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2023 Supreme(Mad) 3220

BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT
R. KALAIMATHI, J.
Y. Davidson (Died) & Ors. - Appellants
Versus
Nagercoil Home Church CSI, Rep. by its Secretary S. Euztace Nayagom, Kanyakumari & Ors. - Respondents
S.A. No. 1665 of 2003
Decided On : 19-10-2023

Advocates:
For the Appellants :P. Thiyagarajan, Advocate. For the Respondents: No appearance.

The acceptance of rent after the expiration or determination of the lease does not create a new tenancy and does not afford ground for holding that the landlord had assented to a new contractual tenancy.

Headnote:

Transfer of Property Act - Tenancy - Section 116, Section 111 - The court discussed the application of Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act in relation to the termination of lease and the acceptance of rent by the landlord. The court clarified that acceptance of rent after the expiration or determination of the lease does not create a new tenancy and does not afford ground for holding that the landlord had assented to a new contractual tenancy. The court also emphasized the difference between a tenant continuing in possession with the landlord's consent and without the landlord's consent, and ruled that a tenant continuing without the landlord's consent does not receive protection under Section 116.

Fact of the Case:

The suit was filed for recovery of possession of non-residential buildings and for permanent injunction. The Trial Court decreed the suit, which was partially allowed by the First Appellate Court. The defendant filed a Second Appeal, arguing that he was entitled to protection under Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act.

Finding of the Court:

The court found that the defendant could not seek protection under Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act as the acceptance of rent after the expiration of the lease did not create a new tenancy. The court also clarified the difference between a tenant continuing in possession with the landlord's consent and without the landlord's consent.

Issues: The issues involved the termination of lease, acceptance of rent, and the application of Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act.

Ratio Decidendi: The court ruled that acceptance of rent after the expiration or determination of the lease does not create a new tenancy and does not afford ground for holding that the landlord had assented to a new contractual tenancy. The court also emphasized the difference between a tenant continuing in possession with the landlord's consent and without the landlord's consent.

Final Decision: The Second Appeal was dismissed, and the Judgment and Decree passed by the First Appellate Court was set aside. The suit in O.S.No.845 of 1987 was allowed, and the time for handing over the possession was set at four months from the date of the judgment. No costs were awarded.

JUDGMENT

(Prayer: Second Appeal filed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the Judgment and Decree dated 03.09.2003 in A.S.No.68 of 2002 on the file of the District Judge, Kanyakumari at Nagercoil confirming the Judgment and Decree dated 22.02.2002 in O.S.No.845 of 1987 on the file of the Principal District Munsif, Nagercoil.)

1. Being aggrieved by the Judgment of the First Appellate Court namely District Court, Kanyakumari at Nagercoil in A.S.No.68 of 2002 dated 03.09.2003, the first defendant, Y.Davidson has preferred this Second Appeal.

2. For the sake of convenience, parties are referred to as per their litigative status before the Trial Court.

3. On behalf of Nagercoil Home Church CSI, a suit was laid against Davidson, Syed Mohamed, Daniel and Chelladurai for recovery of possession of plaint schedule properties - non residential building bearing Door Nos.679 and 680 from the defendants 1, 2 and 4 and for permanent injunction restraining the first defendant from evicting the third defendant from the plaintiff's shop No.681 as per the Judgment in O.S.No.527 of 1984 and for future mesne profits.

4. According to the plaintiff, the lease has expired on 27.10.1986 by efflux of time. It was further claimed that notice was issued to the first defendant on 19.02.1987 terminating the lease in his favour by 27.03.1987 and requesting him to surrender the vacant possession of the leasehold buildings by 28.03.1987. It was further claimed that though the first defendant received the notice on 21.02.1987, he has not surrendered the leasehold buildings.

5. Counteracting to the plaint details, per contra, it was claimed by the first defendant that the tenancy was commenced in the year 1969 for a period of 11 years and 9 months. Thereafter, it was extended for five years from 28.10.1980. From 18.10.1985, for an year, lease was further extended. It was further claimed that though, thereafter, lease was not extended, he continue to be a lessee and has been paying rent to the plaintiff as lessee holding over. Evenafter the issuance of notice dated 19.02.1987, the plaintiff continues to receive rent from the first defendant accepting his status as lessee. Therefore, the possession of the first defendant is legal and as there is no cause of action arose to file the suit and the suit has to be dismissed.

6. The Trial Court framed relevant issues. At trial, PW1 and PW2 have been examined. Exs.A1 to A20 were marked. On the side of the defendants, DW1 and DW2 were examined. Exs.B1 to B11 were marked. Two Documents have been marked as Exs.X1 and X2.

7. After hearing both sides and upon considering the oral and documentary evidence, Trial Court decreed the suit, against which, the first defendant Y.Davidson preferred the First Appeal in A.S.No.68 of 2002, which was allowed in part by modifying the Judgment of the Trial Court as follows.

(i) The suit is decreed for recovery of plaint schedule properties except shop No.681.

(ii) The quantum of mesne profits will be decided in separate proceedings.

(iii) Time for eviction is one month.

(iv) The suit is dismissed regarding the prayer for injunction without costs.

8. Aggrieved by the said Judgment, the first defendant has preferred this Second Appeal on various grounds besides suggesting some substantial questions of law.

9. Pending Second Appeal, the appellant, namely, Y.Davidson has passed away and therefore, his LRs are brought on record as appellants 2 and 3 in this appeal.

10. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants would vehemently argue that the notice which was issued by the plaintiff on 19.02.1987 was received by the first defendant on 21.02.1987. As the rent was being paid continuously by the first defendant, it has to be taken that the first defendant was continuing as a tenant holding over. He would stress upon the fact that after the receipt of the notice, as the plaintiff has been receiving rents from the first defendant an

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