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2023 Supreme(Mad) 2908

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
S. VAIDYANATHAN, R. KALAIMATHI, JJ.
The Management of M/s. Hyundai Motor India Limited – Appellant
Versus
Thiru M. Ganesan - Respondent
W.A. No. 829 of 2021 & C.M.P. No. 4670 of 2021
Decided on : 08-03-2023

Advocates:
Advocate Appeared:
For the Appellant : Mr.Sai Raaj for M/s. Sai Raaj Associates
For the Respondent: Mr.S. Prabakaran, M/s.C.K. Appaji, S. Regu, S. Shannmugam

The central legal point established in the judgment is the limited power of the authority under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the need for the employee to raise an industrial dispute under Section 2-A or seek the assistance of the Union under Section 10 of the Act.

Headnote:

Industrial Disputes Act - Approval Petition - Section 33(2)(b) - 1947 AIR 1004, 2019 IV LLJ 513 (SC) - The court discussed the application of Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the principles of natural justice in the context of a dismissal from service. The court emphasized the limited power of the authority under Section 33(2)(b) and the need for the employee to raise an industrial dispute under Section 2-A or seek the assistance of the Union under Section 10 of the Act. The court also highlighted the relevance of the judgments in 1947 AIR 1004 and 2019 IV LLJ 513 (SC) in determining the fairness of the enquiry and the authority's jurisdiction to interfere with the punishment.

Fact of the Case:

The employee, a technician, was dismissed from service following a charge memo and enquiry. The Management filed an approval petition under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The Labour Court granted approval, but the employee challenged the decision, leading to the learned Single Judge setting aside the Labour Court's order.

Finding of the Court:

The court found that the authority under Section 33(2)(b) has limited power and cannot interfere with the punishment under Section 11-A of the Act. It emphasized the need for the employee to raise an industrial dispute under Section 2-A or seek the assistance of the Union under Section 10 of the Act. The court also highlighted the relevance of the judgment in 2019 IV LLJ 513 (SC) in determining the fairness of the enquiry and the authority's jurisdiction to interfere with the punishment.

Issues: The issues revolved around the authority's power under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the fairness of the enquiry, and the jurisdiction to interfere with the punishment.

Ratio Decidendi: The court emphasized the limited power of the authority under Section 33(2)(b) and the need for the employee to raise an industrial dispute under Section 2-A or seek the assistance of the Union under Section 10 of the Act. It also highlighted the relevance of the judgment in 2019 IV LLJ 513 (SC) in determining the fairness of the enquiry and the authority's jurisdiction to interfere with the punishment.

Final Decision: The writ appeal was allowed, and the court provided directions for the employee to raise an industrial dispute within a specified period. The court emphasized the limited power of the authority under Section 33(2)(b) and the need for the employee to raise an industrial dispute under Section 2-A or seek the assistance of the Union under Section 10 of the Act.

JUDGMENT :

Prayer: Writ Appeal as against the order dated 03.12.2020 passed in W.P. No. 17275 of 2019.

The present appeal has been preferred by the Management questioning the order of the learned Single Judge dated 03.12.2020 passed in W.P. No. 17275 of 2019 whereby the learned Single Judge set aside the order dated 03.04.2018 passed by the III Additional Labour Court in Approval Petition No. 22 of 2010 in I.D. No. 418 of 2007.

2. The admitted case of the parties is that the employee, who was serving as a technician was issued with a charge memo for which enquiry was conducted and based on the proved charges, he was dismissed from service. As there was an industrial dispute pending between the Management and the Union, the Management/employer filed an approval petition as contemplated under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 ("I.D.Act" in short). Since the Labour Court, while dealing with the issue, following the dictum of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Lalla Ram V. Management of D.C.M. Chemical Works Limited and Another reported in 1978 AIR 1004 held that the domestic enquiry was fair and proper and that there was no violation of principles of natural justice and confirmed the order of the Management by granting approval. The employee approached the learned Single Judge contending that the charges are not serious and a farce of an enquiry was conducted by the Management and the Labour Court's order granting approval under the provisions of Section 33(20(b) of I.D. Act is erroneous.

3. The learned Single Judge accepted the contention of the employee and set aside the order of the Labour Court inspite of the fact that the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in John D'Souza V. Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation reported in 2019 IV LLJ 513 (SC) was referred to. The principle laid dwon in the said case is that if the domestic enquiry is found to be defective and principles of natural justice appear to have been violated, then the entire exercise will have to be redone by the authority under Section 33(2)(b) of I.D.Act. In fact, the scope of Lalla Ram's case was widened and the matter came to be dealt with afresh by the Approval Authority. In this case, the authority has gone into the various aspects on the five guidelines prescribed in Lalla Ram's case, dealt with the fairness of enquiry and came to the conclusion that the enquiry was fair and proper and that the Management had complied with all the norms. The learned Single Judge, after discussing the evidence let in by the parties, came to the conclusion that the order of the authority needs to be interfered with.

4. With respect to the learned Single Judge, we are of the view that the power of the authority under Section 33(2)(b) of I.D.Act is very limited and he has no powers to interfere with the punishment under Section 11-A of the I.D. Act. If the employee was aggrieved even after the orders of the approval authority, nothing prevented him from raising an industrial dispute under Section 2-A of I.D.Act or seek the assistance of the Union and raise a dispute under Section 10 of I.D.Act.

5. Mr.S. Prabhakaran, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent has vehemently contended that even assuming for the sake of argument that the Labour Court was right in following the 5 guidelines prescribed by the Hon'ble Apex Court, it ought not to have gone in detail with regard to the enquiry and held that the enquiry was fair and proper. That apart, he would submit that the powers of this Court to interfere with the punishment under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is very wide and hence, taking note of the charges framed against the employee, this Court can mould the relief and the order of the learned Single Judge in interfering with the order of the Labour Court is perfectly valid.

6. Mr.R. Sai Raaj, learned counsel appearing for the appellant would submit that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in John D'Souza's case has categorically held that while following the guide

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