Point of law : Plea of guilt – Stage - Necessity of evidence would arise only if and when the charge is not accepted. There is no reason to restrict the applicability of S. 229 of the Cr.P.C. to a particular date or occasion but the purport of section is obvious that plea of guilt can be advanced by an accused at any stage of the trial after framing charge. If an accused is allowed to withdraw his claim to be tried and plead guilty, an earlier termination of the trial can be secured and wastage of the precious time of the court can be avoided.

ORDER :

1. The petitioner stands convicted by the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-I, Parappanangadi in C C. Nos. 2058 of 2014 and 2059 of 2014, arising from Crime Nos. 625 of 2014 and 626 of 2014 of the Tirurangadi Police Station. The incident leading to registration of the crimes occurred on 02.06.2014 at about 10.15 a.m. when the accused allegedly obstructed the procession taken out from the Thrikkulam Government High School, Chemmad in connection with the school admission festival and assaulted some of the volunteers. Crime No. 625 of 2014 was registered for offences under Sections 143, 147, 353 read with 149 of the IPC and Section 35 (sic) of the Kerala Prevention of Disturbances of Public Meetings Act, 1961. Crime No. 626 of 2014 was registered for the offences under Sections 143, 147, 148, 341, 323, 324 read with 149 of IPC. All accused were convicted by the trial court on their pleading guilty of the offences. Upon conviction, the accused were sentenced to pay fine for each offence. The judgments are challenged mainly on the ground that the procedure adopted by the trial court in finding the accused to have pleaded guilty was patently illegal.

2. Heard Sri. D. Anilkumar, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Sri. T.R. Renjith, learned Public Prosecutor.

3. Sri. Anilkumar contended that the conviction of an accused based on his plea of guilty results in that person being convicted and punished without trial and hence the Magistrates are bound to ensure that the plea is voluntary, clear and unambiguous and is put forth after understanding the implications of such admission. According to the learned Counsel, a monosyllabic ‘yes’ elicited as an answer to the pointed question as to whether the petitioner had committed the offences mentioned in the charge, will not satisfy the aforementioned requirements. It is submitted that the petitioner was not made aware of the consequences of his pleading guilty and the unknowing act has resulted in the petitioner being denied appointment, in spite of the inclusion of his name in the ranked list of Constable (Telecommunication). It is argued that the impugned judgment is bad for non-application of mind, which is evident from the conviction and sentence imposed under Section 35 of the Kerala Prevention of Disturbances of Public Meetings Act, 1961, despite the enactment having only three sections. Support for the argument is mustered by relying on the decision of the Apex Court in Jupudi Anand Gupta vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2019) 14 SCC 723.

4. In reply, the learned Public Prosecutor highlighted the limited scope for interference with the judgments where the conviction is based on the admission of guilt by the accused.

5. On scrutiny of the diary extract and records received from the lower court, it is seen that the court charge in the cases was framed and read over to the accused on 09.03.2017. Thereafter, the accused were asked whether they had committed the offences and they answered in the negative. This plea of not guilty was recorded and the cases posted for prosecution evidence. After a few adjournments, the cases were taken up on 24.04.2018, on which day, the question whether the accused had committed the offences was repeated. This time the accused answered yes. This answer was treated as pleading of guilt and the accused were convicted. Surprisingly, in the questionnaire containing the replies given by the accused, the answer of the first accused to the question whether he had committed the offences, is not seen entered. Having noted this patent defect, I find substance in the contention of the petitioner that the plea was recorded in a very casual manner. The legality of the said procedure, which would decide the sustainability of the petitioner’s conviction, is the issue to be decided.

6. Being the contextually relevant provisions, Sections 240 and 241 of Cr.P.C. are extracted hereunder:

“240. Framing of charge:

(1) If, upon such consideration, examination, if any, and hea