The main legal point established in the judgment is the requirement for the first respondent to afford an opportunity to the petitioner to present his defense before passing the final order.

JUDGMENT

(Prayer; Criminal Revision Case filed under Sections 397 & 401 Cr.P.C to set aside the order dated 27.05.2022 in Na.Ka.No.002/2022/A2 on the file of the Sub Divisional Magistrate and Revenue Divisional Officer, Coimbatore.)

1. This revision has been preferred challenging the impugned order dated 27.05.2022 passed in Na.Ka.No.002/2022/A2 by the learned Sub Divisional Magistrate and Revenue Divisional Officer, Coimbatore.

2. On the complaint given by the respondents 3 to 7 by invoking Section 133 Cr.P.C before the first respondent-Sub Divisional Magistrate and Revenue Divisional Officer, Coimbatore, has issued summons to the petitioner, for which, the petitioner has filed a petition under Section 309 Cr.P.C before the first respondent and sought time for submitting his explanation. However, the first respondent instead of giving an opportunity to the petitioner and without passing an interim order, straightaway passed the final order. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner has preferred the present revision petition.

3. Mr.N.Manokaran, learned counsel instructed by Mr.M.Sundara Kadeeswaran, counsel on record for the petitioner submitted that in an earlier occasion, some third parties have filed a petition under Section 133 Cr.P.C before the first respondent on the ground that the petitioner had been causing public nuisance by keeping large number of dogs in his premises for commercial purpose. The first respondent-Sub Divisional Magistrate without following the mandatory provisions under Section 133 Cr.P.C has passed an order. Challenging the said order, the petitioner herein has filed revision before this Court. This Court by an order dated 23.12.2009 dismissed the petition. Thereafter, the respondents therein have not filed any petition. Now, only, after ten years, the third respondent herein and four others have come with the very same allegations and filed yet another petition under Section 133 Cr.P.C before the first respondent. Even in the said complaint also, the first respondent without following the procedures under Section 133 Cr.P.C and without affording an opportunity to the petitioner and without passing interim order, straightaway passed the impugned order.

4. The learned counsel further submitted that before passing an order, the learned Sub Divisional Magistrate ought to have find out whether there must be imminent danger to the property and consequential nuisance to the public and then give opportunity and pass conditional order and thereafter, after affording opportunities, he can pass the final order.

5. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of M.P. Vs. Kedia Leather and Liquor Ltd. and others reported in (2003) 7 SCC 389 and the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in P.Someshkandar vs.Vijayan reported in 2009(5) L.W.750 and the decision of the Single Bench of this Court in The Manager, Kodanad Estate, Kotliagiri Taluk, The Nilgiris District Vs. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate and Ors. reported in Manu/TN/2054/2008.

6. The learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the petitioner is rearing dogs only for domestic purpose and not for commercial. If it is found that there is an imminent danger and if a person founds that the petitioner is having cattle for breeding, if allowed to continue long period then he has to approach the Civil Court and the first respondent cannot pass such an order. The respondents have not taken any action for more than ten years. Therefore, the order of the first respondent has to be set aside.

7. Mr.P.S.Raman, learned Senior Counsel instructed by Mr.Gladys Daniel, counsel on record for the respondents 3 to 7 submitted that in the earlier occasion the neighbour of petitioner had filed a petition under Section 133 Cr.P.C before the first respondent on the ground that the petitioner had been causing public nuisance by keeping large number of dogs for commercial purpo