Sealing of property must be done in accordance with statutory provisions and due process of law, as guaranteed by Article 300-A of the Constitution of India.

JUDGMENT :

Heard Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Mr. Manoj Kumar, learned G.A.-III appearing for the respondent-State.

2. This petition has been filed for quashing of the order dated 12.09.2019, issued under the signature of the C.O., Meharma in the District of Godda, whereby the Circle Officer, has directed the Officer-in-Charge to vacate the school and close the school building and hostel within two days and inform the office of the C.O., Meharma. Further prayer has been made for quashing of the order dated 5.09.2019, passed by the Deputy Commissioner-cum-District Magistrate, Godda, whereby he has taken the decision for closing of the petitioner-school till further order and directed the Sub-Divisional Police Officer, Mahagama to comply that order.

3. Preliminary objection has been raised by Mr. Manoj Kumar, learned G.A.-III appearing for the State and submits that this petition is not maintainable and only civil writ, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can be maintained before this Hon’ble Court. He submits that there is no criminality involved in the matter. He further submits that in view of the matter, the criminal writ, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not maintainable.

4. On the other hand, Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the on the alleged allegation of law and order, Superintendent of Police was also involved in the matter and thereafter the sealing order with respect to the property of this petitioner has been directed to be issued by the Deputy Commissioner. He submits that once the FIR is registered and based on this, the impugned order is passed, the criminal writ petition is maintainable.

5. To buttress his arguments, he relied in the case of Ram Kishan Fauji Versus State of Haryana & Ors., reported in (2017) 5 SCC 533, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Paras-28, 29, 30, 31 and 40 has held as follows:-

“28. The Court in Ishwarlal Bhagwandas case referred to Article 133 of the Constitution and took note of the submission that the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court as regards the grant of certificate pertains to judgment, decree or final order of a High Court in a civil proceeding and that “civil proceeding” only means a proceeding in the nature of or triable as a civil suit and a petition for the issue of a high prerogative writ by the High Court was not such a proceeding. Additionally, it was urged that even if the proceeding for issue of a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution may, in certain cases, be treated as a civil proceeding, it cannot be so treated when the party aggrieved seeks relief against the levy of tax or revenue claimed to be due to the State. The Court, delving into the nature of civil proceedings, noted that: (AIR p. 1821, para 8)

“8. … The expression “civil proceeding” is not defined in the Constitution, nor in the General Clauses Act. The expression in our judgment covers all proceedings in which a party asserts the existence of a civil right conferred by the civil law or by statute, and claims relief for breach thereof.”

29. After so stating, the Court elucidated the nature of criminal proceeding and, in that regard, ruled thus : (Ishwarlal Bhagwandas case, AIR p. 1821, para 8)

“8. … A criminal proceeding on the other hand is ordinarily one in which if carried to its conclusion it may result in the imposition of sentences such as death, imprisonment, fine or forfeiture of property. It also includes proceedings in which in the larger interest of the State, orders to prevent apprehended breach of the peace, orders to bind down persons who are a danger to the maintenance of peace and order, or orders aimed at preventing vagrancy are contemplated to be passed.”

30. Explicating the concept further, the Court opined that: (Ishwarlal Bhagwandas case, AIR p. 1821, para 8)

“8. … The character of the proceeding, in our judgment, depends not upon the nature of the tribunal which is invest