Judicial restraint in exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 is imperative when efficacious alternate statutory remedies are available, emphasizing the importance of decentralizing justice and preserving court efficiency.

JUDGMENT :

MOHAMMED NIAS C.P, J.

1. The petitioner challenges the Ext.P10 order passed by the Regional Transport Authority, Palakkad, whereby a fresh regular stage carriage permit was granted to the 3^rd respondent on an inter- district route overlapping the petitioner’s existing regular permit. It is the specific contention of the petitioner that the Regional Transport Authority failed to consider the objections raised by the petitioner regarding substantial route overlap and timing clash, and proceeded to grant the permit in derogation of the statutory scheme under the Motor Vehicles Act and the Rules. According to the petitioner, the impugned order has been passed without a proper assessment of the existing services on the route and without recording any cogent reasons justifying the grant.

2. Against the order impugned in the writ petition, the petitioner has an alternate efficacious statutory remedy under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal.

3. The learned counsel for the petitioner, relying on the judgment of Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and Others [ (1998) 8 SCC 1 ], submits that since statutory violations are alleged, this Court can entertain the writ petition.

4. The law is well settled that the existence of an efficacious alternate remedy does not operate as an absolute bar to the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

5. Equally settled is the distinction between cases where the High Court may interfere despite the availability of an alternate remedy and cases where the High Court alone can decide, like a challenge to legislative action, a lack of inherent jurisdiction, or constitutional infirmities. As held by the Supreme Court in United Bank of India Vs. Satyawati Tondon and Others [2010 (8) SCC 110], the Hon’ble Supreme Court cautioned the High Courts against entertaining the writ petitions in the teeth of statutory remedies, particularly having regard to docket explosion and institutional discipline. Therefore, while the High Court's constitutional power remains plenary, the consistent judicial policy mandates that, in matters where efficacious alternate remedies are available, parties ought ordinarily to be relegated to pursue the same, reserving writ jurisdiction for cases that fall within the recognised exceptions or require exclusive consideration by the High Court.

6. As rightly held by this Court in Tolin Rubbers (P) Limited v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax (2003 SCC ONLINE KER 432), the crucial question is whether this Court is justified in exercising the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the face of the alternative remedies available. If this Court entertains writ petitions on the ground of jurisdictional error, unmindful of the existence of an alternative remedy, this Court will be doing a great disservice to public interest. The efficacy of this Court has been considerably compromised owing to the docket explosion. This Court's precious time should be preserved for those matters which this Court alone is competent to deal with.

7. Reliance was placed on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kanubhai Bhahmbhatt v. State of Gujarat [1989 Supp (2) SCC 310], wherein the Apex Court underscored that despite the fact that the right to approach the Apex Court is a fundamental right under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner should first approach the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, instead of directly knocking at the doors of the Apex Court. The Supreme Court cautioned as follows:

“Reasons, good and substantial, exist for directing the petitioner to approach the conce