IMPORTANT POINTS
The terms of Ext R 2(a) settlement are no longer in force also cannot be accepted for the reason that even if we were to hold so, that, by itself, will not revive Ext.P.2. On the repeal of the parent statute (here the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948), any subordinate legislation framed thereunder would also stand repealed unless, of course, they were specifically saved under the repeal and savings clause.

JUDGMENT :

Gopinath, J.

This Writ Appeal is filed by the respondents in W.P.(C)No.30561/2012. That Writ Petition was filed by the son of a former Part-Time Contingent Employee who died while in service of the Kerala State Electricity Board Limited (hereinafter referred to as ‘KSEBL’), on 21.3.2011, claiming compassionate appointment. The claim of the writ petitioner was rejected on the ground that only the dependants of the Part-Time Contingent Employees, who die before attaining the age of 60 years are eligible to be considered for compassionate appointment in terms of the industrial settlement entered into between the Kerala State Electricity Board and its employees, in 2007.

2. The writ petitioner contended, inter alia, that the provisions of the long term settlement were in direct conflict with Statutory Regulations framed by the erstwhile Kerala State Electricity Board in the exercise of the powers conferred by Section 79 r/w. Section 15 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. These regulations, which are produced as Ext.P2 along with the writ petition clearly did not place an embargo on the dependants of Part-Time Contingent Employees, who died after attaining the age of 60 years from claiming the benefit of the dying-in-harness scheme.

3. A learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition following the judgment in Rita Bella v. State of Kerala [2015 (1) KLT 691], wherein it was held that the provisions of the settlement cannot override the Statutory Regulations in determining the eligibility for appointment of dependants under the dying-in-harness Scheme.

4. We have heard Sri. Raju Joseph, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri. Joseph Antony, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, KSEBL, and Dr. George Abraham, learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner. Sri. Raju Joseph would contend that the writ petitioner’s mother died on 21.3.2011, at the age of 66. He would contend that the question of applying the law laid down in Rita Bella's case (supra) does not arise on account of the fact that the statutory scheme relied upon by the petitioner (Ext.P2) is presently not in force on account of the repeal provision in Section 185 of the Electricity Act. 2003. He contends that the Supreme Court in its recent judgment in Santhosh N.C. v. State of Karnataka and others reported in 2020 (2) KHC 371 (SC) has held that insofar as compassionate appointment is concerned, only the rules prevailing on the date of consideration of the application will apply. According to Sri. Raju Joseph, since writ petitioner’s mother, died on 21.3.2011, the question of applying Ext.P2 regulation, which was framed under the repealed provisions of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, does not arise as on the relevant date the provisions of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 stood repealed by the provisions of the Electricity Act of 2003. He would contend that unless the provisions of subordinate legislation framed under the provisions of the repealed enactment are specifically saved by the repealing Act, the subordinate legislation cannot have any legal effect after repeal. Mr.Raju Joseph refers to State of U.P. v. Hirendra Pal Singh, (2011) 5 SCC 305 and in particular to paragraph 22 of that judgment which reads as follows:-

“It is a settled legal proposition that whenever an Act is repealed, it must be considered as if it had never existed. The object of repeal is to obliterate the Act from the statutory books, except for certain purposes as provided under Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Repeal is not a matter of mere form but is of substance. Therefore, on repeal, the earlier provisions stand obliterated /abrogated /wiped out wholly i.e. pro tanto repeal (vide Dagi Ram Pindi Lall v. Trilok Chand Jain [(1992) 2 SCC 13 : AIR 1992 SC 990] ; Gajraj Singh v. STAT [(1997) 1 SCC 650 : AIR 1997 SC 412] ; Property Owners' Assn. v. State of Maharashtra [(2001) 4 SCC 455 : AIR 2001 SC 1668] and Mohan Raj v. Dimbeswari Saikia [(2007) 15 SCC 115 : (2