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1998 Supreme(Raj) 51

Rajasthan High Court
Honble V.S. KOKJE & B.S. CHAUHAN, JJ.
Smt. Aqueela - Appellant
Versus
State of Rajasthan and Others - Respondents
D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 1270 of 1997
Decided On : January 17, 1998

Advocates Appeared:
M.S. Singhvi, for Appellant Vijay Bishnoi, for Respondents

Headnote:(a) Consitution of India, Art. 226 – Applicability of Limitation in writ jurisdiction – Law of Limitation does not apply to the writ jurisdiction – The principles enshrined in limitation are applicable and the Court can not entertain the stale claims unless there are some compelling circumstances and the explanation for the same has been provided for. (Para 7)(b) Constitution of India, Art. 226 – Grant of interim order – The litigant can not derive benefit from mere pendency of case in a Court of law – Interim order always merges in final order, if the writ petition is dismissed, the interim order stands nullified – The act of the Court prejudice no-one – Appellant can not get any benefit of the interim orders passed in her favour. (Para 11 & 12)

       The issue of application of Limitation in writ jurisdiction is not res integra. It has been held time and again by the Courts that though the Law of Limitation does not apply to the writ jurisdiction, however, the principles enshrined therein are fully applicable and the Court should not entertain the stale claims unless there are some compelling circumstances and the explanation for the same has been provided for. (Para 7)

       It is, also, settled law that no litigant can derive any benefit from mere pendency of case in a Court of law, as the interim order always merges in the final order to be passed in the case and if the writ petition is ultimately dismissed, the interim order stands nullified automatically. A party cannot be allowed to take any benefit of his own wrongs by getting interim order and thereafter blame the Court. The fact that the writ is found, ultimately devoid of any merit, shows that a frivolous writ petition had been filed. The maxim ``Actus Curie neminem gravabit is applicable in such a case, which means that the act of the Court shall prejudice no-one. In such a situation the Court is under an obligation to undo the wrong done by a party by the act of the Court. Thus, any undeserved or unfair advantage gained by a party invoking the jurisdiction of the Court must be neutralised as institution of litigation cannot be permitted to confer any advantage on a suitor from delayed action by the act of the Court. (Para 12)

Honble CHAUHAN, J.–The instant appeal has been filed against the common judgment and order of the learned Single Judge dated 2.12.97 passed in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 5592/92 challenging the termination of the services of the petitioner- appellant vide order dated 27.3.91 and also claiming regularisation of her service, and in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3461/1994 challenging the order dated 12.5.94 terminating the services of the appellant as the appellant had been reinstated in terms of the interim order of this Court dated 22.10.92.

(2). The facts, giving rise to this appeal, are that the appellant passed her Secondary School examination in the year 1975 from the Board of Secondary Education, Rajasthan, Ajmer and obtained the Diploma in Niddle Work and Tailo- ring from the Rajasthan Mahila Vidhyalaya, Udaipur in the year 1977. The appellant was appointed on the post of Primary School Teacher by the Panchayat Samiti, Jhadol vide order dated 26.9.84 on temporary basis for a period of six months and her services were extended from time to time, but the same came to an end in the year 1985. She was again re-appointed on temporary basis vide order dated 28.6.85. The appellant was informed, vide order dated 14.9.88 contained in Annexure P.5 to the writ petition, that since the Diploma possessed by the appellant had not been recognised by the Government for appointment on the post of primary school teacher and she was not eligible to be appointed, she would be allowed to continue but her pay scale would be reduced. However, the said order was subsequently withdrawn vide order dated 7.1.89. The appellant applied for regular selection on the post in question. However, her claim was rejected vide order dated 14.8.88 as she was not possessing the requisite qualification and her Diploma in Niddle Work and Tailoring was not the required eligibility and her services were terminated vide order dated 27.3.91 with effect from 1.4.91 on the ground that duly selected candi- dates had become available and her services were not more required.

(3). Being aggrieved and dis-satisfied from the order dated 27.3.91, the appellant preferred S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 5592/92 and this Court passed the interim order on 22.10.92 directing the respondents to reinstate the appellant and pay her the salary regularly and this interim order was complied with by the respondents. The services of the appellant petitioner were again terminated by the respondents vide order dated 12.5.94, contained in Annexure 18 to the writ petition, on the ground that the Honble Supreme Court had decided the aforesaid Civil Appeal No. 7031/93, State of Rajasthan vs. Sgtan Lal Joshi (1); according to which the appellant was not possessing the requisite qualification and, thus, was not eligible for the said post. The said order was, however, passed terminating the services of a large number of teachers. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied, the appellant-petitioner challenged the said order dated 12.5.94 by filing S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3461/94 and this court, vide Order dated 27.7.94, directed the respondents to take the appellant-petitioner in employment until further orders. Respondents filed an appli- cation on 5.12.94 under Article 226(3) of the Constitution of India. However, this Court extended the interim order passed earlier without considering the application under Article 226(3) and both the matters were ultimately finally heard and dismissed by a common judgment dated 2.12.97. Hence this appeal.

(4). As the matter relates to temporary services of the appellant, who had been allowed to continue in service for several years by the interim orders of this Court, the learned counsel appearing for the parties requested the Court to dispose of the appeal at the Admission Stage, hence the appeal was finally heard.

(5). Heard Mr. M.S. Singhvi-learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. Vijay Bishnoi learned counsel for the respondents.

(6). Mr. Bishnoi - learned counsel for
























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