Point of Law: While calculating time contemplated under Section 138(c) of the NI Act and 15 day's time has to be counted from the next day of date of receipt of notice.

ORDER :

This is a petition filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash Annexure-A1 complaint, which led to registration of S.T.No.1970 of 2020 pending before the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Changanacherry. The petitioner herein is the accused before the trial court and the respondents are State of Kerala as well as the original complainant in the above case.

2. A question of subtle importance crops up for consideration is;

How to calculate the period of limitation for filing complaint under Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act alleging commission of offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act?

3. Though notice served on the second respondent, he did not appear.

4. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner as well as the learned Public Prosecutor representing the State.

5. The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the legal notice issued in this case was accepted by the accused on 22.04.2020. Thereafter, the complaint was filed on 08.06.2020. Therefore, it is argued that, the complaint was filed after expiry of the statutory period without any petition to condone delay. It is submitted further that as per Section 142(1)(b) of the Negotiable Instruments Act(hereinafter will be referred as 'NI Act' for convenience), the complaint shall be filed within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises under clause(c) of the proviso to Section 138(b). Therefore, there is one day's delay in lodging the complaint which was filed on 08.06.2020 and therefore, the cognizance taken in this matter without condoning the delay is illegal and as such, the complaint is liable to be quashed.

6. In view of this argument, how to calculate the period of limitation in filing complaint under Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act alleging commission of offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act? is the relevant question. It is to be noted that the Apex Court dealt the said issue in a three Bench decision reported in [2013(3) KHC 659], Econ Antri Ltd. v. Rom Industries Ltd. and Another, where it has been held referring to another decision reported in [1999 (3) SCC 1], [1999 (1) KLJ 820], [1999 KHC 456], and [1999 (2) KLT SN 13], Saketh India Ltd. and Others v. India Securities Ltd. (where the relevant provisions of the General Clauses Act and the Limitation Act also considered) that it is not possible to hold that the word 'of' occurring in S.138(c) and 142(b) of the NI Act is to be interpreted differently as against the word 'from' occurring in S.138(a) of the NI Act; and that for the purposes of S.142(b), which prescribes that the complaint is to be filed within 30 days of the date on which the cause of action arises, the starting day on which the cause of action arises should be included for computing the period of 30 days. As held in Ex parte Fallon, 1793(5) Term Rep 283 the words 'of', 'from' and 'after' may, in a given case, mean really the same thing. As stated in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, Vol.3 1953 Edition, Note(5), the word 'of' is sometimes equivalent of 'after'. Further, it has been held that for the purpose of calculating the period of one month, which is prescribed under Section 142(1)(b) of the NI Act, the period has to be reckoned by excluding the date on which the cause of action arose. Thus, it was held that SIL Import USA(SIL Import USA v. Exim Aides Silk Exporters, Banglore, [1999 KHC 317] 1999 (2) KLT 275], 1999 (2)KLJ NOC 9], AIR 1999 SC 1609] did not lay down the correct law and any decisions of the Apex Court which took a view contrary to the view taken in Saketh's case (Supra) do not lay down the correct law.

7. Thus the law declared in Econ Antri Ltd.'s case(supra) would govern while calculating the period of limitation in filing a complaint alleging commission of offence under Section 138 of the NI Act.

8. In Saketh's case (supra), the facts dealt by the Apex Court was regarding cheques dated 15.03.1995 and 16.03.1995 which were bounced a