IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH
AMOL RATTAN SINGH, J.
Yuvraj Singh - Petitioner
Versus
State of Haryana and another - Respondents
CRM-M No. 9035 of 2021
Decided On : 17-02-2022
Petitioner sought to quash FIR registered against him for allegedly using a casteist slur against a member of the Scheduled Caste community. The Court examined the relevant provisions of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (the Act), and the Indian Penal Code (IPC), as well as the applicable case law. It held that the word used by the petitioner, though not intended to cause harm, was derogatory and insulting to the Scheduled Caste community. The Court found that the petitioner's act of using the word in a derogatory manner, even if not intended to cause harm, amounted to an offense under Section 3(1)(u) of the Act. The Court also held that the petitioner's apology, issued after the FIR was registered, was an afterthought and did not negate the commission of the offense. The Court dismissed the petition, allowing the investigation to continue.
Fact of the Case:
The petitioner, a famous cricketer, used a casteist slur during a live chat on social media. The slur was directed at a member of the Scheduled Caste community. An FIR was registered against the petitioner under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (the Act), and the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The petitioner filed a petition to quash the FIR, arguing that he did not intend to cause harm and that the word used was not derogatory.
Finding of the Court:
The Court held that the petitioner's act of using the word in a derogatory manner, even if not intended to cause harm, amounted to an offense under Section 3(1)(u) of the Act. The Court also held that the petitioner's apology, issued after the FIR was registered, was an afterthought and did not negate the commission of the offense.
Issues: 1. Whether the petitioner's act of using a casteist slur during a live chat on social media amounted to an offense under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (the Act), and the Indian Penal Code (IPC)? 2. Whether the petitioner's apology, issued after the FIR was registered, negated the commission of the offense?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The Court held that the petitioner's act of using the word in a derogatory manner, even if not intended to cause harm, amounted to an offense under Section 3(1)(u) of the Act. The Court relied on the following reasoning: * The word used by the petitioner was derogatory and insulting to the Scheduled Caste community. * The petitioner's act of using the word in a derogatory manner, even if not intended to cause harm, amounted to an offense under Section 3(1)(u) of the Act. * The petitioner's apology, issued after the FIR was registered, was an afterthought and did not negate the commission of the offense. 2. The Court held that the petitioner's apology, issued after the FIR was registered, was an afterthought and did not negate the commission of the offense. The Court relied on the following reasoning: * The apology was issued only after the FIR was registered, which suggested that it was an afterthought. * The apology did not express any remorse or regret for the petitioner's actions. * The apology did not offer any explanation or justification for the petitioner's actions.
Final Decision: The Court dismissed the petition, allowing the investigation to continue.
JUDGMENT :
Amol Rattan Singh, J.
Vide this petition, the petitioner seeks to invoke the jurisdiction of this court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, to quash FIR no.0115, dated 14.02.2021, registered at Police Station Hansi, District Hansi, wherein it is alleged that offences punishable under Sections 153-A and 153-B of the IPC, as also Section 3 (1)(u) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities), Act, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), have been committed. [Subsequently, as submitted before this court, an offence punishable under Section 3(1)(s) of the Act has also been added in the FIR.]
The grounds spelt out in the petition for quashing the FIR, can be essentially summed up as follows:-
(ii) That respondent no.2 has no locus standi to register the FIR as the word in question (bhangi) as was used by the petitioner, was neither directed at him nor at any other member of the dalit community; and therefore the motive of the said respondent, in getting the FIR registered, was only to blackmail the petitioner and to extract money from him;
(iii) That none of the ingredients of either Sections 153-A and 153-B of the IPC, or of Section 3(1)(u) of the Act, would be made out, with no specific allegation (in reference to them), having been levelled against the petitioner, because in the entire FIR there is no averment of the petitioner promoting enmity between any different groups on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence etc., or of doing any act prejudicial to maintenance of harmony, or being prejudicial to national integration etc.;
(iv) That the FIR thus deserves to be quashed on the aforesaid grounds, as also in terms of the ratio of various judgments of the Supreme Court, cited as follows:-
a. Subhash Kashinath Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra, (2018) 6 SCC 454;
b. Jones v. State, 2004 Crl.LJ 2755;
c. Inder Mohan Goswami and another v. State of Uttranchal and others, (2007) 12 SCC 1;
d. State of Karnataka v. L. Muni Swami and others, AIR 1977 SC 1489;
e. Som Mittal v. Govt. of Karnataka, (2008) 2 SCC (Crl.) 1;
f. State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1991 (1) RCR (Crl.) 383;
2. When the petition first came up for hearing, the contentions initially raised by counsel for the parties on the date, (with notice of motion issued and with an interim order thereafter passed by this court at that stage), are also considered appropriate to be reproduced at this initial stage itself, in this judgement. Thus, the relevant part of the order dated 25.02.2021, is reproduced as regards the arguments raised on that date by learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, and learned counsel for the complainant (respondent no.2):-
He next submits that the remarks were made in the context of the person concerned (Yuzvendra Chahal) “having made” his father dance at a marriage ceremony (as contended), and therefore the remarks were in the context of somebody being in an inebriated condition, with him thereafter submitting that bhang is also an intoxicant and the word ‘bhangi’ had been used by the petitioner in that context.
He points to paragraph 5 of the petition, in which it is stated that term used, ‘bhangi’, was not intended to hurt the sentiments of any community or any person, but was a friendly comment made by the petitioner to his friends and colleagues who are not part of the “respected dalit community”.
Mr. Bali next points to the provision in respect of which the petitioner is stated to have committed an offence, i.e. Section 3 (1) (u)
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Interpretation of terms and the need for careful usage, especially by influential individuals, to avoid misinterpretation and potential legal consequences.
The FIR lacks necessary ingredients for offences under Section 196(1)(a) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, justifying its quashing due to vagueness.
FIR under SC/ST Act quashed absent caste-based insult, humiliation intent linked to caste, or cognizable offence ingredients; prior similar vexatious complaints indicate abuse of process for revenge.
The judgment established that to prove an offence under Section 153A IPC, there must be evidence of promoting enmity between different groups, and mere statements or social media posts may not be suf....
The court established that mere allegations of caste-based insults are insufficient to invoke the SC/ST Act unless there is clear evidence of intent to humiliate based on caste and that the incident ....
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