The Magistrate must provide sufficient reasoning when summoning an accused, reflecting a proper application of mind to the facts and law, as established in relevant case law.

JUDGMENT :

Rakesh Kainthla, J.

1. The respondent/complainant filed a complaint against the petitioner/accused before the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Indora (learned Trial Court) for taking action against him for violation of Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act (in short ‘NI Act’).

2. Learned Trial Court passed the following orders on18.11.2024:

“Ms. Vandana Pathania, learned Advocate for the complainant.

Be Registered. Notice be issued to accused for25.02.2025.”

3. Being aggrieved from the order passed by learned Trial Court, the petitioner/accused has approached this Court by filing the present petition.

4. I have heard Mr. Virender Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Naresh Kaul, learned counsel for the respondent.

5. Mr. Virender Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the order passed by learned Trial Court does not show the application of mind which is necessary before issuing of summons. He relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in J.M. Laboratories v. State of A.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 208, in support of his submission.

6. Mr. Naresh Kaul, learned counsel for the respondent has fairly conceded that he is not in a position to support the order passed by learned Trial Court.

7. It was laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in J.M. Laboratories (supra) that an order issuing summons to the accused is a serious matter and the learned Magistrate is required to apply his mind to conclude that there exists sufÏcient reasons for summoning the accused. It was observed:

8. In the judgment and order of even date in Criminal Appeal Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 2345 of 2024 titled INOX Air Products Limited Now Known as INOX Air Products Private Limited v. The State of Andhra Pradesh, we have observed thus:

“33. It could be seen from the aforesaid order that except recording the submissions of the complainant, no reasons are recorded for issuing the process against the accused persons.

34. In this respect, it will be relevant to refer to the following observations of this Court in the case of Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate, (1998) 5 SCC 749 (supra):

“28. Summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course. It is not that the complainant has to bring only two witnesses to support his allegations in the complaint to have the criminal law set into motion. The order of the Magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. He has to examine the nature of allegations made in the complaint and the evidence both oral and documentary in support thereof and would that be sufÏcient for the complainant to succeed in bringing charge home to the accused. It is not that the Magistrate is a silent spectator at the time of recording of preliminary evidence before summoning of the accused. The Magistrate has to carefully scrutinise the evidence brought on record and may even himself put questions to the complainant and his witnesses to elicit answers to find out the truthfulness of the allegations or otherwise and then examine if any offence is prima facie committed by all or any of the accused.”

35. This Court has clearly held that summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter. It has been held that the order of the Magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. This Court held that the Magistrate is required to examine the nature of allegations made in the complaint and the evidence, both oral and documentary in support thereof and as to whether that would be sufÏcient for proceeding against the accused. It has been held that the Magistrate is not a silent spectator at the time of recording of preliminary evidence before summoning the accused.

36. The said law would be consistently following by this Court in a catena of judgments incl