Condonation of delay under the Limitation Act requires substantial justification, and the State is treated no differently than private litigants in these matters.

JUDGMENT :

SASHIKANTA MISHRA, J.

The State-defendants in C.S. No.86 of 2010 of the Court of learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Sambalpur have preferred this appeal being aggrieved by the judgment/order dated 13.07.2022 passed by the learned District Judge, Sambalpur in R.F.A. No.7 of 2019 dismissing the said appeal on the ground of limitation.

2. For convenience, the parties are referred to as per their respective status before the trial Court.

3. The facts, relevant only to decide the present appeal are that the aforementioned suit was filed by the plaintiff for recovery of sum of Rs.64,30,495/- from the defendants with PI and FI @9% per annum. The claim of the plaintiff was allowed by the trial Court by its judgment dated 15.09.2014 followed by decree.

4. The State-defendants preferred the aforementioned appeal after a long period of delay. The appeal was accompanied by an application under Section 5 of the LIMITATION ACT for condonation of the delay.

5. Learned District Judge, after hearing the parties on the question of limitation was not inclined to condone the delay and hence, by the order impugned, the appeal was not admitted. Being further aggrieved, the State- defendants have preferred the present second appeal, which was heard extensively on the question of admission.

6. Heard Mr. A.R. Dash, learned Additional Government Advocate for the State and Mr. G.M. Rath, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff-respondent.

7. Mr. Dash argues that the first appellate Court did not appreciate the facts properly, rather adopted a hyper- technical approach. He further submits that the delay in filing the appeal was properly explained by the defendant- appellants by furnishing all the relevant dates showing the movement of the file from one authority to the other. Since the State is involved, no single person is authorized to take a decision regarding filing the appeal and such decision can only be collective in nature after passing through the official hierarchy. Mr. Dash further argues that the first appellate Court has not considered the practical difficulties of the concerned authorities particularly when the decretal amount is substantial. The first appeal was preferred on substantial grounds which, is considered, would have revealed the error in the judgment/decree passed by the trial Court. According to Mr. Dash, the impugned judgment/order cannot be sustained in the eye of law and the matter needs to be remitted for hearing the appeal on its own merit.

8. Mr. Rath, on the other hand, would argue that law is well settled that State is not entitled to any preferential treatment in the matter of condonation of delay and that the same parameters as applicable to a private litigant are to be applied to it. In this context, Mr. Rath argues that there are long gaps in the explanation submitted by the State while seeking condonation of the inordinate delay of more than five years. It is well settled that for the lack of promptitude and diligence of the Government officials, a private litigant cannot be deprived of enjoying the fruit of the decree passed in his favour.

9. Before delving into the facts, it would be apposite to keep the settled position of law regarding condonation of delay in perspective. The law relating to limitation has received a fresh look by the Supreme Court recently in the case of Shivamma V. Karnataka Housing Board & Others 2025 SCC Online SC 1969. As regards the question of technical considerations vis-a-vis substantive justice, the Supreme Court af