IMPORTANT POINT
The doctrine of delay and laches can disentitle a petitioner from obtaining discretionary relief, and inordinate delay may lead to the dismissal of a petition.

1. The instant petition has been filed for the following relief:

“It is, therefore, most respectfully prayed that this writ petition may kindly be allowed and the respondents by way of appropriate writ, direction or order be issued against the respondents, directing therein to grant four tier pay scale to petitioner with effect from 01.01.1996 and the pay of the petitioner may be ordered to be re-fixed accordingly. The petitioner may also be held entitled to the grant of interest on the amount due @ 12% p.a. with effect from 01.01.1996 alongwith such other and further consequential benefits, as may be admissible to him. The cost of the petition may also be awarded to the petitioner and against the respondents and justice be done.”

2. The petitioner was appointed as Constable in the Police Department on 12.10.1957. He was promoted to the post of Inspector w.e.f. 31.08.1987 and was confirmed on said post w.e.f. 20.12.1990.

3. The petitioner retired on 31.07.1997. After his retirement, petitioner approached the erstwhile State Administrative Tribunal by way of O.A. No. 3571 of 2000 seeking direction to consider the petitioner for promotion to the post of Dy. S.P. on completion of two years’ service as Inspector. Learned Tribunal vide order dated 13.12.2006, allowed the Original Application of the petitioner. The challenge of respondents to the order passed by learned Tribunal by way of in CWP No. 2239 of 2007 also remained unsuccessful. Accordingly, the petitioner was promoted to the post of Dy. S.P. w.e.f. 21.08.1991.

4. The grievance of the petitioner as raised in the instant petition is that the State Government had made applicable four tier pay scale to its employees w.e.f. 01.01.1996. Since, the petitioner had completed four years of service as Dy. S.P. as on 01.01.1996, he was also entitled to higher pay scale. The petitioner submitted his representation to the competent authority on 04.12.2018 seeking benefit of four tier pay scale. He issued reminder on 12.01.2019. Having remained unsuccessful in getting positive response from the respondents, the instant petition was filed in the year 2022.

5. The respondents have contested the claim of the petitioner by alleging that in view of Clause 4 (b) of letter dated 09.08.2012, issued by the Department of Finance, the benefit of higher scale could be granted on assessment of work and conduct of the incumbent. It has further been submitted that as per Clause C (ii) of letter dated 23.06.2000 issued by the Department of Finance, the petitioner was required to pass the departmental examination and the assessment was also required to be done of his Annual Confidential Reports which were not available with the Department on account of having been destroyed after requisite period of five years.

6. In rejoinder filed by the petitioner, it has been submitted that the provisions of communications dated 09.08.2012 and 23.06.2000 could not be applied retrospectively to the detriment of petitioner as he had already retired on 31.07.1997. As regards the non-availability of ACRs of petitioner, it has been submitted that since the benefit of promotion had already been granted in his favour, there could not have been any inhibition in granting the benefit of four tier pay scale to him.

7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the records of the case carefully.

8. The factual position as has emerged is that the petitioner was ordered to be promoted as Dy. S.P. by creation of supernumerary post w.e.f. 21.08.1991 to 31.12.1997 vide notification dated 09.02.2010 issued by the State Government. Consequently, vide office order dated 17.03.2012, the actual orders promoting the petitioner to the post of Dy. S.P. w.e.f. 21.08.1991 to 12.05.1994 on ad hoc basis and w.e.f. 13.05.1994 on regular basis were issued. Thus, on 17.03.2012, the petitioner stood promoted as Dy. S.P. w.e.f. 21.08.1991.

9. The petitioner remained silent till 04.12.2018 when for the first time he raised the