The High Court does not have the authority to overturn a disciplinary authority's punishment, even if it deems it to be arbitrary, excessively harsh, or disproportionate to the offense committed, in cases where the punishment was imposed following a full-fledged departmental inquiry.

HANSARIA, J.

( 1 ) THE following question of law has been referred for our decision:-"whether it is open to a High Court in a writ proceeding to set aside an order of punishment if the same be, according to it, arbitrary or grossly excessive or out of all proportion to the offence committed; and if so, can it substitute any other punishment in its place which, in its opinion, be just and proper in the circumstances of the case?"

( 2 ) THE aforesaid reference has come to be made in these circumstances : A view was taken by a Bench of two Judges in two unreported decisions of this Court, namely, Gopinath Das v. State of Orissa (O. J. C. No. 146 of 1985 disposed of on 12-10-1990) and Ramachandra Routray v. Anil Kumar Mukherjee (O. J. C. No. 1679 of 1989 disposed of on 23-10-1990), that it is open to the High Court to interfere with the quantum of punishment imposed by a disciplinary authority following a departmental enquiry where the High Court be of the view that the punishment is shockingly disproportionate, viewed in the background of the gravity of the charges. This view was taken in the aforesaid two O. J. Cs. relying on the decisions of the supreme Court in Bhagatram v. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1983 SC 454 :and Shankar Das v. Union of India, AIR 1985 SC 772.

( 3 ) WHEN the aforesaid decisions were cited before another Bench of this Court in Y. Venkatrao v. South-Eastern Railway, (1991) 71 Cut LT 512, that Bench took the view that the opinion expressed in the aforesaid two O. J. Cs. runs counter to the decision of the Supreme Court expressed in Union of India v. Parma Nanda, AIR 1989 SC 1185, in which case both the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court were noted, whereafter in paragraph 28, it was observed that what was stated in Bhagatram's case was no authority for the proposition that the High Court has jurisdiction to impose any punishment to meet the ends of justice. As to Shankar Dass's case, the same was regarded as an exception to the proposition. The Venkatrao Bench then referred to the Constitution Bench decision of the Supreme Court in State of Orissa v. Bidya Bhusan Mohapatra, AIR 1963 SC 779, in which it was opined that it would not be open to a High Court, while exercising certiorari jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution, to interfere with the punishment once the misdemeanour alleged is found and proved. The Bench also noted that Bidya Bhusan's case had been followed by the Supreme Court in a number of decisions, of which reference has been made in paragraph 3 of the judgment. That Bench, therefore, disagreed with the view expressed in the aforesaid O. J. Cs. and observed that in normal course it would have referred the matter to a larger Bench, but in view of that fact that several cases of the Supreme Court including the Constitution Bench case had not been noticed in those O. J. Cs. , reference to a larger Bench was not thought necessary.

( 4 ) WHEN the present case came up for hearing, Shri Mohapatra appearing for the petitioner contended that the Venkatrao Bench (1991 (71) Cut LT 512) had itself missed to note a later Constitution Bench decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel, AIR 1985 SC 1416 , in which, according to Shri Mohapatra, the apex Court had held in paragraph 127 that where the punishment is arbitrary or grossly excessive or out of proportion to the offence committed, the High Court can substitute any other punishment in its place, which, in its opinion, would be just and proper in the circumstances of the case. This view finds place in paragraph 127 of the judgment. Shri Mohapatra further contended that Tulsiram Patel's case being a later Constitution Bench decision, the view expressed therein would prevail over that taken in Bidya Bhusan's case, and in this connection he referred to some decisions of different High Courts, which we shall note later. So, this reference.

( 5 ) THE first point which we need to decide is whether the vi