The provisions of Sections 110A to 110F of the Motor Vehicles Act are procedural in nature and do not affect any substantive rights. Therefore, the doctrine of retrospectivity is not applicable to these provisions.

1. - By its order dated the 20th of July, 1968 the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Ajmer (hereinafter called "the Tribunal") rejected the claim in both the appeals beating Nos. 93 and 94 of 1966 on the ground that the accident bad taken place prior to the constitution of the Tribunal and was, therefore, not capable of being taken cognizance of by it. These two appeals raise an identical point and are therefore being disposed of by this judgment,

2. Succinctly stated the circumstances which proceeds the two appeals, are these: In between the night of 5th and 6th June, 1964 a bus bearing No. RJY 2035 was proceeding from Ajmer to Udaipur carrying petitioners Fatehlal and Mohanswaroop, the two claimants, amongst other passengers. From the opposite direction a truck bearing No. RJZ 2190 came and collided with the bus aforesaid, causing injuries to the right hand of petitioner Fatehlal and on the right elbow of petitioner Mohanswaroop Fatehlal and Mohanswaroop presented two claim petitions on 24-5-1965, each claiming Rs. 21,000/- before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal at Ajmer, The claims were hotly contested by the widow of the owner of the truck RJZ 2190 and including the Jupiter General Insurance Co. L d. The Tribunal trained as many as 8 issues but rejected the claim by answering issue No. 1 against the claimants holding that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the claim because the accident took prior to its constitution and therefore it has also no jurisdiction to condone the delay. It held in passing without framing any issue that the Jaipur Tribunal had no authority to transfer to him both the claims before it. Aggrieved by the rejection of the claim petitions both Fatehlal and Mohanswaroop have come up in appeal.

3. Learned Counsel for the Jupiter General Insurance Co, Ltd. Mr. Jain raises a preliminary objection that the appeal is not competent because the Tribunal gave no award and Section 110D envisages only an appeal against an award He places reliance on Miss Sarin Rustomji Munshi v. Santubhai Manibhai Patel and Ors. AIR 1969 Guj. 233 .

4. The provision which releases to appeal under Motor Vehicles Act (hereinafter called "the Act") is contained in Section 110D. It reads:

"110 D. (1) Subject to the provisions of Sub-section (2), any person aggrieved by an award of Claims Tribunal may, within ninety days from the date of the award, prefer an appeal to the High Court:

Provided that the High Court may entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period of ninety days, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal in time.

(2) No appeal shall lie against any award of a Claims Tribunal, if the amount in dispute in the appeal is less than two thousand rupees."

5. The learned Judge of the Gujrat High Court in Miss Sarin Rustomji's case AIR 1969 Guj. 233 expressed the opinion that the Claims Tribunal having refused to entertain a claim on the ground that it had no jurisdiction and accordingly the order was one of dismissal or disposal of the claim or determination of the claim in any other manner, and there was no adjudication of the claim but a refusal to adjudicate the claim and accordingly it was not an award within the meaning of Section 110 D of the Act. The learned Judge has significantly observed in paragraph 15 as follows:

"Nevertheless the reasoning of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the light of those decisions does call for consideration. The decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court is based on the ground that refusal to go into the claim of damages to the car amounted to refusal to make an award amounted to making an award. That conclusion may be valid in the particular circumstances of that case. In fact that is how the counsel for the appellant in that case had placed his case. But assuming that the decision defines the word 'award' so as to cover an order refusing to enquire into and adjudicate on the ground of want of jurisdiction, that view can