The High Court possesses inherent power to compound non-compoundable offenses post-conviction under Article 142, considering factors like the nature of the injury and the voluntary compromise by victims.

JUDGMENT :

A. BADHARUDEEN, J.

1. This appeal is at the instance of accused Nos.1 to 3 in SC No137/2011 on the files of the Additional Sessions Court-V, Palakkad. As per the impugned judgment dated 17.03.2014, the trial court found that the appellants/accused are guilty for the offences punishable under Sections 452 , 326, 324 and 294(b) of the INDIAN PENAL CODE (hereinafter referred to as ‘IPC’ for short) and accordingly, they were convicted and sentenced.

2. Now Crl.M.A.No.2/2025 has been filed jointly by the appellants as well as the injured persons, Sri.Vijayan and Unnikrishnan, stating that the matter has been compromised and therefore, the appeal need not be continued. Consequently, they submitted that the conviction and sentence are to be set aside acting on the compromise.

3. In so far as compounding of offences involving severe punishment, including under Section 326 of IPC, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that in the decision in Ramgopal and Ors. Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh , 2021 (5) KLT 601 : (2022) 14 SC 531, the Apex Court considered quashment of non- compoundable offences after conviction. In the said case, the Apex Court considered conviction and sentence imposed against the accused persons therein under Sections 294 , 323 and 326 r/w 34 of IPC. While answering the query as to whether compounding is permissible after conviction and sentence when offences are of serious nature, the Apex Court, after referring earlier decisions, viz. Narinder Singh and Ors. Vs. State of Punjab and Ors. 2014 (6) SCC 466 and the decision in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan and Ors. (2019) 5 SCC 688 , concluded the legal position in paragraph Nos.18 and 19 as under:

“18. It is now a well crystalized axiom that the plenary jurisdiction of this Court to impart complete justice Under Article 142 cannot ipso facto be limited or restricted by ordinary statutory provisions. It is also noteworthy that even in the absence of an express provision akin to Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure conferring powers on the Supreme Court to abrogate and set aside criminal proceedings, the jurisdiction exercisable Under Article 142 of the Constitution embraces this Court with scopious power to quash criminal proceedings also, so as to secure complete justice. In doing so, due regard must be given to the overarching objective of sentencing in the criminal justice system, which is grounded on the sub- lime philosophy of maintenance of peace of the collective and that the rationale of placing an individual behind bars is aimed at his reformation.

19. We thus sum-up and hold that as opposed to Section 320 Code of Criminal Procedure where the Court is squarely guided by the compromise between the parties in respect of offences ‘compoundable’ within the statutory framework, the extra-ordinary power enjoined upon a High Court Under Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure or vested in this Court Under Article 142 of the Constitution, can be invoked, beyond the metes and bounds of Section 320 Code of Criminal Procedure Nonetheless, we reiterate that such powers of wide amplitude ought to be exercised carefully in the context of quashing criminal proceedings, bearing in mind: (i) Nature and effect of the offence on the conscious of the society; (ii) Seriousness of the injury, if any; (iii) Voluntary nature of compromise between the Accused and the victim; & (iv) Conduct of the Accused persons, prior to and after the occurrence of the purported offence and/or other relevant considerations.”

4. On perusal of the legal position settled by the Apex Court in Ramgopal and Ors. (supra), as opposed to Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as ‘C