2022 Supreme(Jhk) 622

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
RAJESH SHANKAR, J.
Shatura Munda – Petitioner
Versus
The State of Jharkhand – Respondent
W.P. (C) No. 4897 of 2022
Decided On : 20-12-2022

The power under Section 71-A of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 cannot be exercised after an unreasonably long time during which third-party interests might have come into effect, even though there is no fixed period of limitation for its exercise.

Headnote:

Land Restoration - Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 - Section 71-A - 71-A - Power to restore possession to members of the Scheduled Tribes over land unlawfully transferred - If at any time, it comes to the notice of the Deputy Commissioner that transfer of land belonging to a Raiyat (or a Mundari Khunt-Kattidar or Bhuinhari) who is a member of the Scheduled Tribes has taken place in contravention of Section 46 (or Section 48 or Section 240) or any other provisions of this Act or by any fraudulent method, (including decrees obtained in suits by fraud and collusion), he may, after giving reasonable opportunity to the transferee, who is proposed to be evicted, to show cause and after making necessary enquiry in the matter, evict the transferee from such land without payment of compensation and restore it to the transferor or his heir, or, in case the transferor or his heir is not available or is not willing to agree to such restoration, resettle it with another Raiyat belonging to Scheduled Tribes according to the village custom for the disposal of an abandoned holding - The words “at any time” as has been mentioned in Section 71-A of the Act, 1908 has been interpreted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Jai Mangal Oraon vs. Smt. Mira Nayak and Others, (2000) 5 SCC 141 and it has been held as under: 16. The submission that, in any event the contesting respondents cannot be allowed to hold the land they being non-tribals and the Deputy Commissioner is obliged to allot the same to some other tribal only does not merit our acceptance. Apart from the grounds on which we have rejected the claim of the appellant, we find that the High Court left open the question about the disputed character of the lands and the nature of interest surrendered which if had been properly considered and decided was likely to have an impact on the question of the very applicability of the statutory provisions to the case on hand. Merely because Section 71-A commences with the words “If at any time......” it cannot be taken to mean that those powers could be exercised without any point of time-limit, as in this case after nearly about forty years unmindful of the rights of the parties acquired in the meantime under the ordinary law and the law of limitation. We consider it, therefore, inappropriate to countenance any such contentions in these proceedings. Further, in the case of Situ Sahu and Others vs. State of Jharkhand and Others, (2004) 8 SCC 340, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: 11. We are, therefore, of the view that the use of the words “at any time” in Section 71-A is evidence of the legislative intent to give sufficient flexibility to the Deputy Commissioner to implement the socio-economic policy of the Act viz. to prevent inroads upon the rights of the ignorant, illiterate and backward citizens. Thus, where the Deputy Commissioner chooses to exercise his power under Section 71-A it would be futile to contend that the period of limitation under the Limitation Act has expired. The period of limitation under the Limitation Act is intended to bar suits brought in civil courts where the party himself chooses to exercise his right of seeking restoration of immovable property. But, where, for socio-economic reasons, the party may not even be aware of his own rights, the legislature has stepped in by making an officer of the State responsible for doing social justice by clothing him with sufficient power. However, even such power cannot be exercised after an unreasonably long time during which third-party interests might have come into effect. Thus, the test is not whether the period of limitation prescribed in the Act of 1963 had expired, but whether the power under Section 71-A was sought to be exercised after unreasonable delay.

Fact of the Case:

The petitioner filed a writ petition seeking restoration of land under Section 71-A of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908. The land was recorded in the name of the petitioner's ancestor, but a common order modified the restoration, leading to the petitioner's appeal.

Finding of the Court:

The court found that the land restoration case was filed after 65 years of dispossession, which was barred by limitation. The court rejected the petitioner's claim for restoration of the land.

Issues: The main issue was whether the petitioner's claim for restoration of the land under Section 71-A of the Act was valid, considering the long period of dispossession.

Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the power under Section 71-A cannot be exercised after an unreasonably long time during which third-party interests might have come into effect, even though there is no fixed period of limitation for its exercise.

Final Decision: The writ petition was dismissed as the court found no merit in the petitioner's claim for restoration of the land.