IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT JODHPUR
FARJAND ALI, J.
Jitendra Singh Deora S/o Shambhoo Singh – Appellant
Versus
Paras Kanwar D/o Late Shambhoo Singh – Respondent
S.B. Civil Revision Petition No. 51 of 2025
Decided on : 07-08-2025
| Table of Content |
|---|
| 1. petitioner challenges trial court's order. (Para 1 , 2) |
| 2. arguments on maintainability of suit. (Para 3 , 4) |
| 3. analysis of cpc provisions regarding compromise. (Para 5 , 6 , 7) |
| 4. cpc bars separate suit for challenging compromises. (Para 8 , 9 , 10) |
| 5. criteria for compromise invalidity assessment. (Para 11 , 12) |
| 6. revision petition allowed; trial court's order quashed. (Para 13 , 14) |
| 7. final order and conclusion of the petition. (Para 15) |
Order :
FARJAND ALI, J.
1. By way of filing this instant petition under Section 115 of the CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE (hereinafter to be referred as “CPC”), the petitioner has assailed the order dated 29.11.2024 passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Sumerpur, District Pali, in Civil Original Case No. 51/2017 “Smt. Paras Kanwar v. Jitendra Singh”, whereby the application preferred by the present petitioner/defendant no. 1 under Order VII Rule 11 CPC came to be rejected.
2. Bereft of elaborate details, the present respondent no. 1/plaintiff filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction, seeking prayer for setting aside the compromise judgment and decree dated 22.06.2015 passed by the Revenue Court as null and void. The petitioner, being the defendant No.1 in the above suit pending before the Civil Court, moved an application under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC, averring therein that the civil suit is barred by law, since it is seeking a declaration to the effect of nullity of the decree dated 22.06.2015 passed by the Revenue Lok Adalat, Sub-Divisional Court, Sumerpur, based on a compromise, and filing a separate suit seeking the above prayer is not maintainable in light of the express statutory provision made in the CPC under Order XXIII Rule 3A. The said application has been dismissed by the learned trial Court; hence, the revision petition.
3. Shri Rajendra Singh Rathore, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that in light of the express provision contained under Order XXIII Rule 3A of CPC, a separate suit seeking setting aside of a decree passed on the ground of compromise is not maintainable, and the best course available to the plaintiff-respondents would be to make challenge, or question the lawfulness of the compromise and the decree before the Revenue Court which passed the decree on the basis of compromise. He contends that all the objections, either in the form of misrepresentation, lawfulness, or misconception, etc., can be raised before the same court which passed the decree, and the same court is empowered to recall it after examining the lawfulness of the compromise, adjustment, satisfaction, or the agreement. Thus, he prayed that the order passed by the learned trial Court be set asided and by allowing the application moved on his behalf, the suit be dismissed on this count alone.
4. On the contrary, Shri Jog Singh Bhati, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, vehemently urges that since the plea of adoption made in the compromise was accepted by the learned Revenue Court, and a suit to examine the validity and correctness of the adoption deed or the question regarding legality and adoption cannot be adjudicated by a Court of Revenue, therefore, only a Civil Court would be able to adjudicate the issue. Hence, no wrong has been committed by the learned trial Court in allowing the application moved on behalf of the parties.
5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the niceties of the matter.
6. Before proceeding with the discussion, it is pertinent to first examine Order XXIII Rule 3 and Rule 3A of the Code of Civil Procedure. For ease of reference, the provisions are reproduced herein below:
“3. Compromise of suit.—Where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise [in writing and signed by the parties]or where the defendant satisfied the plaintiff in respect to the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the suit, the Court shall order such
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A separate suit to set aside a compromise decree is barred under Order XXIII Rule 3A of the CPC, and challenges to such decrees must be raised in the court that issued them.
(1) No suit shall lie to set aside a decree on the ground that compromise on which decree is based was not lawful.(2) Mere clever drafting would not permit plaintiff to make suit maintainable which o....
A party aggrieved by a compromise decree has a right to challenge the compromise decree by way of an appeal or to approach the same court which passed such decree by way of an appropriate application....
An appeal against a consent decree is barred under Section 96(3) of the CPC; aggrieved parties must contest the decree's validity in the same court that issued it.
A suit challenging a compromise decree not challenged, but the compromise itself is called into question, would be barred by the provisions of Order XXIII Rule 3A of CPC. Additionally, a third party,....
A consent decree obtained through fraud is void, and courts must investigate claims of fraud before accepting the decree as valid.
A suit where a decree based on compromise is not challenged, but compromise itself is called into question, would also be barred by provisions of Order XXIII Rule 3A of CPC.
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