The 2010 Act confers absolute ownership rights to Dholidars after 20 years, overriding previous judgments that deemed a 99-year lease as permanent alienation.

JUDGMENT

Mr. Anil Kshetarpal, J.

In this regular second appeal, the correctness of the judgments and decrees passed by both the courts below is assailed by the defendants.

2. In order to comprehend the issue involved in the present case, the relevant facts, in brief, are required to be noticed.

3. In the column of ownership of the revenue record 'Shamlat Panna Bhima Sudhar' is recorded as the owner of the property. The plaintiff is a "Brahmin Priest. His father used to perform obsequies (funeral rites). He was granted "Dholi" rights by the proprietors of Panna Bhima Sudhar to cultivate 26 kanals land without the payment of any amount. The plaintiff (the son of original Dholidar) executed a registered lease deed for a period of 99 years on 03.04.1970, in favour of late Sh. Munna Lal, the predecessor-in- interest of defendants no.1 to 7 and defendant no.8.

4. On 29.04.1988, the plaintiff filed the suit for grant of decree of declaration that the aforesaid lease amounts to the permanent alienation of the property which is not permissible. It was also alleged that the lease deed was executed for a period of 17 years but due to misrepresentation the period of lease was described as 99 years.

5. Both the courts have held that the plaintiff failed to prove that the period of lease was 17 years, however, decreed the suit on the ground that such lease results in the permanent alienation of property which is not permissible.

6. As per the findings of fact arrived at by the courts below the execution of the lease deed on receipt of the amount has been proved. It has also come on record that the proprietors of Panna Bhima Sudhar filed a suit for the cancellation of the lease deed, however, the same was dismissed as withdrawn vide order Ex.D1, dated 21.05.1982, Ex.D5. The proprietors of Panna Bhima Sudhar also filed a suit for cancellation of "Dholi" rights against the plaintiff which was also withdrawn by them. In the meantime, the State of Haryana has notified the Haryana Dholidar, Butimar, Bhondedar and Muqararidar (Vesting of Property Rights) Act, 2010 (hereinafter referred to as 'the 2010 Act' ) conferring the absolute right of ownership in favour of such Dholidars.

7. Both the courts have held that "Dholi" tenure is a peculiar type of grant created in favour of an individual, who is rendering services to the village community. It is a grant in lieu of the services rendered to the residents of the village. The courts have relied upon the judgment passed by two Division Benches in Dharma v. Smt. Harbai, 1976 PLJ 617 and Sittal Dass and another v. Financial Commissioner Haryana and others, 1989 PLJ, 148, to hold that such permanent alienation of the property goes against the very concept of grant of Dholi.

8. This Bench has heard the learned counsel representing the parties at length and with their able assistance perused the paper book.

9. On the one hand the learned counsel representing the appellants submits that the judgment passed by the Division Bench in Dharma's case (supra) is based on a clear restriction on the rights of "Dholi" to keep the land as "Dholi" in Sharat Wajib-ul-arz . The Dholidar is forbidden from selling or mortgaging the land. In that context, the aforementioned judgment was delivered. He further relies upon the judgment passed in Rajwati and another v. Sukhi and others, 2018(3) PLR 137.

10. On the other hand, the learned counsel representing the respondents while heavily relying upon the Division Bench judgment passed in Dharma's case (supra) submits that the creation of the lease for a period of 99 years results in the permanent alienation of the land and as such it defeats the very purpose of 'Dholi'. He submits that the aforesaid alienation is prohibited, hence the courts have correctly decided the case.

11. In fact, this court in Rajwati and another's case(supra) considered the following two questions in detail:-

"(i) Whether a person who subsequently acquires absolute title can be permitted to challenge the