1. 1. This second appeal has been filed against the judgment and order of the learned Appellate Court dated 25.9.2001, allowing the appeal of the respondent.

2. The facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that vide order dated 19.4.1980, appellant had been appointed temporarily as a Lower Division Clerk with a clear stipulation that his services would be liable to be terminated without any notice. His services stood terminated without providing any opportunity of hearing or issuing show cause notice vide order dated 3.3.1981. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied, appellant filed Civil Suit No. 178/1981 in the Civil Court, Bikaner, which was allowed vide judgment and decree dated 5.11.1999 with the direction that appellant should be reinstated with all consequential benefits. However, as in the meanwhile, appellant had joined the service in the Government of Rajasthan Secretariat, Jaipur with effect from 26.3.1984, he was deprived of the back wages from the said date. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied, the State preferred first appeal, which has been allowed vide impugned judgment and order dated 25.9.2001, mainly on the ground that the said civil suit was not maintainable and even otherwise as appellant's services were temporary and liable to be terminated without any notice, the termination, vide order dated 3.3.1981, was not illegal. Hence this appeal.

3. Mr. G.K. Vyas, learned Counsel for the appellant, has submitted that the first appellate court has erred in holding that services of an employee, appointed temporarily, can be terminated without complying 'with the principles of natural justice and there is an absolute bar of civil court's jurisdiction in service matters and the suit cannot be entertained under any circumstance.

4. Undoubtedly, the second appeal can be entertained only on a substantial question of law. The Hon'ble Apex Court has been taking a very serious view of the matter emphasising that the High Courts should not entertain a second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure , 1908 (for short, "the Code") unless it raises a substantial question of law. In Panchu Gopal Barua v. Umesh Chandra Goswami and Ors., AIR 1497 Supreme Court 1041, , , the Court observed that while entertaining the second appeal, the Court should not over-look the change brought about by the Amendment Act of 1976 restricting the scope of second appeal drastically and now it applies only to appeals involving substantial question of law, specifically set-out in the memorandum of appeals and formulated by the High Court. The Court, for the reasons to be recorded, may also entertain a second appeal even on any other substantial question of law, not formulated by it, if the Court is satisfied that the case involves such a question. Therefore, the existence of a substantial question of law is a sine-qua-non for the exercise of jurisdiction under the amended provisions of Section 100 of the Code. It is the obligation on the Court of Law to further the clear intendment of the Legislature and not to frustrate it by ignoring the same.

5. Similarly, in Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar and Ors., AIR 1999 Supreme Court 2213 , the Apex Court held that right of appeal is a creation of the Statute. Thus, being a substantive statutory right, it has to be regulated in accordance with law in force, ensuring the full compliance of the conditions mentioned in the provision. Therefore, the Court has no power to enlarge the scope of those grounds mentioned in the statutory provision. Second appeal cannot be decided merely on equitable grounds as it lies only on substantial question of law, something distinct from the substantial question of fact. The Court cannot entertain the second appeal unless the substantial question of law is involved.

6. In Kashibai v. Parwatibai, (1995) 6 SCC 273 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the High Court cannot ignore the statutory provisions of Section 100 of the Code and re-a