Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation

2022 Supreme(P&H) 611

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH
Vinod S. Bhardwaj, J.
Kamlesh Kumar Heda – Appellant
Versus
State Of Punjab & Anr. – Respondents
CRM-M-47585-2019
Decided On : 19-04-2022

Advocates Appeared:
Mr. Arvind Rajotia, Advocate, for the Appellant; Ms. A.K. Khurana, DAG, Punjab. Mr. Pratham Sethi, Advocate for respondent No.2, for the Respondent

The court has inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash criminal proceedings to prevent abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The court may quash criminal proceedings if the dispute does not fall within the prohibited category or as an offence that is heinous and grossly shocking to the conscience of the Court, and no useful purpose would be served by continuation of the proceedings.

Headnote:
SURFAESI ACT - Quashing of FIR - Section 406/120-B IPC - [SURFAESI ACT, 2002] - [Section 409 IPC, Section 406 IPC, Section 482 Cr.P.C.] - The court examined whether the FIR registered for an offence under Section 406 IPC, where an offence under Section 409 IPC may be made out, can be quashed. The court referred to various judgments and legal principles to conclude that the dispute involved in the case pertained to an offence under Sections 406/120-B IPC, which did not fall within the prohibited category or as an offence that is heinous and grossly shocking to the conscience of the Court. The court allowed the petition and quashed the FIR and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom, subject to payment of costs by the petitioner.
Fact of the Case:

The petitioner sought quashing of FIR registered under Sections 406/120-B IPC at Police Station City Tarn Taran, District Tarn Taran, pertaining to an alleged unauthorized removal of equipments-plant & machinery from an industrial unit taken over by the Bank under the SURFAESI ACT, 2002. The parties reached a compromise, and the Illaqa Magistrate reported on the genuineness of the compromise.
Finding of the Court:

The court found that the offence in question would prima facie fall under Section 409 IPC, but the FIR was registered under Section 406 IPC, a lesser offence. The court referred to various judgments and legal principles to conclude that no useful purpose would be served by continuation of the proceedings, and the dispute did not fall within the prohibited category or as an offence that is heinous and grossly shocking to the conscience of the Court.
Issues: The main issue was whether the FIR registered for an offence under Section 406 IPC, where an offence under Section 409 IPC may be made out, can be quashed.
Ratio Decidendi: The court referred to legal principles and judgments to conclude that the dispute involved in the case pertained to an offence under Sections 406/120-B IPC, which did not fall within the prohibited category or as an offence that is heinous and grossly shocking to the conscience of the Court. The court allowed the petition and quashed the FIR and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom, subject to payment of costs by the petitioner.
Final Decision: The court allowed the petition and quashed the FIR and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom, subject to payment of costs by the petitioner.

JUDGMENT

Vinod S. Bhardwaj, J. - The petitioner has approached this Court seeking quashing of FIR No.65 dated 22.03.2019 registered under Sections 406/120-B IPC at Police Station City Tarn Taran, District Tarn Taran (Annexure P-2) and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom on the strength of compromise/Affidavit dated 07.10.2019 (Annexure P-3) entered between the parties.

2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the dispute in question pertained to an allegation of alleged unauthorized removal of the equipments-plant & machinery from the industrial unit that had been taken over by the Bank under the SURFAESI ACT, 2002 Act resulting in registration of the FIR No.65 dated 22.03.2019 registered under Sections 406/120-B IPC at Police Station City Tarn Taran, District Tarn Taran (Annexure P-2) and that with the intervention of the respectables from both the sides, the matter has been settled and amicably resolved. It is further submitted that the compromise amongst the parties was effected on account of free will and without any pressure and coercion.

3. Vide orders dated 07.11.2019 and 09.12.2019 respectively, the parties were directed to appear before the Illaqa Magistrate to get their statements recorded and the Illaqa Magistrate was further directed to send the report regarding the genuineness of the compromise and to also intimate whether any criminal proceedings against the petitioners are pending.

4. In compliance of the said order, a report from the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Tarn Taran has been received vide letter No. 1017 dated 11.12.2019. The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Tarn Taran has reported as under:-

'It is submitted that the petitioner and respondent No.2 appeared in person today along with their respective counsel S/Sh.Vivek Sharma and Sudhir Salwan, Advocates and also produced their Aadhaar Cards as proof of their identification. The statements of both the parties were recorded in the Court and from their statements, it emerged that there is no lawful compromise between the petitioner and respondent No.1. The paragraph-wise report, as desired by the Honourable High Court, is submitted as follows:

1. The respondent No.2 has stated to have compromised through petitioner but there are number of other accused persons also, who are neither petitioners before Honorable High Court nor they have been granted bail by any Court. Since the respondent No.2 has not specifically compromised with the petitioner, therefore, the compromise between the parties cannot be termed as genuine. The allegations against the petitioner and other co-accused is for the offence punishable under Section(s) 409 of Indian Penal Code but the Investigating Agency has wrongly booked him under section(s) 406 of Indian Penal Code, which is a lesser offence.

2. None of the accused persons are appearing before the Court of undersigned.

3. As per record, no other proceedings, except the First Information Report in question is pending against accued/petitioner.'

5. A perusal of the report sent by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Tarn Taran, the offence in question would prima facie fall under Section 409 IPC, however, the Investigating Agency has investigated the case under Section 406 IPC which is a lesser offence. The FIR in question has been registered on 22.03.2019 and the petition has been filed for seeking quashing of the FIR and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom. There is no material on record on the basis whereof the offence may be construed as having been registered under Section 409 IPC. However, as the said aspect has been noticed and pointed out by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Tarn Taran, it has necessitated this Court to examine whether the FIR that has been registered for an offence under Section 406 IPC but where offence under Section 409 IPC may be also made out can be quashed by this Court. While dealing with a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for an offence under Section 409 IPC in the matter of 'Madan Mohan Abbot