The eligibility for appointment is considered primarily on the date of advertisement or selection, and a candidate cannot claim a right for appointment based on an educational qualification that was not in terms of the rules applicable on the date of selection.

ORDER :

(Shree Chandrashekhar, J.)

Mr. Rahul Saboo, the learned GP-II appears for the State.

2. The appellant has challenged the order dated 29th July 2019 passed in W.P.(S) No. 2878 of 2012.

3. The appellant being aggrieved of the order dated 23rd July 2012 by which his candidature for appointment on the post of Para Teacher in the Upgraded Government Middle School, Amwa was rejected has approached the writ Court.

4. The writ Court approved the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner observing that the order dated 23rd July 2012 is a well-considered order and does not require any interference by the writ Court.

5. The writ Court has held as under:

“3. Pursuant to this order, the case of the petitioner has to be considered by the Deputy Commissioner and he has rejected the claim of the petitioner on the ground that the petitioner was not trained in terms of the Right to Education Act, 2009. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that when the advertisement was published there was no condition of trained and the Act, in question, was not in effect at that time.

4. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the State submits that the prayer of the petitioner has been considered pursuant to order of this Court and taken into account the further development by way of implication of the Right to Education Act, the case of the petitioner has not come under that purview and as such the case of the petitioner has been rejected by the competent authority.”

6. Mr. Vijay Kumar Sharma, the learned counsel for the appellant submits that by incorporating the conditions under the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 which came into force on 1st April 2010 the authorities have changed rules of the game and illegally rejected the claim of the appellant for appointment on the post of Para Teacher.

7. The submission made at the Bar is that the minimum educational qualification as indicated in the advertisement issued on 23rd October 2008 could not have been changed in the midst of the selection process by imposing a higher qualification for appointment on the said post.

8. Briefly stated, the appellant came to this Court in W.P.(S) No. 4771 of 2010 raising a grievance against appointment of the respondent no.5 who according to him was ineligible for appointment as Para Teacher. By that time, the representation submitted by the appellant was pending before the Deputy Commissioner, Palamau, who by an order dated 17th October 2011 was directed by the writ Court to take a decision in that regard. Subsequently the appointment of the respondent no.5 was cancelled and a fresh selection process was initiated in which candidature of the appellant has been rejected by the Deputy Commissioner by the aforesaid order dated 23rd July 2012.

9. It is fundamental in the service jurisprudence that appointment on a post must be made of the persons who possess minimum educational qualification. Normally the eligibility for appointment is considered on the date of advertisement and, in some cases, on the date of selection. This process is adopted primarily for the benefit of the candidates such as the appearing candidates so as to make them eligible but this procedure cannot be stretched too far to lay a claim for appointment on the basis of the educational qualification which was not in terms of the rules applicable on the date of selection.

10. This is not in dispute that after selection of the respondent no.5 in W.P.(S) No. 4771 of 2010 was cancelled, the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 has come into force and the minimum qualification for appointment of Para Teacher was redefined. Admittedly, the appellant does not possess such qualification as on the date of selection and while so he cannot claim a right for appointment.

11. The aforesaid being the factual scenario, we find no ground to interfere with the writ Court's order and, accordingly, LPA No. 666 of 2019 is dismissed.