IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR
Sudesh Bansal, J.
Ambresh Sharma S/o Laddaram - Appellant
Versus
Sarad Chand Fadke S/o Late Shri Krishanrai Fadke - Respondent
S.B. Civil Second Appeal No. 79/2022
Decided On : 23-08-2022
Civil Procedure Code, 1908 – Section 100 – Order 6 Rule 17 – Rent Control Act, 2001 – Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001 –Agreement For Leave and Licence– First Appeal – Second appeal – Appellant-defendant has been directed to vacate and hand over the vacant possession of suit premises as also to pay arrears of mesne profits month until delivery of possession, which has been reduced by first appellate court – Held, Court has been bringing to notice of High Courts constraints of Section 100 of Code and mandate of law contained in Section 101 that no second appeal shall lie except on ground mentioned in Section 100, yet it appears that fundamental legal position concerning jurisdiction of High Court in second appeal is ignored and overlooked time and again – Present appeal is unfortunately one of such matters where High Court interfered with judgment and decree of first appellate court in total disregard of above legal position – Ordered Accordingly.
JUDGMENT :
1. Appellant-defendant has preferred this second appeal under Section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure against the judgment and decree dated 16.03.2022 passed in Civil First Appeal No.2/2021 (12/2021) by the Court of Additional District Judge No.2, Jaipur District, Jaipur, affirming the judgment and decree dated 06.08.2021 passed in Civil Suit No.148/2019 (06/18) by the Court of Additional Senior Civil Judge No.2, Jaipur District, Jaipur, whereby and whereunder the suit for possession, mesne profits and permanent injunction filed by respondent-plaintiff before the civil court has been decreed and the appellant-defendant has been directed to vacate and hand over the vacant possession of the suit premises as also to pay the arrears of mesne profits @ Rs.8,000/-per month until delivery of possession, which has been reduced by the first appellate court to Rs.4250/- per month.
2. Heard learned counsel for both parties & perused the impugned judgments and record.
3. Admittedly, the suit property is a residential houses comprising one hall, bedroom, kitchen, store & WC etc. situated in first floor of house No.123, Brahampuri, Jaipur.
4. It is not in dispute between the parties that the possession of aforesaid suit premises was given by the plaintiff to defendant through an agreement dated 03.05.2011 for a period of eleven months and later on this agreement was renewed by executing subsequent agreements time to time. All these agreements are undisputed between the parties and the appellant-defendant has admitted the execution as well as the contents of these agreements. These agreements are available on record from Exhibit 1 to Exhibit 6.
5. In the agreement dated 03.05.2011 (Ex.6), titled as “Agreement For Leave And Licence”, it was stated that possession of the house is being given to defendant on license and it is not a lease. Defendant also agreed to take the possession as license and not as lease. Such intention of parties stands clarified by the agreement and the Clauses A & B of the agreement reads as under:
The license fee was determined initially @ Rs.3150/-which time to time enhanced to Rs.4250/-.
6. Plaintiff instituted the present civil suit for possession on 23.05.2018, stating inter alia that renewal of license by the last agreement dated 6.01.2016, the license of defendant was not renewed thereafter and because defendant did not make any payment of the license fee and arrears accrued against him, therefore, by issuing a legal notice dated 17.04.2018, the license of defendant was terminated and due arrears of license fee were claimed. Since defendant did not respond the notice, hence the present suit has been instituted on 23.05.2018.
7. Defendant submitted his written statement and admitted getting possession of the suit premises under the agreement dated 3.05.2011 as also admitted the renewal of agreement by the subsequent agreements. Defendant denied to receive any notice dated 17.4.2018 by the plaintiff and contended that no cause of action has accrued to plaintiff to institute the present civil suit for possession.
8. It is worthy to note here that in written statement, defendant has not taken any plea that the agreements in question are not license deed but these agreements were executed as lease deed or should not be construed as license deed. The defendant, although alleged himself to be a tenant but did not raise any defence that being a tenant, the suit is not triable by the civil court. There is no plea of
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The distinction between a license and a lease is determined by the intention of the parties, as reflected in the deed, rather than merely the possession of the property.
Order XLII Rule 2 provides power of Court to direct that appeal be heard on question formulated by it.
GPA and similar documents do not confer title to immovable property; legal heirs of the original allottee are entitled to possession.
The main legal point established in the judgment is the application of the principle of estoppel against tenants or lessees in possession, as embodied in Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, which....
The distinction between lease and license must adhere to explicit terms of agreements, with possession alone insufficient to confer tenancy rights.
Tenancy rights cannot be terminated without due process under the Transfer of Property Act, and eviction must follow legal requirements.
Landlord can obtain possession of premises upon clear admissions about tenancy relations and formal lease termination, regardless of tenant's claims of extensions based on rent acceptance.
A second appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure is restricted to substantial questions of law. Appellate courts cannot reappreciate evidence or substitute factual findings unless the lower court's ....
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