The main legal point established in the judgment is the need for a liberal approach in condonation of delay, while also emphasizing the requirement for a genuine and acceptable explanation for the delay.

Judgment

Mr. Sumeet Goel, J.

CRM-54546-2023

1. The present application has been filed on behalf of the applicant/petitioner-husband for condonation of 398 days delay in filing the accompanying revision petition. The main revision petition has been filed impugning the judgment dated 28.08.2022 passed by Learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Faridabad whereby the applicant-petitioner(herein) was directed to pay Rs.4,000/- per month to the wife and Rs.2,000/- per month to the son of the petitioner, from the date of filing of the petition before the Family Court.

2. Learned counsel for the applicant-petitioner, while seeking grant of prayer for condonation of delay of 398 days, has argued that the accompanying revision petition could not be filed in time as the petitioner (herein) was proceeded against ex-parte before the learned Family Court on 15.05.2022 & there was no timely intimation from his trial Court counsel in this regard. It has been further argued that when the petitioner (herein) inquired from the said trial Court lawyer about the status of case, it is then that the applicant-petitioner came to know that he had been proceeded against ex-parte on 10.05.2022 in the matter before trial Court and even the final judgment dated 28.08.2022 had been passed against the applicantpetitioner. Learned counsel for the applicant-petitioner has further argued that the circumstances of the case indicate that the delay in filing the revision petition is neither intentional nor deliberate & hence delay deserves to be condoned.

3. I have heard learned counsel for the applicant-petitioner and have perused the paper-book.

4. The prime issue for determination in the instant case is as to whether, the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act of 1963 filed by the applicant-petitioner seeking condonation of 398 days delay in filing the accompanying revision petition, deserves to be allowed. The analogous legal question that arises for consideration is as to what are the parameters for granting/allowing of an application seeking condonation of delay in terms of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Relevant Statutory Provisions

5. Section 5 of The Limitation Act, 1908 (hereinafter to be referred as ‘1908 Act’) reads as under:-

“5. Extension of period in certain cases. Any appeal or application for a revision or a review of judgment or for leave to appeal or any other application to which this section may be made applicable by or under any enactment for the time being in force may be admitted after the period of limitation prescribed therefor, when the appellant or applicant satisfied the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.

Explanation.--The fact that the appellant or applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period of limitation may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section.”

Section 5 of The Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter to be referred as ‘1963 Act’) reads as under:-

“5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases.- Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfied the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.

Explanation.- The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section.”

Relevant Case Law

6. The precedents, apropos to the matter(s) in issue, are as follows:

I. Re: Interest Reipublicae Ut Sit Finis Litimum

(i) The Hon’ble Supreme Court in a judgment in Civil Appeals No.4575-76 of 1998 titled