The limited scope of interference by the High Court in departmental proceedings and the evaluation of the decision-making process in disciplinary proceedings.

JUDGMENT :

Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the respondents.

2. Petitioner has challenged the order dated 08.03.2015 as contained in memo No.883/Go, passed by the Superintendent of Police, Godda, whereby, on conclusion of the departmental proceeding, petitioner has been punished with stoppage of one increment for six months, which is equivalent to one black mark. It was further ordered that during the period of suspension, petitioner will not be paid any amount except the subsistence allowance. Further the petitioner has also challenged the appellate order dated 4th January, 2017 as contained in memo No.57/Go passed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Santhal Pargana Division, Dumka, whereby the appeal preferred by the petitioner against the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority has been dismissed.

3. Petitioner is a police constable. He was chargesheeted vide memo No.934 dated 27.06.2014, alleging therein that one Dula Munda, Sub Inspector of Police, had to prepare a report in respect of a non-FIR registered under Section 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on 31.05.2014, based on a complaint made by Pratima Devi. The said Dular Munda prepared a report to be sent, but the allegation is that the petitioner removed the report and prepared another report in his own handwriting, without containing any signature in the said report. Thus, there is an allegation against this petitioner of tampering with the documents and report. A Departmental Proceeding was initiated, wherein, based on the evidence adduced during the enquiry, the Enquiry Officer found the petitioner guilty of the offence. After issuance of second show cause notice and furnishing the Enquiry Report to the petitioner, petitioner was inflicted with a punishment of stoppage of one increment for six months, which is equivalent to one black mark. It was also ordered that during the period of suspension, he will only be paid the subsistence allowance. A departmental appeal was preferred by the petitioner against the said order of punishment, which was also dismissed.

4. Counsel for the petitioner submits that Dular Munda was never produced as witness before the Enquiry Officer. He submits that only on the basis of conjunctures and surmises, petitioner was found guilty of the misconduct.

5. Mr. Indranil Bhaduri, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State-respondents, submits that in the Departmental Proceeding, opportunity was given to the petitioner to defend himself, which he failed. In the Departmental Proceeding, standard of proof is “preponderance of probability”. In this case there is highest degree of probability that the petitioner has committed the misconduct. Admittedly, it is not the case of the petitioner that the report was not prepared by him. Responsibility of preparing the report was given to Dular Munda, Sub Inspector of Police and admittedly, the said report was removed and the report, which was there in the record is in the writing of this petitioner. This fact cannot be denied. Thus, probability is against the petitioner. Petitioner has also accepted that the report is in his pen. That being so, there is no necessity of examining Dular Munda and the misconduct against the petitioner stands proved.

6. In exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, especially in judicial review, scope of interference by this Court in the departmental proceeding is very limited. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of Director General of Police, Railway Protection Force and Others versus Rajendra Kumar Dubey reported in 2020 SCC OnLine SC 954 at paragraph 37 thereof has held that it is well settled that High Court cannot act as an Appellate Authority and re-appreciate the evidence, which was led before the enquiry officer. By referring to judgment in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh versus S. Sree Rama Rao [1963 AIR SC 1723], the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that it is not the function of the