High Court of Judicature at Madras
V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.
M.S.D. Chandrasekar Raja
Versus
M/s. Jayabharath Textiles Pvt. Ltd. & Another
Company Appeal No. 6 of 2011
Decided On : 06-11-2013
COMPANY LAW BOARD - JURISDICTION - STAY OF PROCEEDINGS - SECTION 10 OF THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE - APPLICABILITY - INHERENT POWER OF THE BOARD UNDER REGULATION 44 OF THE COMPANY LAW BOARD (REGULATIONS), 1991 - SCOPE - RES JUDICATA - PRINCIPLE OF - APPLICABILITY TO PROCEEDINGS UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION - POWER OF THE BOARD TO POSTPONE THE HEARING OF A CASE TO A FUTURE DATE BEYOND A DATE ON WHICH THE CIVIL COURT IS LIKELY TO DECIDE THE SUBSTANTIAL DISPUTE BETWEEN THE PARTIES - WHETHER AVAILABLE.
Fact of the Case:
The appellant, a shareholder in the first respondent-Company, filed a company petition before the Company Law Board (CLB) under Sections 397 and 398 of the Companies Act, 1956, complaining of oppression and mismanagement against the second respondent, who was the other shareholder and Director in the Company. The second respondent filed an application before the CLB under Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) read with Regulation 44 of the CLB Regulations 1991, praying for a stay of further proceedings before the CLB, till the civil suit filed by him in a District Court was disposed of. The CLB allowed the application and stayed its own proceedings, on the ground that the reliefs sought by the appellant before the CLB and the reliefs sought by the second respondent before the Civil Court, are one and the same and that therefore, there is a likelihood of conflict of decisions if the CLB proceeded further with the hearing of the main petition.
Finding of the Court:
The Court held that the CLB is not a Court within the meaning of the expression "Court" appearing in the Companies Act, 1956 or within the meaning of the expression appearing in the Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore, all the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be required to be followed in the proceedings before the CLB. It is only those provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure which are made applicable under sub-section (4C) of Section 10-E and those provisions of the Company Law Board Regulations 1991, which are analogous to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, that can be applied to the proceedings before the CLB. The Court further held that the power under regulation 44 of the CLB (Regulations) 1991, would include a power to stay its own proceedings pending the adjudication of a dispute in a previously instituted suit. This is due to the fact that one test for the applicability of Section 10 of the Code is whether or not, the final decision in the previous suit would operate as res judicata in the subsequent suit. Therefore, if principles analogous to res judicata could be applied to proceedings to which CPC would not apply, then on the same analogy, the principles upon which the power under Section 10 of the Code is based, could also be invoked by the Tribunals, to which CPC would not apply. The absence in the Company Law Board Regulations 1991, of a provision similar to Section 10 of the Code, is not an indication of the restrictive nature of the inherent power under Regulation 44. The inherent power under Regulation 44 encompasses within itself, a power to do something, which finds an expression in specific terms in Section 10 of the Code.
Issues: 1. Whether the provisions of Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure would apply, per se to the proceedings before the Company Law Board or not. 2. Whether Regulation 44 of the Company Law Board Regulations 1991, which merely confers inherent powers upon the Board, could be used to produce a result that could have been achieved only under Section 10 of the CPC, when no analogous provision is incorporated in the Regulations? 3. Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the invocation of any such power, even if available, is warranted?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The provisions of Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure would not apply, per se to the proceedings before the Company Law Board. 2. Regulation 44 of the Company Law Board Regulations 1991, which merely confers inherent powers upon the Board, could be used to produce a result that could have been achieved only under Section 10 of the CPC, when no analogous provision is incorporated in the Regulations. 3. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the invocation of the power under Regulation 44 of the CLB (Regulations) 1991, to stay its own proceedings pending the adjudication of a dispute in a previously instituted suit, is warranted.
Final Decision: The appeal was allowed and the impugned order of the Company Law Board was set aside and the Company Law Board was directed to proceed with the hearing of the company petition and dispose it of in accordance with law, preferably in a manner that would put an end to the sufferings of the company, if not the sufferings of the applicant and the second respondent.
68. Without getting into details,it can be pointed out that a survey of the law as it developed in the past 50 years, from the earliest Constitution Bench decision in Daryao vs. State of U.P. {AIR 1961 SC 1457} to the various decisions such as those in Amalgamated Coalfields Limited vs. Janapada Sabha {AIR 1964 SC 1013}, Devilal Modi vs. Sales Tax Officer {AIR 1965 SC 1150}, Bombay Gas Co. Ltd vs. Jagannath Pandurang {1975 (4) SCC 690}, Lal Chand vs. Radha Krishan {AIR 1977 SC 789}, G.K.Dudani vs. S.D.Sharma {AIR 1986 SC 1455}, Forward Construction Co. vs. Prabhat Mandal {1986 (1) SCC 100}, V.Purushotham Rao vs. Union of India {2001 (10) SCC 305}, State of Karnataka vs. All India Manufacturers Organisation {2006 (4) SCC 683}, would show -
(i) that Section 11 CPC is not the foundation of the principle of res judicata, but a statutory recognition of a principle of common law, founded on the one hand upon public policy to ensure finality to litigation and on the other hand, upon private interest to ensure that an individual is not vexed twice over the same cause;
(ii) that consequently, Section 11 CPC is not exhaustive of the general principles of the law;
(iii) that the principle is a recognition of the "cause of action estoppel" as well as "issue estoppel";
(iv) that since the principle of res judicata is not confined to the four corners of the Code of Civil Procedure, but is rooted on principles of public policy, it is applicable even to writ proceedings, despite the insertion of the Explanation under Section 141 CPC by the Amendment Act 104 of 1976; and
(v) that on the same analogy, the principle of constructive res judicata is also applicable to proceedings under Article 226.
69. Therefore, it is clear that even where some of the principles enshrined in the Code of Civil Procedure are specifically excluded in their application to certain proceedings, the Courts have always made analogous principles applicable to those proceedings, if the foundation of those principles could be traced to public policy. Keeping this in mind, if we have a look once again at section 4(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, (to which I have already made a reference in paragraph-above) it will be clear that the provisions of the Code do not limit or otherwise affect any special or local law or any special jurisdiction or power conferred or any special form of procedure prescribed by any other law.
70. As indicated elsewhere, Regulation 25 of the CLB (Regulations), 1991, confers powers upon the Board to adjourn the hearing the case. Regulation 44 confers, rather saves the inherent power of the Board, to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of the Bench. Therefore, the same would naturally include a power to postpone the hearing of a case to a future date beyond a date on which the civil court is likely to decide the substantial dispute between the parties. A stay in terms of section 10 of the Code, is nothing but a postponement of the hearing of a subsequently initiated litigation till the previous one is decided. To say that the power to postpone the hearing to a definite date is available to the CLB by virtue of regulation 25, but a power of postponement to an indefinite date is not available, even under Regulation 44, in view of the absence of section 10 of the Code, does not appear to be the correct reading of the power of the Board.
71. Therefore, I hold on the 2nd question of law that the power under regulation 44 of the CLB (Regulations) 1991, would include a power to stay its own proceedings pending the adjudication of a dispute in a previously instituted suit. This is due to the fact that one test for the applicability of Section 10 of the Code is whether or no
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Bharat Bank Limited vs. Employees AIR 1950 SC 188
Nahar Industrial Enterprises vs. Honkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation 2009 (8) SCC 646
Trans Mediterranean Airways vs. Universal Exports 2011 (10) SCC 316.
Laxmi Engineering Works vs. P.S.G. Industrial Institute 1995 (3) SCC 583
Charan Singh vs. Healing Touch Hospital 2000 (7) SCC 668
State of Karnataka vs. Vishwabharathi House Building Cooperative Society 2003 (2) SCC 412
Union of India vs. Madras Bar Association 2010 (11) SCC 1.
Daryao vs. State of U.P. AIR 1961 SC 1457
Amalgamated CoalfieldsLimited vs. Janapada Sabha AIR 1964 SC 1013
Devilal Modi vs. Sales Tax Officer AIR 1965 SC 1150
Bombay Gas Co. Ltd vs. Jagannath Pandurang 1975 (4) SCC 690
Lal Chand vs. Radha Krishan AIR 1977 SC 789
G.K.Dudani vs. S.D.Sharma AIR 1986 SC 1455
V.Purushotham Rao vs. Union of India 2001 (10) SCC 305
State of Karnataka vs. All India Manufacturers Organisation 2006 (4) SCC 683
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