The constitution of an Internal Complaints Committee under the POSH Act requires a workplace as defined by the Act; a Bar Association does not qualify as an employer, rendering its ICC constitution void.

JUDGMENT :

P.M. MANOJ, J.

The primary issues to be considered in this Writ Petition are the legality of the constitution of the Internal Complaints Committee (‘ICC’ for short) under the provisions of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 (for short, the POSH Act), the enquiry conducted by the said committee, and the challenge to the suspension order issued against the petitioner by the Kollam Bar Association.

2. The short facts of the case are as follows:

The petitioner and the 3^rd respondent are members of the Kollam Bar Association, the 1^st respondent, which is registered under Section 26 of the Travancore Companies Regulation 1 of 1092. The 3^rd respondent preferred a complaint before the 1^st respondent alleging misconduct on the part of the petitioner. The alleged incident occurred on 14.06.2024 at the petitioner's residence, when the 3^rd respondent visited the petitioner to discuss the notarisation of a document.

3. It is a matter of fact that the 3^rd respondent had also preferred a complaint before the Police, based on which a First Information Report (FIR) was registered alleging offences under Sections 3 54, 354A(1)(i), 354(1)(ii), and 354(1)(iv) IPC. Subsequently, on the basis of the complaint preferred by the 3^rd respondent on 15.06.2024, the President of the 1^st respondent Bar Association constituted an ICC as provided under Section 4 of the POSH Act.

4. The ICC conducted an enquiry into the alleged misconduct that occurred on 14.06.2024 and submitted a report, marked as Ext.P8. The primary challenge in this petition is against the said report. The remaining reliefs sought are consequential to the report, including the challenge against the suspension of the petitioner from the 1^st respondent Association.

5. For the purpose of examining the issues involved, it is necessary to consider Sections 2 (a), 2(f), 2(g), 2(n) and 2(o) as well as Sections 3 , 4 and 9 of the POSH Act.

For convenience, the above Sections are reproduced hereunder:

“2. Definitions.—In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, —

(a) “aggrieved woman” means—

(i) in relation to a workplace, a woman, of any age whether employed or not, who alleges to have been subjected to any act of sexual harassment by the respondent;

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(n) “sexual harassment” includes any one or more of the following unwelcome acts or behavior (whether directly or by implication) namely:—

(i) physical contact and advances; or

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(v) any other unwelcome physical, verbal or non-verbal conduct of sexual nature;

(o) “workplace” includes—

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(ii) any private sector organisation or a private venture, undertaking, enterprise, institution, establishment, society, trust, non- governmental organisation, unit or service provider carrying on commercial, professional, vocational, educational, entertainmental, industrial, health services or financial activities including production, supply, sale, distribution or service;

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(v) any place visited by the employee arising out of or during the course of employment, including transportation by the employer for undertaking such journey;”

6. The provisions mentioned above constitute the definition of sexual harassment under Section 3 of the Act, which focuses on prevention. Section 3 begins with an inclusive clause stating that no woman shall be subje