23865/2015, has substantially endorsed the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioners. He has also drawn my attention to Section 13A of the Act to stress the proposition that once there is a conflict between the substantive legislation and the bye-laws, it is the former that prevails. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel has placed reliance on Philomina Dominic v. Kerala State Co-operative Housing Federation (2011 (1) KLT SN 27 (C.No.