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2025 Supreme(Jhk) 2145

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
RONGON MUKHOPADHYAY, PRADEEP KUMAR SRIVASTAVA, JJ.
Istekhar Mian, son of Nijam Pentar - Appellant
Versus
The State of Bihar Now Jharkhand - Respondent
Cr. Appeal (D.B.) No. 231 of 1997(R)
Decided On : 01-08-2025

Advocates:
Advocate Appeared:
For the Appellant :Mr. Nilesh Kumar, Advocate
For the Respondent: Mrs. Nehala Sharmin, Spl.P.P.

An individual assessed to be a juvenile at the time of offence must not be tried as an adult, with their age determination being essential for proper legal proceedings.

Headnote:(A) Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 - Section 18 - Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 - Section 7-A - Conviction and sentence under Section 302/34 IPC set aside for appellant’s age being 15 years 4 months on date of occurrence, qualifying him as a juvenile under the applicable laws. (Paras 3, 15, 17)

(B) Age determination - Court held that appellant was a juvenile when the offence occurred, reaffirming that juvenility can be raised at any stage and must be assessed adequately. (Paras 11, 15)

(C) Authority of Juvenile Justice Board - Enquiry held confirming appellant's age under Section 7-A of the 2000 Act made the trial of appellant as an adult invalid. (Paras 10, 17)

Facts of the case:
The appellant was charged under Section 302 IPC, convicted and sentenced to life for murder. Age assessments indicated he was a juvenile at the time of the offence. (Paras 4, 7)

Findings of Court:
The trial was invalidated as appellant was adjudicated as juvenile, and the sentence was set aside while confirming the conviction. (Para 17)

Issues: The primary issue was whether the appellant qualified as a juvenile under the statutes applicable at the time of the offence. (Para 12)

Ratio Decidendi: Age at the time of the offence was determinative of the appellant's status as a juvenile, leading to the conclusion that the trial was not valid due to incorrect categorization at original proceedings. (Paras 11, 17)

Result: The sentence of life imprisonment is set aside; the appellant is directed to report to the Juvenile Justice Board for appropriate orders.

Table of Content
1. factual background leading to the conviction (Para 2 , 6 , 7 , 8)
2. arguments on juvenility and implications of relevant acts (Para 3 , 4 , 5 , 10)
3. court's reasoning regarding juvenility of the appellant (Para 11 , 12 , 13)
4. ratio decidendi affirming the juvenile status and implications (Para 14 , 15 , 17)
5. final disposition of the appeal (Para 18 , 19)

JUDGMENT :

Pradeep Kumar Srivastava, J.

1. Heard Mr. Nilesh Kumar, learned counsel for the appellant as well as Mrs. Nehala Sharmin, learned Spl. P.P. for the State.

2. The instant criminal appeal is preferred for setting aside the judgment and order of conviction and sentence passed by Fourth Additional Sessions Judge, Palamau at Daltonganj in Sessions Trial Case No. 25/1991 dated 28.08.1997 whereby and whereunder the appellant has been held guilty for the offence under Section 302 /34 of I.P.C. and sentenced to undergo R.I. for life.

3. Learned counsel for the appellant without touching the merits of the impugned judgment has confined his argument towards the plea of juvenility of the appellant. It is submitted that the date of occurrence of this case was 16.05.1990 and under the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986, the age of the appellant was assessed by the Board of Doctors and a prayer was made before the learned C.J.M. during investigation of this case for medical board examination of the appellant for age assessment and medical examination report was received showing the age of the appellant to be between 16-17 years. It is submitted that since he was not found below the age of 16 years as per the provisions under Section 18 of Juvenile Justice Act, 1986, his case was committed to the Court of Sessions after submission of the charge-sheet for trial. It is further submitted that on the date of judgment also, the age of the appellant was assessed to be 22 years indicating that he was about 15-18 years age on the date of occurrence. The appellant has taken a plea of juvenility in the memo of appeal filed by him at the earlier stage at para 7, 8 and 9. It is further alleged that the appellant filed an interim application being I.A. No. 8991 of 2023 for conducting an enquiry with respect to juvenility of the appellant under Section 7-A of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 which was allowed vide order dated 30.10.2023 and a direction was given to the Juvenile Justice Board Palamau at Daltonganj for assessment of the age of the appellant on the date of occurrence. It was further directed that the enquiry must be held under the provisions of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 and rules framed thereunder. It is further submitted that in compliance of the aforesaid order, an enquiry was conducted by the Juvenile Justice Board and report was submitted through Letter No. 21 dated 22.01.2024. After conclusion of enquiry, the juvenile justice board vide order dated 11.12.2023, on the basis of oral as well as documentary evidence, assessed the date of birth of the appellant to be 02.01.1975 as such on the date of occurrence i.e. 16.05.1990, the appellant’s age was 15 years 4 months 12 days and he was juvenile under the said Act. It is further submitted that there is catena of judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court that the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 is applicable to all persons below the age of 18 years on the date of occurrence even after enactment of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015. In this connection, learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance upon the following reported judgments:

i. Pratap Singh Vs. State of Jharkhand , (2005) 3 SCC 551, at Para 21 and 36;

ii. Hari Ram Vs. State of Rajasthan (2009) 13 SCC 211 , at Para 59 and 69

iii. Dharambir Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr., (2010) 5 SCC 344, at Para 11 and 15

iv. Daya Nand Vs. State of Haryana , (2011) 2 SCC 224 , at Para 13 and 14

v. Mukarrab & Ors. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2017) 2 SCC 201

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