Order of eviction can be passed despite denial of title of landlord.

The tenant, who is the respondent in R.C.O.P. No.23 of 1992 on the file of the District Munsif, Ramanathapuram, (filed by the respondent for the said tenant’s eviction on the ground of owner’ s occupation, in relation to a non-residential, building), is the petitioner in this revision petition. The said revision is against the order, allowing I.A. No.33 of 1994 in the said R.C.O.P. The said I.A. was filed by the respondent for amendment of the petition in the said R.C.O.P., so that the said petition included another ground for eviction, viz., denial of title. Admittedly the said application was filed since subsequent to the filing of the abovesaid R.C.O.P., the petitioner had denied the title of the respondent, in the counter to the said R.C.O.P.

2. The only question argued by learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Rent Controller has no power to amend the pleadings in the R.C.O.P., which affects the rights of parties. In other words, O.6. Rule 17, C.P.C., as such is not applicable to the rent control proceedings though the Rent Controller has been held to be a “court” for certain purposes, like Sec.5 of the Limitation Act. He also relied on the decisions in Munisami Naidu v. Kasim Khan, (1971)2 M.L.J. 379: A.l.R. 1972 Mad. 437: 84 L. W. 521, In re., S.N. Komaraswami Gounder, (1951)1 M.L.J. 422: A.l.R. 1951 Mad. 766: 64 L.W. 730: 1951 M.W.N. 227 (D.B.), Aruppukottai Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam v. M.Periaswami and another. 1974 T.L.NJ. 247 and Jalaluddin v. Mohammed Ismail and another 1986 T.L.N.J. 83.

3. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the respondent contends Rent Controller, has such jurisdiction and he relied on the decisions in Raju v. Mohamadabi, 1993 2L.W. 171, Ganapathy Ammal v. Chandaresan, (1994)2 L.W. 622 and Sukhdev Prasad v. Rambhujarati, A.l.R. 1982 Bom. 25 (D.B.).

.4. After going through all the above decisions and also one other decision in Satyanarayana v. S.Satyanarayana Murty, (1967)2 An.L.T. 355, which is in favour of the respondent’s contention, it is quite clear to me that the Rent Controller has jurisdiction to make the abovesaid amendment. In re., S.N. Komaraswami Gounder, (1951)1 M.L.J. 422: A.l.R. 1951 Mad. 766: 64 L.W. 730: 1951 M.W.N. 227 (D.B.), did not deal with such an amendment but dealt with a proposed amendment pursuant to an inadvertent error in the pleadings before the Rent Controller and the question was whether how far Sec.151, C.P.C. could be invoked. That decision may not have strict application to the present case. Likewise Jalaluddin v. Mohammed Ismail and another, 1986 T.L.N.J. 83 also will not help the petitioner. There, the amendment before the rent control court was sought for with reference to description of property, whether it is tiled building or thatched roof building. In such a context, this Court held that by the said amendment the rights and liabilities of the parties were not affected. So, the amendment was upheld. Therefore, it is clear that this decision also will have no application to the present case.

.5. Then Munisami Naidu v. Kasim Khan, (1971)2 M.L.J. 379 is also distinguishable. There, the amendment sought for though was similar to the present case (i.e.) affecting rights of parties it was sought for at the appellate stage i.e., before the Appellate Authority under the Rent Control Act, only in that context, this Court observed thus:

.“....the appellate authority in this case is not justified in allowing the amendment at the appellate state more or less permitting the respondent to seek a review of the judgment rendered by the Rent Controller.... What the respondents wants to do is to have the petition for eviction amended and to test the correctness of the judgment of the Rent Controller on the basis of such an amendment.” [Italics supplied] This decision may not have strict application to the present case, where the amendment is sought for before the Rent Controller himself and that too before evidence is taken in the R.C.O.P. Aruppukot