1. Challenge to termination order for non-disclosure of criminal case involvement in verification form. (Para 1 , 2 , 3 )
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2026 Supreme(Raj) 668
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT JAIPUR
PRAVEER BHATNAGAR, J.
Surendra Singh S/o Harphool Singh – Appellant
Versus
The State of Rajasthan – Respondent
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 21768 of 2013
Decided On : 26-02-2026
Important Points
Under Article 226(2) of the Constitution, mere communication of a termination order at an employee's residence does not constitute a 'cause of action' conferring territorial jurisdiction. The cause of action arises where the disciplinary proceedings are conducted and the final order is passed.
Subject
Constitutional Law - Territorial Jurisdiction
Act Referred
Headnote
(A) Constitution of India - Article 226(2) - Territorial Jurisdiction - Cause of Action - Termination of service - Mere communication of an order of removal or appellate order at the residential address of the employee within the territorial limits of a High Court does not constitute a part of the cause of action - Cause of action is a bundle of material facts which the petitioner must plead and prove to obtain relief (Paras 14, 15, 19, 20)
(B) Service Law - Termination of employment - In matters relating to termination of service, the cause of action typically arises where the disciplinary proceedings are initiated, conducted, and concluded, and where the impugned order is passed - The residential address of the employee has no nexus with the disciplinary process unless the nature of the charges makes the place of service relevant to completing the cause of action (Paras 32, 33)
Facts of the case:
A petitioner was appointed to a post in a central police force and was later removed from service following a departmental enquiry for non-disclosure of involvement in a criminal case. The disciplinary proceedings, the termination order, and the subsequent appellate and revisional orders were all passed by authorities outside the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court. The petitioner challenged these orders before the High Court, contending that since the orders were communicated to him at his residential address within the state, a part of the cause of action had arisen within the court's jurisdiction.
Findings of Court:
The court found that the disciplinary proceedings were neither initiated nor conducted within its territorial limits and the orders were passed outside the state. The communication of the termination order at the residential address merely confers knowledge of a decision already taken and does not form an integral part of the bundle of material facts constituting the cause of action.
Issues: Whether the mere service or communication of a termination order upon the petitioner within the territorial limits of the High Court is sufficient to confer territorial jurisdiction under Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India.
Ratio Decidendi: The invocation of territorial jurisdiction under Article 226(2) depends on where the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises. "Cause of action" signifies the bundle of material facts required to prove a case. In service termination cases, this typically encompasses the place where proceedings are initiated, conducted, and the order is passed. The receipt of an order only enables the person to seek a remedy for a right that had already accrued when the order was passed elsewhere.
Result: Writ petition dismissed in limine on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction.
(B) Service Law - Termination of employment - In matters relating to termination of service, the cause of action typically arises where the disciplinary proceedings are initiated, conducted, and concluded, and where the impugned order is passed - The residential address of the employee has no nexus with the disciplinary process unless the nature of the charges makes the place of service relevant to completing the cause of action (Paras 32, 33)
Facts of the case:
A petitioner was appointed to a post in a central police force and was later removed from service following a departmental enquiry for non-disclosure of involvement in a criminal case. The disciplinary proceedings, the termination order, and the subsequent appellate and revisional orders were all passed by authorities outside the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court. The petitioner challenged these orders before the High Court, contending that since the orders were communicated to him at his residential address within the state, a part of the cause of action had arisen within the court's jurisdiction.
Findings of Court:
The court found that the disciplinary proceedings were neither initiated nor conducted within its territorial limits and the orders were passed outside the state. The communication of the termination order at the residential address merely confers knowledge of a decision already taken and does not form an integral part of the bundle of material facts constituting the cause of action.
Issues: Whether the mere service or communication of a termination order upon the petitioner within the territorial limits of the High Court is sufficient to confer territorial jurisdiction under Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India.
Ratio Decidendi: The invocation of territorial jurisdiction under Article 226(2) depends on where the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises. "Cause of action" signifies the bundle of material facts required to prove a case. In service termination cases, this typically encompasses the place where proceedings are initiated, conducted, and the order is passed. The receipt of an order only enables the person to seek a remedy for a right that had already accrued when the order was passed elsewhere.
Result: Writ petition dismissed in limine on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction.
Legal Category Hierarchy
- constitutional law
- administrative law
- practice and procedure
Advocates Appeared:
For the Appellant : M.S. Raghav
For the Respondents: Praveen Singh Rajawat, Munendra Singh Faujdar, Somitra Chaturvedi
For the Appellant : M.S. Raghav
For the Respondents: Praveen Singh Rajawat, Munendra Singh Faujdar, Somitra Chaturvedi
Table of Contents
2. Petitioner: no deliberate concealment; respondent: suppression of material information justified removal. (Para 4 , 7 , 9 , 10 )
3. Service of termination order alone does not confer territorial jurisdiction; cause of action arises where disciplinary proceedings occur. (Para 11 , 13 , 14 , 15 , 16 , 17 , 18 , 19 , 20 , 21 , 22 , 23 , 24 , 25 , 26 , 27 , 28 , 29 , 30 , 31 , 32 , 33 , 34 )
4. For writ jurisdiction under Article 226, cause of action must arise within territorial limits; mere communication of order is insufficient. (Para 32 , 33 , 34 )
5. Writ petition dismissed for lack of territorial jurisdiction; liberty granted to approach appropriate forum. (Para 35 , 36 )
6. Does mere communication of a termination order at the petitioner's residence within the state confer territorial jurisdiction under Article 226?
No, the consistent legal position is that communication alone does not form an integral part of the cause of action; jurisdiction depends on where the disciplinary proceedings were initiated and concluded. (Para 16 , 17 , 18 , 19 , 32 , 33 )
7. What is the relevant 'cause of action' for challenging a service termination order under Article 226?
The cause of action arises at the place where the disciplinary proceedings are initiated, conducted, and concluded, and where the impugned order is passed, not at the employee's residence. (Para 32 , 33 , 34 )
8. Can precedents holding that service of an appellate order confers jurisdiction be distinguished from the present case?
Yes, those precedents were rendered in peculiar factual circumstances, such as the petitioner being in judicial custody or on equitable grounds, and are not applicable to the present case. (Para 24 , 25 , 26 , 27 , 28 , 29 , 30 , 31 )
9. What is the legal principle regarding territorial jurisdiction when a member of a central armed police force challenges a removal order?
The jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 is determined by the place where the cause of action arises, which is where the disciplinary proceedings took place, not the petitioner's residential address. (Para 32 , 33 , 34 )
JUDGMENT :
PRAVEER BHATNAGAR, J.
1. The present writ petition has been preferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking following reliefs:
“(i) By an appropriate writ, order or direction the impugned termination order dated 21/2/09 and impugned order dated 10/8/09, 11/5/10 & 24/8/11, passed by the respondents be quashed and set aside, and further pleased to direct the respondents to reinstate the petitioner back on the post of constable (G.D.) with all consequential benefits.
(ii) Any other appropriate order or direction which the Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case may also kindly be passed in favour of the humble petitioner in the interest of justice.
(iii) Cost of the writ petition may also kindly be awarded in favour of the petitioner.”
2. Briefly stated, the petitioner was selected and appointed to the post of Constable (GD) in the Central Reserve Police Force pursuant to a recruitment advertisement. During the course of his service, a show cause notice dated 13.08.2008 (Annexure-1) was issued against the petitioner alleging non-disclosure of involvement in a criminal case, against which the petitioner submitted his reply (Annexure-2).
3. Subsequently, a charge memorandum along with relevant documents was served by Respondent No.5 and a departmental enquiry was conducted under Section 11(1) of the CRPF Act, 1949 read with Rule 27 of the CRPF Rules, 1955. Upon conclusion of the enquiry, the disciplinary authority passed an order dated 21.02.2009, removing the petitioner from the services (Annexure A-3).
Arguments advanced by learned counsel for the Petitioner-
4. It is contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that there was no deliberate concealment on part of the petitioner, as he was unaware of the alleged incident relating to the year 2001 and no criminal case was pending against him at the time of his appointment. The petitioner being aggrieved by the order of removal dated 21.02.2009, preferred an appeal before the Competent Authority contending that his defence and explanation had not been properly considered in the departmental enquiry and the said appeal came to be rejected vide order dated 10.08.2009.
5. The petitioner thereafter submitted a revision petition before the office of I.G. CRPF, inter alia, contending that mere involvement in a criminal case prior to joining service, particularly when the same ends in acquittal, could not justify termination. However, the said revision petition was rejected vide order dated 11.05.2010.
6. It is further averred that the adverse action culminating in the order of removal was founded upon alleged negligence on the part of the police authorities at Jhunjhunu, who forwarded two police verification reports along with reference to an FIR dated 18.07.2005, indicating that a criminal case was pending against the petitioner and FIR was registered under Sections 341 and 343 Indian Penal Code, 1860. However, as per subsequent communication issued by the concerned police authority vide letter dated 21.10.2008, it was clarified that the criminal case had already been adjudicated on 09.11.2001 and that the petitioner had been acquitted by the learned Trial Court. It is further pleaded that at the time of the alleged incident the petitioner was a juvenile and therefore, no criminal case was pending against him on the date of selection. It is contended that he had truthfully filled the relevant columns of the verification form and was not required to disclose any pending criminal case.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that though the order of removal dated 21.02.2009 and the subsequent appellate, revisional and review orders were passed outside the territorial limits of this Court, the same were admittedly communicated to the petitioner at his residential address within the State of Rajasthan and, therefore, part of the cause of action has arisen within this jurisdiction. It is contended that under Article 226(2) of
