Point of Law: Every sovereign legislature possesses the right to make retrospective legislation. The power to make laws includes power to give it retrospective effect.

JUDGMENT :

1. The present appeal assails the judgment and decree dated 27.06.2001 in A.S.No.201 of 1996 on the file of the Court of the Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, (for short, lower appellate Court), whereunder the appeal was allowed reversing the judgment and decree dated 03.06.1996 in O.S.No.600 of 1991 passed by the Court of the V Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad (for short, trial Court), whereunder the trial Court rejected the relief prayed by the plaintiff for eviction of the defendant from the suit premises.

2. The appellant herein is the defendant and the respondent herein is the plaintiff in the suit. For the sake of convenience, the parties hereinafter are referred to as they are arrayed in the suit.

3. The case of the plaintiff is that he is the owner of house bearing No.19-2-180/114, situated at Narasareddy Moochi Colony, Tadban, Hyderabad. The said house consists of four mulgies, and out of them, two mulgies (hereinafter referred to as ‘suit premises’) were leased out to the defendant on monthly rent. The suit premises were leased out to the defendant initially under the rental deed dated 09.04.1987 on monthly rent of Rs.350/-. The defendant was running a tea stall in the suit premises. The defendant has been paying monthly rent of Rs.250/-, after deducting rent of Rs.100/- towards loan obtained by the plaintiff from him. While so, the defendant failed to pay the rents from January, 1989, in spite of advice given by the Basthi Committee.

4. It is the further case of the plaintiff that he was in requirement of the suit premises for his personal occupation. Apart from committing the default in payment of rents, the defendant caused damage to the suit premises. In the said circumstances, the plaintiff got issued a legal notice terminating the tenancy on various grounds. The defendant though issued reply, failed to handover the possession of the suit premises to the plaintiff. Therefore, the present suit has been filed.

5. The defendant filed written statement admitting the ownership of the plaintiff over the suit premises and also the monthly rent. He denied the plaintiff’s claim that he caused the destruction of the suit premises as well as default in payment of rents. According to the defendant, the present suit has been filed only as a counter-blast to the Rent Control Case filed by him vide R.C.No.579 of 1989 on the file of the I Additional Rent Controller, Hyderabad. It is the further case of the defendant that with greed of fetching more rent, the plaintiff is trying to evict him and that there is no default on his part in payment of rents.

6. The trial Court, on the basis of the above pleadings, has framed the following issues:

“1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to possession?

2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to damages?

3. To what relief?”

7. The plaintiff, to support his case, examined P.Ws.1 and 2 and relied upon Exs.A-1 to A-14. The defendant, to support his case, examined D.Ws.1 and 2 and relied upon Exs.B-1 to B-13.

8. The trial Court, after appreciating the evidence on record, held that there is no destruction of the suit premises, no default in payment of rents by the defendant and the legal notice issued by the plaintiff terminating the tenancy under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (for short, the Act) was contrary to the provisions of the Act i.e., the notice is defective and consequently the suit was dismissed. Aggrieved by the same, the plaintiff filed A.S.No.201 of 1996, and the lower appellate Court, allowed the same on the ground that the defendant was a ‘tenant holding over’ on account of determination of lease period by efflux of time and that there was no fresh renewal of lease, as such, there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. Challenging the same, the defendant filed the present Second Appeal.

9. This Court, while admitting the Second Appeal, has made a reference to the substantial questions of law raised in the